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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
17 January 1975

Text of Statement by Helms to Senators on C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16—Following is the text of a statement today by Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Central Intelligence:

Mr. Chairman:

We are here this morning for a straightforward purpose: To get at the facts bearing on the conduct of the Central Intelligence Agency in situations that have lately come under attack in certain quarters of the press and from some members of Congress.

All the members of this committee have devoted much, if not all, of their professional lives to the public service. I ask for the privilege to speak to you across the familiar ground of a shared experience. Before becoming an Ambassador, I spent 30 years in the intelligence service. For me and, I believe, for most of those who served with me in the Central Intelligence Agency, these were years of high meaning -- serious work in the American interest.

I was and remain proud of my work there, culminating in my six and a half years as director. I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the agency served. I still do: without regrets, without qualms, without apology.

If then a feeling of pride should hereafter pervade what I have to say about my direction of the agency and my exposition of its functions, I pray you will not interpret my attitude as self-serving. It is simply the way I feel about what I came to look upon not merely as a job, but rather as a calling—a profession, regulated as all professions are, by scruples, by honor, and by duty. In addition, the needs of the President were paramount, within the bounds of a statutory charter.

And if I should yield to indignation in my comments on the public turmoil that now surrounds the agency, it will be because I am indignant at the irresponsible attacks made upon the true ends of the intelligence function—attacks which, if suffered to pass unchallenged, could seriously damage the interests of the United States by impairing its ability to live safely in a world too much of which remains locked off in closed, fortress-like states.

The function—the work, that is—of the Central Intelligence Agency is well spelled out in the National Security Act of 1947, the same act that gave rise to the Defense Department as we know it today.

That law was passed after much debate. It has endured the test of time and nearly three decades of international turbulence.

Basically, the charge laid upon the agency—its controlling mission—is to collect, synthesize and evaluate information associated with foreign happenings that affect the national security. The finished product is passed directly to the President and the relatively few members of his staff who are responsible for the conduct of our foreign policy and national defense.

It so happens that the word "foreign" does not appear in the act. Yet there never has been any question about the intent of the Congress to confine the agency's intelligence function to foreign matters. All the directors from the start—and Mr. Colby is the eighth in the succession—have operated on the clear understanding that the agency's reason for being was to collect intelligence abroad. The boundary has always been plain to them and to their staffs.

Those of us who were in one or another of the national intelligence services during the second world war remember well that when General Donovan first put forward the concept of a peacetime intelligence service agency in 1944, the idea was attacked in the press as a device for fastening a Gestapo on the nation.

It was precisely for the purpose of banishing such fears, however groundless, that the language of the founding act specifies that the Central Intelligence Agency should have no police, law enforcement, or subpoena power, and no internal security function.

To my certain knowledge, all the Directors of Central Intelligence in their turn accepted the division of the foreign and domestic intelligence and security tasks as an absolute—a separation confirmed by the mandate of Congress. Our work lay in foreign fields.

So that there may be no misunderstanding, we all know that just as photographic satellites are launched from American soil, a considerable portion of our effort is based in this country. The agency is charged with collecting foreign intelligence domestically from United States citizens or residents traveling abroad.

Overseas activities may need a home base in this country and in any case are basically administered from headquarters in Virginia, where also are the bulk of our analytical and estimative personnel.

As I will describe in a minute, the interface with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is continuous and we have never in any way challenged their jurisdiction. And finally the Director of Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. But in all this the target remains abroad.

How then do we account for the phenomenon that finds an agency so chartered under a drum-fire of attack for allegedly engaging in domestic espionage and other illegal actions, in defiance of its statutory constraints?

There are, in my observation, two reasons for that.

One is that the American people in general and the press as an institution have traditionally been skeptical of any government operation that is carried on in secrecy, especially in peacetime.

That distrust is a healthy one and the intelligence services should accept such skepticism as an inescapable occupational hazard. They are themselves, after all, essentially reporting services. Whenever they fail to read the signs correctly, or whenever they are guilty of some misfeasance in the conduct of their business, the press has a right, indeed a duty, to take them to task.

Irresponsibility Alleged

This brings me to the second reason. The current attack aimed at the agency was in my opinion irresponsible.

The principal allegations remain unsupported, and, to the contrary, have been undermined by contrary evidence identified by the press itself. Yet these allegations, picked up and carried to the four corners of the earth, have brought undeserved embarrassment and humiliation to the patriotic and dedicated men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. And they seriously damage, at least temporarily, the function the agency is charged with performing in the national interest.

We in the intelligence community and the press in its world are both in the business of reporting information in the public interest. I say in all seriousness that for some of the press to pound the public with such a farrago of charges can only result in scarring the reputation of an arm of the government without serving a useful purpose.

I offer, if I may, another observation. It is that quite apart from the question of the motives that may or may not have fostered the attack on the agency, the press

plainly lacked a firm understanding of the practices and precepts of American intelligence.

I see now, in hindsight, a fairly urgent need for educating the press, and through the press the American people, in the not particularly arcane distinctions that exist in the intelligence community.

If my estimate is correct, it took the more responsible elements of the press a full fortnight to grasp what has actually gone on inside the different parts of that community. If this distinguished panel should agree with me that much of ruinous misunderstandings of these past weeks could have been avoided if only the intelligence function had been more widely understood, then perhaps you will find a way to make certain the confusion will not be repeated.

Two Parts of Budget

To begin with, there is the matter of straightening out the public conception of the various bodies that make up the intelligence community, the boundaries that separate them and the common concerns they share.

It is well known, to be sure, that our total Federal intelligence effort is both extensive and expensive. Not so well known is the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency's fraction of the total machinery, in terms of money,

The bulk of its budget is spent on the collection and assessment of information. In contrast, the counterintelligence side, the side that seems most to fascinate our critics, is small both in budget and in people. It has the highly professional job of detecting and countering foreign efforts to penetrate and subvert our institutions, and policies.

In this task the counterintelligence branch must by law and necessity work closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The F.B.I. handles the counterintelligence function inside our shores. The C.I.A. does the job abroad. Manifestly, since agents come and go, there has to be a continuous interchange of information between the two organizations, and an exchange of files as well.

Trust and confidence are the sovereign coinage in this work. One simply cannot pass such valuable people as identified foreign agents to and fro between the foreign and the home systems as the international and domestic air carriers do with their passengers. Our sources of intelligence would not last long if we were that indifferent.

I have a last point to make. In normal times few Ameri-

cans would ever come within the purview of our foreign intelligence operations. That happened only when evidence appeared of their involvement with subversive elements abroad.

Until the recent past, such involvements were rare occurrences. Then in the late 1950's and early 1960's came the sudden and quite dramatic upsurge of extreme radicalism in this country and abroad, an uprush of violence against authority and institution, and the advocacy of violent change in our system of government.

By and in itself, this violence, this dissent, this radicalism were of no direct concern to the Central Intelligence Agency. It became so only in the degree that the trouble was inspired by, or coordinated with, or funded by, anti-American subversion mechanisms abroad. In such event the C.I.A. had a real, a

clear and proper function to perform, but in collaboration with the F.B.I. the agency did perform that function in response to the express concern of the President. And information was indeed developed, largely by the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice, but also from foreign sources as well, that the agitation here did in fact have some overseas connections.

As the workload grew, a very small group within the already small counterintelligence staff was formed to analyze the information developed here and to give guidance to our facilities abroad. As you can see from the material furnished by the agency, the charter of this group was specifically restricted to the foreign field. How, then, is it possible to distort this effort into a picture of massive domestic spying?

Intelligence because he has no investigative power, he has no facilities for looking into who might have leaked what.

"And when classified papers disappear or stories appear in the The New York Times or whatever the case may be, all he can do is wring his hands and check around with other agencies of the government and so forth, but he has no way really to follow up. So he has a charge against him which he has an awful time trying to fulfill."

According to the recent declaration by Helms' successor, William E. Colby, the CIA did place surveillance on five Americans not affiliated with the intelligence agency. Among them, according to an independent source, were columnist Jack Anderson and his colleague Les Whitten, and Washington Post reporter Michael Getler. The surveillance was reportedly "fruitless."

When Helms testified in May, 1973, he described the agency's Office of Security as limited to personnel investigations, but restricted from investigating citizens not affiliated with the CIA.

"We don't have any arm of the agency to investigate in the U.S.," Helms testified. "We have a Security Office which goes around making personnel checks and things of this kind, but they are not authorized to go out and check up on newspapers or things of that kind, make that type of investigation. That is within the aegis of the police or the FBI or somebody of this kind."

Former Rep. William G. Bray, who was ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, suggested to Helms that legislation might be needed to extend the CIA's domestic authority though Bray, who was defeated last fall, conceded that in the Watergate atmosphere such a proposal would receive a great deal of suspicion.

"I agree," Helms replied. "Inside of the agency we can interrogate people, speak with them and do things of this kind with our own employees. But once we get outside of the agency, we may not do it."

Rep. Bob Wilson, another Republican on the subcommittee, asked Helms: "Are you permitted to call the FBI?"

"We can ask the FBI," Helms replied, "but when it comes to the investigation of leaks, the FBI is very reluctant to undertake those."

Contrary to Helms' description of the limited role of the CIA Office of Security, Colby has declared that this office was responsible for planting 10 agents inside dissident political organizations in the Washington area back in 1967, on the pretext of protecting CIA installations in the city.

In the course of his 1973 testimony, Helms made one other oblique assertion which appears to conflict with what the public now knows about CIA domestic activities. In discussing the Ellsberg case, Helms told the House members that his initial reaction to the White House request for assistance was that the

CIA had nothing to offer.

"We know nothing about the man," Helms said he responded. "There is no material in this agency on him. He never worked for us. We don't keep material on American citizens."

In his recent declaration, Colby acknowledged that the CIA does keep information on American citizens who are not affiliated with the agency—including a computer file on some 10,000 political dissenters.

Most of Helms' 1973 testimony was devoted to the CIA's entanglement with the Watergate scandal and his explanation of why the agency provided surveillance equipment to the White House "plumbers."

Helms explained that the agency director normally screens White House requests for their propriety, but assumes that the proposals are legal.

WASHINGTON POST
29 January 1975

New Conflict In Account by Helms Seen

By William Greider and George Lardner
Washington Post Staff Writers

Some months after the Central Intelligence Agency spied on Washington reporters in search of security leaks, the CIA's former director, Richard Helms, told a congressional subcommittee that the CIA has no authority to conduct such investigations.

The episode suggests another incident where testimony by Helms before various congressional hearings conflicts with recent disclosures on the CIA's domestic activities. Two weeks ago, the agency formally acknowledged that it placed five Americans—three of them later identified as reporters—under physical surveillance in 1971 and 1972 because they were suspected of obtaining classified information.

Yet Helms, when he appeared in private before the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence in May of 1973, insisted at length that the CIA doesn't conduct such investigations because it lacks the legal authority.

Helms, who is now U.S. ambassador to Iran, was CIA director from 1966 to 1973. His testimony before the House subcommittee, which remained secret until now, was apparently not taken under oath, according to the transcript made available to The Washington Post.

The subject of "leaks" came up in the hearing as Helms was discussing the White House concern in 1971 over the Pentagon Papers and its request for CIA help in constructing a "psychological profile" on Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the anti-war activist who released the papers. Helms told the subcommittee, whose chairman was Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), that, while the CIA is charged with the protection of "intelligence sources and methods," it has no capacity to track down such leaks.

"As a citizen who is no longer involved in the agency," Helms testified, "I think it would be well to look at that provision of the law as a charge against the Director of

WASHINGTON POST
28 January 1975

Franklin Lindsay

The Dangers of Damaging the CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency has had such a poor press over the past decade that it is inevitable, and probably a good thing, that a full investigation has been launched. CIA has been guilty of some embarrassing apparent failures and excesses, so its operations should be reviewed. But let us be careful we do not destroy the agency in the process: CIA is a delicate mechanism; those who tinker with it must do so with sophistication and perspective.

It is important at this moment that the public understand the very broad range of CIA's functions and the na-

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ture of its accomplishments in the post-war world. The United States needs the capabilities of intelligence today more than ever before. One example: without these capabilities, the SALT I arms control agreement with the Soviets would never have been possible.

It is helpful, also, to recall how the CIA came into being. It was established by Congress in 1947 in response to the threat of Stalinism, which was perceived to be bent on world revolution under Moscow rule. It was in this atmosphere that an urgent need was felt by the Truman administration to create an organization that could provide intelligence on Communist plans and capabilities and that could counter to some degree the massive political and subversive action programs supported by Moscow.

In the intervening quarter century, the nature of the threats and the problems they generate have changed. The organization and priorities of the CIA have changed correspondingly, although in some cases, not as fast as they should have. Today, by far the largest part of the budgets of CIA and the Defense Department's intelligence agencies are spent on collection of information by technical means, such as monitoring radio transmissions and seismic signals, and photography. And in the opinion of many intelligence experts, a very large part of the "value" of intelligence obtained comes from these sources. Indeed, these technical intelligence activities have been implicitly sanctioned by the two superpowers as the means each side will use to monitor the other's adherence to the agreed arms levels. Further, the SALT I agreement provides that neither nation will interfere in the operation of the other's "national means" for verification.

The CIA has also performed a valuable function in verifying the estimates of foreign military arms levels made by our own defense departments. This

has served to reduce the danger that a foreign arms build-up will be undetected or understated and equal danger that it will be overestimated and thus fuel a new round of arms procurement. If we know the strength of a potential adversary, we will not need to overbuild our own defenses as added protection against the uncertainty of what he might have.

The CIA analysts have performed similar functions in the political field, often with greater accuracy than others have shown. A leading French political analyst and commentator, Raymond Aron, has recently written about CIA's assessment of the efficacy of bombing in North Vietnam.

"Equally striking is the contrast between the accuracy of the analyses supplied by the intelligence services, especially the CIA, and frequent errors of the civilian advisers, especially the academics. The CIA had foreseen that the bombing would harden the North Vietnamese leaders' will and would not prevent infiltration, and that increased aid to the North would be the response to any reinforcement of the American forces. President Johnson, before starting the air strikes, had transmitted a threatening message, virtually an ultimatum, through the Canadian member of the International Control Commission. This attempt at "compellence" had met with an inflexible determination, which the intelligence experts, unlike the arm-chair theoreticians, had appraised at its true worth, and whose implications it had accurately predicted. Similarly, these experts had repeated over and over again to unheeding Presidents and their advisers that the roots of the war and the key to success — assuming there was a key — lay in the South, not the North, or in other words, that it was essential for the United States to establish a government in Saigon capable of winning popular support and installing in the South Vietnamese a will to independence against the Communist North."

There is a continuing place for both covert operations and secret intelligence activities, but they must be used carefully and only after the risks of exposure, especially of covert operations, are fully weighed. Clandestine activity is an instrument to be used by the President in carrying out his foreign policies, not an independent activity. I believe that CIA leadership has always accepted this concept and that covert activities have had advance approval from higher levels of government. The trouble is that the high level approving committee — presently called the 40 Committee — is made up of very busy government executives who simply do not have the time to assess in depth either the likelihood of exposure or its repercussions. I would suggest that a more effective way to apply the sort of mature judgment needed would be to create a review committee composed of men seasoned in foreign affairs who have reached a career position where they can put in the substan-

tial time necessary to think through the risks of covert operations and the possibility of accomplishing the same ends by overt means. Such a review committee would buttress and support the present highest level policy approving process. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which does not review individual operations in advance, cannot fulfill these particular functions. But it does provide a high level mechanism which can be used by him to assure himself that the supervision and control processes for the entire intelligence community are working properly. But it will need his active support if it is to be effective.

Another issue that has been raised is whether covert operations should be separated from CIA and placed in an independent organization. British experience, as well as our own, is that separation is both dangerous and impractical. The danger comes from the increased possibility that a foreign intelligence service can play one secret organization off against the other. The impracticality arises because a single foreign individual or group may simultaneously be a source of intelligence and a recipient of covert support.

Every intelligence organization must have a counterintelligence arm. Its function is to protect the organization from penetration by a foreign intelligence organization. To recognize the importance of this function, one needs only to remember that the Soviet intelligence service recruited the British intelligence officer, Kim Philby, before World War II and that until 1952 he regularly supplied the Soviets with secret documents of both the British and American governments. The counterintelligence organization exists to prevent such penetrations, to prevent other governments from knowing how we are getting our intelligence about them, and to prevent them from deliberately injecting false information into our own intelligence system. Counterintelligence is hard, painstaking work which involves piecing together thousands of bits of information about people, their backgrounds and with whom they are or have been associated. It is not easy to separate, between CIA and the FBI, the responsibility for understanding this watchdog program. If the CIA is tracking a foreign agent who then crosses into the United States — it is difficult to stop tracking and turn the whole thing over to the FBI. It is this borderline area where our government appears to have misstepped and is the prime subject of the new investigation of the CIA.

Emerging as still another new area of major concern, which will require CIA capabilities, is the threat of nuclear theft and blackmail by terrorist groups. Unlike governments that possess nuclear weapons, terrorist groups are less likely to be deterred by the threat of nuclear, or non-nuclear, retaliation. Where and who would one hit in retaliation? Secret intelligence and counterintelligence of a high order seems to be the only way to forestall

or cope with such potential terrorist activities as nuclear hijacking or diversion of nuclear materials we have provided other nations for power reactors. This too can lead into borderline areas which demand a high awareness of appropriate and inappropriate action.

The United States needs an intelligence organization; it needs highly motivated people who have within themselves the "ethical compass" to know when ends don't justify means, but it also needs mature and uninvolved people

to review its operations and to provide a second line of defense against the temptation to use covert funds and people in ways harmful to the long-run interests of the United States.

In light of the Watergate scandals, restoration of public confidence in the CIA is essential. Only a thoughtful, full investigation will accomplish this. But for the sake of the country's stability in this period of worldwide nervousness, let us not cut down the tree in order to prune out a few dead branches.

WASHINGTON POST
28 January 1975

Senate Creates Panel to Probe CIA, FBI Roles

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

A comprehensive investigation of alleged illegal spying on civilians and related abuses of power by the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI and other government agencies was authorized by an 82-to-4 vote of the Senate yesterday.

The vote created an 11-member committee with a \$750,000 budget to undertake the probe, and majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) immediately named Frank Church (D-Idaho), Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.) and freshmen Robert Morgan (D-N.C.) and Gary Hart (D-Colo.) as the six Democratic members.

Church is expected to be chosen chairman when the Democratic members meet today to begin organizing. Hart of Michigan told newsmen that he would nominate Church, a senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee who has won plaudits for his handling of the subcommittee investigating multinational corporations.

The GOP members, named by Minority Leader Hugh Scott (Pa.), are John Tower (Texas), who is expected to be selected vice chairman by the Republicans on the committee, Barry M. Goldwater (Ariz.), Howard H. Baker (Tenn.), Richard S. Schweiker (Pa.), and Maryland's Charles McC. Mathias Jr., who has long pressed for an investigation of the type authorized yesterday.

Creation of the select committee, which will have full subpoena powers and authority from the Senate to obtain all records and documents it wishes, was spurred by newspaper reports that the CIA had been spying on civilians in the United States although its charter is limited to work overseas, that the FBI had collected derogatory information

on members of Congress, and that the rooms of some delegates to the 1964 Democratic National Convention had been "bugged" by government eavesdroppers.

The composition of the committee seems to assure that the investigation won't end up a whitewash, as some had feared. Although Tower and Goldwater have always been considered close friends of the defense and national security establishment, a majority of the 11 members have been highly critical of the security apparatus at one time or another.

Baker hinted in a floor speech that he might want to hear from former President Nixon. "I think one of the major undertakings of the committee ought to be to call up the last surviving President to determine if the President of the United States knows what is going on," Baker said.

On the other side of Capitol Hill, the House has been considering creating a special or select committee of its own to undertake a similar investigation, but hasn't yet taken action.

Mansfield, before announcing the names of the six Democratic members, told the Senate, "There can be no whitewash in this inquiry nor is there room for a vendetta" against the CIA or FBI. He said he wants "no Roman circus or television spectacular." As it became clear on the

floor that the resolution would pass overwhelmingly, Mansfield scribbled the names of the six Democrats, which he had refused to disclose earlier, then announced them as the vote ended.

Church, in an interview after the vote, said, "I think every effort should be made to avoid leaks," adding, "I would not see this inquiry as any type of television extravaganza. It's much too serious to be a sideshow."

Church said the keynotes should be to "safeguard the legitimate security interests of the country" while uncovering abuses of power and finding ways to forestall future abuses. "lest we slip into the practices of a police state." He added, "I see no threat to the CIA, only an effort to see whether agencies are adhering strictly to the law."

During his probe of multinational corporations, he said, "I myself was a critic of the involvement of CIA in Chile, because it seemed to me we had no business interfering with a government that had been freely elected in Chile."

Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), who guided the resolution creating the committee to floor passage yesterday, told the Senate "The FBI, and CIA, military intelligence are absolutely necessary to the security and survival of this great country" and there isn't any intention "to disrupt or to injure these fine agencies," only to root out abuses. "There have been some very serious abuses," he added.

In creating the select committee, the Senate in effect made clear that it didn't want old-line pro-military committees like Armed Services and Appropriations to handle the investigation. Armed Services Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) had indicated previously that he felt rebuffed and angry, but he voted in favor yesterday after obtaining approval of a floor amendment requiring the new committee to establish written rules to prevent leaks of intelligence.

Tower won voice vote approval of an amendment requiring security clearances for committee employees having access to classified information, but only after Pastore, in a colloquy with Alan Cranston

(D-Calif.) and Mansfield, made clear that the committee, and not the executive branch, will decide whether an employee receives a clearance.

The Senate investigation will cover the CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, Secret Service, Treasury, Justice Department, State Department and a half dozen other intelligence-gathering units—"any agency" carrying on intelligence functions.

Church, sometimes mentioned as a presidential hopeful, told reporters, "I certainly don't intend to mix my activities on this committee with any type of presidential campaign."

The four senators who voted against creating the committee yesterday were William L. Scott (R-Va.), Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.).

In the New Executive Office Building, meanwhile, the presidential commission investigating the CIA held its third full day of closed hearings. One witness was Richard Ober, a National Security Council Aide who formerly worked in the CIA counterintelligence division, which conducted some of the controversial domestic surveillance.

Vice President Rockefeller, chairman of the eight-member commission, declined to disclose any of the substance of the testimony from Ober and CIA Director William E. Colby, who reappeared before the commission yesterday. All but one commission member, former Gov. Ronald Reagan, of California, attended. It was Reagan's second absence.

WASHINGTON POST
20 January 1975

CIA Domestic Spies Spoofer in Pravda

MOSCOW, Jan. 19 (UPI) — The Communist Party newspaper Pravda printed a cartoon today spoofing the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The cartoon showed black-coated agents, forming the Russian initials for CIA, watching two men. The agents had a camera, carphones and a telescope.

Two other men are in the foreground with a newspaper reporting allegations of CIA domestic spying.

One says to the other: "Oh, them—they are CIA agents spying on members of the commission which is investigating CIA activities."

WASHINGTON STAR
22 January 1975

The CIA's Case

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William E. Colby, has made a persuasive rebuttal to charges that the agency engaged in "massive illegal domestic intelligence operations." Unless Colby is hiding something — and there is no reason to believe he is — the most the CIA can be accused of is that it strayed somewhat beyond the bounds of its charter.

The heart of the so-called expose of "massive illegal" operations involves the compilation of files on 10,000 citizens involved in or somehow connected with dissident activities and civil disorders that swept the country during the years of protest against the war in Vietnam. Colby's explanation as to how and why these files were kept is too detailed to set forth here, but reasonable people reading his Thursday statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee could hardly draw the conclusion that the CIA is some kind of an internal gestapo.

It is evident that the CIA activity in regard to the dissidents was carried out with full knowledge, even at the instigation, of the White House and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has responsibility for domestic intelligence gathering relating to the national security. The purpose, according to Colby, was to determine whether foreign stimulus or support was being provided to the dissident activity.

Colby flatly denied the charge that,

an anti-war congressman, or any other congressman for that matter, was placed under surveillance. As to "break-ins" in this country, Colby listed three and said they involved premises related to agency employees or former employees whose activities involved questions of national security.

On wiretapping charges, the director listed 21 taps between 1951 and 1965, involving 19 agency employees or former employees and two other citizens thought to be receiving sensitive intelligence information. One CIA employee was wiretapped after 1965 and that was done with approval of the attorney general.

Physical surveillance of citizens within the United States was rare, Colby said, and was done only when there was reason to believe those being shadowed might be passing information to hostile intelligence services. Colby acknowledged several instances when mail was inspected but said the primary purpose was to identify persons in correspondence with Communist countries for presumed counterintelligence purposes.

Aside from providing some equipment to one of the Watergate figures, —Howard Hunt — and preparing a psychological assessment on Daniel Ellsberg, Colby denied any CIA involvement in Watergate.

The activities outlined by Colby do

not add up to "massive illegal domestic intelligence operations" to us. It does appear that CIA was involved to some extent in domestic intelligence gathering that should have been left to the FBI. It also is evident, as Colby suggested, that the legislation establishing the CIA needs to be amended to make it more clear where foreign intelligence gathering ends and domestic intelligence begins.

But if there is nothing more to the "expose" than has been detailed by Colby, it seems to us that the CIA has been dealt an unjust blow. Further investigation by appropriate authorities certainly is not out of order, but the investigators ought to be careful that the CIA's ability to carry on its vital national security functions is not further impaired.

There is nothing particularly wrong with the Senate's decision to appoint a special committee to look into the CIA, as well as into the intelligence gathering operations of other government agencies. President Ford's overloading of his "blue-ribbon" panel with persons friendly to the CIA made it inevitable that Congress would make its own probe. The House probably won't want to be left out, so it is likely that another investigation will be started on that side of Capitol Hill. The danger is that the whole thing could turn into a three-ring circus more damaging than enlightening.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 JAN 1975

Ex-Employee Doubts CIA Probe Sincerity

BY KENNETH REICH
Times Political Writer

SAN DIEGO—A former Central Intelligence Agency employee who told 10 days ago of being aware of CIA mail surveillance of American citizens in 1958-59 is now charging here that the commission President Ford appointed to look into such allegations isn't really interested in doing so.

Dr. Mel Crain, a 53-year-old San Diego State University political science professor, said in an interview that since he detailed the alleged illegal surveillance he has heard from congressional investigators but not from the staff of the commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

"My impression of this commission is that it's trying to protect the agency," Crain said. "That's essentially what they're up to. I don't think they really want to delve."

In Washington, D.C., Friday, a commission spokesman replied, "Don't lean on us too hard." He said the commission staff is just getting organized and that it is the commission's intention "to at least contact everyone who can contribute to the investigation."

Accounts of interviews with Crain have run in recent days at length in such prominent newspapers as the New York Times, and partial confirmation of what he had to say has come from his immediate supervisor at the CIA in the late 1950s, Richard M. Bissell, then deputy director of

the CIA's office of plans.

Essentially, what Crain has said is that he received a high security clearance in the fall of 1958 that made him aware that the Post Office Department was covertly assisting the CIA to intercept and copy letters American citizens were sending to the Soviet Union.

He reports that the briefing officer who gave him his initial information about the surveillance "said right out, 'this is unconstitutional and illegal, but remember, we're in the Cold War and our mission demands it.'"

Crain said that his objections to the surveillance "hastened" his departure from the CIA, via resignation, in June, 1959, after eight years with the agency.

Although the professor said he has long routinely told his students that the CIA spied on American citizens, the first time such reports sparked any interest came in the wake of recent published reports about alleged wide-ranging CIA domestic surveillance in violation of the agency's charter.

Then, Crain was approached and granted an interview to a San Diego Union reporter.

Crain acknowledged in a Thursday afternoon Times interview that he is violating written agreements he made with the CIA not to reveal anything publicly about his work with the agency and he said he believed that technically he is in violation of the law for doing so.

But he said he believes a thorough airing of allegedly illegal CIA activities is in order.

Crain said that even before the alleged mail surveillance alarmed him, he had become concerned at the increasing concentration inside the CIA on clandestine operations, some of which he described as "just crazy."

WASHINGTON STAR
29 January 1975

James J. Kilpatrick:

An S.O.S. for the CIA

One of the wisest heads in the Senate rests upon the aging shoulders of John Stennis of Mississippi. Last week the rampaging Jacobins whacked it off: They shouted down his effort to direct a responsible investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We are therefore likely to have an irresponsible investigation instead. On both sides of Capitol Hill the tumbrels are rolling. In the House it was Bastille Day for the seniority system. We are in for a bloody time. Unless the revolutionary fervor can be calmed, the CIA will become the first victim of the new inquisitors.

The peril to the CIA is both real and immediate. The most liberal Democrats in the Senate, known for their animosity to the agency, are shouting for a chance to sit on a select committee of accusation. In post-Watergate Washington, where the guilt of public officials is simply assumed, the CIA finds itself convicted overnight of "massive illegalities." That was the charge brought by the

New York Times in an overblown story on Dec. 22.

CIA Director William E. Colby did his best last week to wet down the flames. He delivered a long and remarkably candid statement to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee. He flatly denied the substance of the Times' allegations, but he acknowledged that a few errors of misjudgment and overzealousness had occurred. "Colby Admits CIA Spying in U.S.," read the banner headline in the Washington Post.

The headline was recklessly misleading. What Colby "admitted" was that, commencing in the summer of 1967, the CIA had established a unit "to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dissident elements." Such an investigation is plainly within the CIA's field of responsibility. Before the investigation was ended in 1973, Colby said, "files" had indeed been created on about 10,000 citizens — but he patiently explained that these were not files or dossiers as the terms generally are employed.

One by one, Colby took up

most of the specific charges brought by the Times — charges of breaking-in, wire-tapping, opening mail and physical surveillance — and reduced a mountain of innuendo to a molehill of fact. Without significant exception, the incidents were wholly defensible in terms of the CIA's obligations under the law. It is high time for senior members of Congress publicly to suggest that Colby's credibility is at least as solid as the credibility of the New York Times.

But the fever rages. Under a little-noticed amendment to last year's Foreign Assistance Act, the CIA now is required to advise the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of its covert operations abroad. The requirement is pure mischief. These are cheesecloth committees; they are certain to leak. The CIA also will have to send its top people to testify before the various investigating bodies. Transcripts will be made of their testimony, and these transcripts will provide an

irresistible temptation to garrulous congressmen, unscrupulous aides and rapacious reporters.

In his statement, Colby said the agency has worked out "cover" arrangements with various corporations "to provide the ostensible source of income and rationale for a CIA officer to reside and work in a foreign country." What is Colby to say if one of his congressional tormentors demands to know more about these corporations? He can only refuse to answer and risk contempt.

No intelligence agency can operate in the sunshine of total disclosure; its sources will evaporate; friendly governments will refuse their cooperation. Two former CIA agents already have done great harm by writing turncoat books. A hundred irresponsible congressmen could well complete the destructive work. It can't be permitted to happen, but unless a few prudent men ride to the CIA's rescue, it will happen.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 20, 1975

CIA Inquiry Focuses on White House

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

The preliminary, secret testimony in the CIA investigation has focused on the White House itself.

Former CIA chief Richard Helms, according to sources close to the investigation, testified behind closed doors that he had been pressured by both Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to spy on Vietnam war protesters.

As far back as 1967, Helms alleged, Johnson began badgering him to investigate any connection between the protest movement and foreign enemies.

Both Johnson and Nixon suspected that the Communists were pumping money into the antiwar movement. However, Helms reported that the CIA found no significant foreign influence.

Some radical groups, such as the Black Panthers and the Weathermen, had foreign contacts. But the student opposition to the war effort was largely an American phenomenon, said Helms.

His secret testimony was taken by the President's com-

mission to investigate the Central Intelligence Agency. Other witnesses confirmed that the CIA files on American citizens largely grew out of the Johnson-Nixon concern over the antiwar agitation.

At first, the Secret Service began investigating every group, no matter how innocent, that expressed the slightest criticism of the President. The Nonviolent Direct Action group came under surveillance, as a typical example, because it "urged members to write Pres. and other govt. officials to protest war in Vietnam," according to confidential Secret Service records.

By late 1970, the Secret Service developed a computer network, which now contains more than 180,000 names of Americans. Other government agencies also began trading information. Files began to grow on tens of thousands of citizens who were guilty of nothing more serious than shooting off their mouths against the President's policies.

Dozens of celebrities wound up in the files, including comedians Dick Gregory, Groucho Marx and Tony Randall; actors Marlon Brando, Paul Newman

and Rock Hudson; actor-producer Carl Reiner; conservative news commentator Paul Harvey; and folk singer Joan Baez.

The CIA, of course, got caught up in the hysteria. There were times when the CIA overstepped its legal limits and conducted domestic surveillance. It became increasingly difficult to draw the line between legitimate security and political security.

This was the atmosphere in the backrooms of the CIA when the Watergate caper began. The CIA didn't balk, therefore, at furnishing E. Howard Hunt with a reddish wig, glasses, a speech alteration device, a set of alias documents, a tape recorder concealed in a portable typewriter case, two microphones and a camera disguised in a tobacco pouch.

Hunt used this James Bond paraphernalia to carry out his Watergate assignments. The CIA has insisted in secret statements that it had no knowledge of Hunt's Watergate role. The supply officer, Cleo Gephart, has sworn that he thought Hunt was a member of the CIA's Domestic Contact Service.

This is the branch that inter-

views U.S. travelers who might pick up interesting information abroad. Gephart didn't explain why Hunt would need a fancy disguise if he were merely conducting routine interviews.

It is also interesting that the CIA converted the Domestic Contact Service from a routine intelligence operation to a clandestine service in 1973. This was done ostensibly for budgetary reasons. But once the unit became a clandestine service, the CIA was no longer obligated to give Congress a detailed account of its activities.

In fairness, it should be added that Helms resisted most of the pressure from the White House to go beyond his legal authority.

WASHINGTON POST
29 January 1975

CIA Head Vows Aid: Church

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chosen yesterday as chairman of the Senate committee to investigate alleged intelligence agency abuses, said he had received a phone call from CIA Director William Colby pledging cooperation with the committee inquiry.

Church was elected unanimously by the committee's six Democrats at a closed organizational meeting yesterday. The five Republican members are expected to choose John G. Tower of Texas as committee vice chairman.

Church said the Democratic members discussed immediate steps needed to obtain a staff director and general counsel, and agreed that strict secrecy must be maintained over national security secrets.

He dodged a question on whether former President Nixon would be called before the committee. "It is much too early to tell which witnesses will be called," he said.

He again pledged that "we are not going to conduct a vendetta" against the CIA, FBI or any of the other intelligence agencies whose alleged abuses of power and illegal spying on civilians the new committee will investigate, "but neither will there be a whitewash."

Church said that on Monday, just after the Senate voted 82 to 4 to create the new committee and Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) announced the names of the Democratic members, he received a phone call from Colby promising to give full cooperation to the committee in its inquiry into the CIA.

Such cooperation—as well as preservation of all documents relevant to the inquiry—was formally requested of Colby, the Justice Department, the FBI, the Pentagon, the Treasury and several other government agencies in letters sent out by Mansfield as majority leader. They had the agencies to preserve all memos, records and other documents that might be needed.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 JANUARY 1975

The Secret Committee Called '40'

By DAVID WISE

WASHINGTON—When it was disclosed last September that the Central Intelligence Agency had spent \$8-million to "destabilize" the Government of Chile under Salvador Allende, President Ford confirmed at a press conference that the United States does take "certain actions in the intelligence field." Mr. Ford added: "The 40 Committee . . . reviews every covert operation undertaken by our Government."

It was an extraordinary public reference by a Chief Executive to one of the least-known, most shadowy and potentially most powerful committees of the Government. At least in theory, the 40 Committee must approve in advance before the C.I.A. can invade Cuba, overthrow a government in Guatemala, or dispatch B-26 aircraft to bomb Indonesia.

But there has been no indication that the 40 Committee has the responsibility to review any domestic covert operations by the C.I.A. itself, of the kind now being investigated—since the intelligence agency has claimed it does not engage in such activities at home. For example, when Senator Symington asked Mr. Colby in 1973 whether the 40 Committee in any way dealt with intelligence "targeted at U.S. citizens" the C.I.A. director replied, "No, the function of the Agency is foreign intelligence."

The operations of the 40 Committee are so secret that in his Senate testimony in 1973, Mr. Colby was reluctant even to identify the chairman, who, as it turned out, was a well-known public figure:

Senator Symington: "Very well. What is the name of the latest committee of this character?"

Mr. Colby: "Forty Committee."

Senator Symington: "Who is the chairman?"

Mr. Colby: "Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive session on the description of the Forty Committee, Mr. Chairman."

Senator Symington (incredulous): "As to who is the chairman, you would prefer an executive session?"

Mr. Colby: "The chairman, all right, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is the chairman as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."

Defenders and Critics

The other members of the 40 Committee, in addition to Henry Kissinger, are Air Force General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; William P. Clements, Jr., the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State

for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Colby. Although the individuals serving on the 40 Committee have changed with administrations, the committee has usually consisted of the Government officials holding these five positions.

The committee has changed its name several times. President Ford said the 40 Committee was established "in 1948"; as far as is publicly known, however, no committee to monitor covert operations achieved formal status until the first Eisenhower Administration, when the Special Group was created for that purpose. The panel was also known as the 54/12 Group, after the number of the National Security Council directive establishing it. By the Johnson Administration the Special Group was known as the 303 Committee, and under Presidents Nixon and Ford as the 40 Committee. Apparently both of the latter designations were also taken from the numbers of classified directives.

Defenders of the C.I.A. and of the necessity for "black," or covert, operations point to the 40 Committee as a mechanism of tight control over such activities. Because of the panel's existence, they maintain, the C.I.A. is restrained from undertaking any covert operations without the approval of high officials accountable to the President.

But critics of the intelligence agency note that the director of C.I.A. is a member of the committee; they cite the analogy of the fox watching the chicken coop. Then, too, all of the members are busy officials with many other Government responsibilities; thus, as members of the 40 Committee, they must necessarily give less than full-time attention to the risks or benefits of a particular operation.

Insulating the President

Senator William Proxmire, a critic of the C.I.A., has said: "It is presumed but never stated that major decisions of the 40 Committee are then checked with the President. The reason for the lack of substantiation of this latter point is clear. The President is insulated from any direct association [with] such illegal activities so that in time of crisis, such as a 'blown'—exposed—mission, he can deny knowledge of the entire affair."

Because the 40 Committee operates in great secrecy, it is difficult to assess how well it performs its job. Nor is it known how large a covert operation must be presented to the 40 Committee for approval. For example, it has been reported that in 1970 the committee authorized, but perhaps later disapproved, the payment of \$350,000 to members of the Chilean Congress, in an attempt to block the election of President Allende. Whether the committee would be asked to approve the payment of, say, \$500 to a political official in Kuwait is doubtful.

During the Nixon Administration, Attorney General John N. Mitchell sat as a member of the 40 Committee, although his successors have not. Earlier this month, Mr. Mitchell was convicted of conspiracy to cover up a domestic covert operation, the Watergate break-in, undertaken in part by former C.I.A. agents.

David Wise is the author of "The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy and Power."

WASHINGTON POST

11 JAN 1975

CIA Views

The Washington Post of Jan. 8 contains a column by Tad Szulc attributing certain views to the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed in that article are not the views of the Central Intelligence Agency.

W. E. Colby,

Director Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 11, 1975

Is a whitewash of the CIA in the making?

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT IN THE UNITED STATES

There was a time, not so long ago in American history, when the appointment by the president of a "blue-ribbon commission" to investigate and resolve a matter of public controversy, was enough to calm passions and instill confidence in the federal government's ability to solve basic national problems. The main criteria seemed to be only that the commission's members must be eminent and respected in the appropriate circles, that they hold hearings at which people could let off steam and that their report be sufficiently lengthy as to seem to cover all bases. The device was used, admittedly with varying degrees of success, to study unrest among university students, the crime wave, the use of marijuana and narcotics and, most notably, the assassination of President John Kennedy. Even when the commission reports did not answer all of the bothersome questions or when a president rejected the findings because he did not agree with them, there was generally a feeling of satisfaction that the issues had been aired, and the passage of time and pressure of new crises had usually caused the original controversy to cool.

Perhaps that is what President Ford hoped for when he named Vice President Rockefeller and seven other prominent men to investigate allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency, in violation of its legal mandate, had engaged in widespread domestic spying operations. But times have changed. Confidence in government is at an all-time low and the instinct in the post-Watergate era is to suspect a cover-up when an investigation is launched.

It was little surprise, then, that the appointment of the commission to study the CIA was greeted with cries of "whitewash". Although much was made by the White House of the fact that none of the members had any prior connection with the CIA, sceptical members of Congress immediately complained that the group was stacked in the agency's favour. Mr Rockefeller himself, as governor of New York state and as a private citizen, had sat since 1969 on the president's foreign intelligence advisory board. Mr Douglas Dillon, as under-secretary of state during the Eisenhower Administration, had been exposed to intelligence matters and possibly participated in the attempt to conceal the facts about American U2 spy flights over the Soviet Union. Mr Erwin Griswold, as solicitor general during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, had argued strenuously before the Supreme Court that domestic surveillance of civilian activity by the military was not illegal.

Mr Lyman Lemnitzer was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff during the Kennedy Administration, and Mr Ronald Reagan, whose second term as governor of California ended this week,

is regarded as one of the most strident conservatives on the political scene. Mr Lane Kirkland, at 52 the commission's youngest member, has worked with the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations since 1948, including the period when the AFL-CIO played an important part in the cold war. There were suspicions that the whole scheme had been cooked up over Christmas by Mr Rockefeller and the Secretary of State, Mr Henry Kissinger, who holidayed together in Puerto Rico with their wives.

The naming of the presidential commission seemed only to reinforce the desire of Congress to mount its own investigations into the CIA affair. One of those inquiries, to be led by Mr John Stennis, a senator from Mississippi who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee and Central Intelligence subcommittee, promises to be rather gentle. But in the House of Representatives Mr Lucien Nedzi, a Michigan member who chairs the Intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services committee, was talking about a tougher look at the CIA. Some congressional leaders would prefer a special joint committee of the two houses. Whatever is decided, Congress is anything but fast-moving and the President seemed to ensure that the first word would come from within the executive branch, by giving his commission a deadline of April 4th for its report.

Scheduled as the lead-off witness when the commission convenes on Monday is Mr William Colby, the director of Central Intelligence. He has already submitted a confidential report to Mr Ford which apparently confirms much of the substance of the allegations about the CIA. Those allegations, begun in the New York Times on December 22nd, are that the agency conducted a major programme of intelligence operations against the anti-Vietnam war movement and other dissident groups within the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s; that it used electronic surveillance, burglaries and the surreptitious inspection of letters as part of these operations; and that it maintained dossiers on thousands of Americans. The commission will surely want to explore with Mr Colby the contrast between his report and the statement by Mr Richard Helms, director of the CIA during many of the years in question (1966-73) and now American ambassador to Iran, that the agency did no illegal domestic work while he was in charge.

The existence of the agency's domestic operations division has been known at least since 1967, when its establishment (in the early 1960s) was discussed in a book called "The Espionage Establishment" (see page 87 for a new book on the CIA). The continuing



LADY, THE CIA HAS TO STAY IN PRACTICE BETWEEN FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS.

reports in the New York Times, written by Mr Seymour Hersh, the investigative reporter who earlier exposed the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam, have been sufficiently specific to dispel initial suggestions that perhaps the CIA had largely been collating material provided to it by other agencies. One article, based on an interview with an anonymous former CIA agent who worked in New York city, indicated that the agency had actually used false identity papers and undercover roles to infiltrate groups of dissenters and report on them. The departure from the CIA of Mr James Angleton, the long-time chief of the agency's counterintelligence operations—which apparently supervised the domestic activities—and three of his aides seems to confirm that a shake-up is under way.

But the issue of legality obviously lies at the heart of the furor. The national security act of 1947, which established the CIA, sounds unequivocal in its statement that "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions". Nonetheless, the CIA has long maintained offices in major American cities, ostensibly for the convenience of work within the United States which is related to "foreign intelligence sources"; how and where to draw the line between that work and the counterintelligence and internal security functions reserved to the Federal Bureau of Investigation is one of the problems. Officials from both the CIA and FBI long tried to establish that the protest movement of the 1960s was financed, or at least influenced, from abroad.

One thing the President's commission and other investigators may discover is that there are secret documents and agreements perhaps never seen by Congress, which elaborate on the legitimate boundaries of CIA activity. The question of legality will become even more difficult to deal with if it is discovered that some of those documents were signed by a president, or if it is claimed by the CIA that it was operating on the basis of other presidential authority, written or oral.

The story being pushed by the CIA, and concurred in by some former FBI officials, is that the agency was forced into domestic operations because the

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

29 January 1975

Probing the CIA—credibly

FBI, under its late director, J. Edgar Hoover, simply was not doing its job. The contention is that Hoover did not follow up on critical leads provided by the CIA and that at one point the stubborn FBI director, fearing the kind of criticism he so often attracted, ordered his agents not to follow suspected spies to the grounds of the United States Capitol; as a result, Capitol Hill supposedly became a favourite meeting place for foreign operatives. It is well known that Hoover never liked the CIA and opposed its creation after the second world war in any form other than as a subdivision of the FBI. Shortly before his death in 1972, infuriated by the CIA's handling of an FBI informant in Denver, Colorado, among other matters, he went so far as to forbid the normal co-operation between FBI and CIA agents (an order which, naturally enough, was often ignored in the field).

The peculiar chemistry of the latest controversy over the CIA seems to guarantee that it will continue for some time. While many people were prepared to forgive other recent agency sins—covert CIA involvement in the weakening and overthrow of the Allende government in Chile; its attempts to prevent publication of a book about it by Mr Victor Marchetti, a former agency official; and the extraordinary CIA collusion with the Watergate burglars—this one hits closer to home. If anything, it may revive the other issues. Mr Howard Baker, the Republican from Tennessee who sat on the Senate Watergate committee, has already asked for a reopening of the investigation into whether the CIA participated in the Watergate burglary and the subsequent cover-up.

Senator John Sparkman, the Democrat who is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has warned Mr Colby that the CIA must obey a little-noticed amendment passed last year which requires the agency to cut off any foreign operations not strictly related to intelligence-gathering or else provide full details about them to Congress. The deputy attorney general, Mr Laurence Silberman, a Republican, has the criminal and civil rights divisions of the Justice Department checking to see if the CIA or its officials violated anyone's civil rights or otherwise broke the law during the domestic intelligence operations. The outrage is bipartisan. The American public does not seem in a mood to be watched over extensively by a government it does not trust.

The Senate has moved to make its special probe of government intelligence activities not only thorough and fair but responsive to two other concerns: that it not turn into either political grandstanding or trial by news leak.

The investigation's credibility will depend on maintaining these standards.

No one would predict a white-wash with CIA critic Frank Church expected to be at the helm. The range of attitudes on the committee tilts toward the moderate or liberal side. But there is conservative balance in vice-chairman Tower and Senator Goldwater, both representing an Armed Services Committee view sympathetic to the CIA.

Political self-promotion on the brink of 1976 ought to be reduced by the promises of no "television extravaganza." And there have been pledges from both parties against unauthorized leaks.

The temptation toward leaks will be minimized if reporters and sources are convinced that the public is receiving all the information it should have without cover-up. Careful measures to protect legitimate uses of secrecy should be part of all the current investigations even as they seek to expose secret illegalities.

Meanwhile, with his open leaks to the media from the top of the CIA investigating commission, Vice-President Rockefeller may be forestalling hidden leaks from the bottom.

Last week he rightly said it would be inappropriate for him as chairman of the commission to predict its findings. Then he went on to say that "so far" the commission's impression was that the

CIA had not indulged in massive illegal domestic spying.

This week he spoke further:

"Now, the question is, to our commission, have there been violations or abuses of the statutes relating to the activities of the CIA in the United States? That's a limited field. Those we will determine."

"And I think we are going to find the answer is yes. And what we want to do is: Where were they, how extensive, and who authorized it? And was this a direct presidential or Attorney General order? And what were the reasons for it?"

If the commission thoroughly answers these questions it can dispel the doubts attached to its objectivity by reason of several members' previous relationship to the intelligence community.

Coincidental with Mr. Rockefeller's remarks were disclosures that a Senate subcommittee had documents indicating that names in CIA files were among those investigated by a political intelligence operation of the Internal Revenue Service.

Clearly the mounting questions confirm the importance of effective congressional overseeing of all intelligence activities. Mr. Rockefeller, as a target of leaks during his vice-presidential confirmation process, noted the problem of providing Congress with secret information. But he also cited the congressional maintenance of secrecy on atomic information. And he provided necessary encouragement and challenge when he suggested that congressional overseers can protect secrets and prevent leaks "if they are determined to do it."

NEW YORK TIMES

12 JAN 1975

Justice and the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

The great brouhaha about whether the C.I.A. exceeded its authority in conducting domestic surveillance. (in final analysis, it is simply a jurisdictional dispute in which the F.B.I., whose jurisdiction was infringed, isn't even complaining) has some interesting ramifications.

That the C.I.A. is precluded by law from carrying on domestic operations is a consequence of the expectation, indeed the certainty, that it would conduct its activities in a manner violative of the U.S. Constitution. Such was the intention. Our Government

must not, as a matter of policy, violate the law at home; what we do in someone else's home is another matter.

Until we are prepared to accord to the world at large the same standards of justice that we apply to ourselves, we cannot but be regarded, at best, as hypocrites, at worst, as outlaws by the rest of the world's peoples. Justice for ourselves is predicated upon the belief that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . ." The C.I.A. as conceived and organized under its present charter simply confutes that premise. MALCOLM MONROE
White Plains, Jan. 2, 1975

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 19, 1975

Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Secret Security Unit Avoided Written Reports

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 18 — Former high-level members of the Central Intelligence Agency have said in interviews that, to their knowledge, the agency's supersecret Counterintelligence Division never made written reports on its sensitive activities to Richard Helms or other top agency officials.

In a series of recent telephone interviews, the former C.I.A. men, including some who had access to details of the agency's covert operations, said that James J. Angleton and his key deputy in the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence unit, Richard Ober, were believed to have made oral reports to Mr. Helms, who headed the C.I.A. from 1966 to 1973 and is now the Ambassador to Iran.

A former C.I.A. undercover agent, who said that he participated in domestic break-ins and wiretaps while monitoring radicals in New York City in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies, said he never received advance written approval nor did he ever file subsequent written reports on the sensitive missions.

Colby's Account Questioned

These and the other former C.I.A. men who were interviewed all questioned whether the C.I.A. report on domestic spying made available this week was, in fact, an accurate accounting of what went on.

In his 45-page statement made public Wednesday, William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, acknowledged that the agency had initiated what he termed some "questionable" activities, such as the infiltration of undercover agents into radical groups and the accumulation of counter-intelligence files on 10,000 Americans.

But Mr. Colby, in summarizing other domestic C.I.A.

operations for the Senate Appropriations intelligence Subcommittee, cited only three break-ins in 1966, 1969 and 1971, all involving past and present employees of the agency, and a total of 21 telephone wiretaps, 19 of them similarly stemming from the activities of past and present operatives.

Well-placed sources have said, however, that there were a number of C.I.A.-directed wiretaps and break-ins in the United States in the last 10 years aimed at radicals and other dissident groups. Some of these activities, they said, were conducted by outside "contract" operatives who were paid in cash and provided with no records or papers to indicate that they were working on behalf of the C.I.A.

It was this kind of alleged activity that will not show up in any agency file anywhere, according to the former agency officials who were interviewed.

"Whenever it's supersecret and ultrasensitive," said one former employee, "part of the tradecraft you're taught [in C.I.A. training schools] is never to put things in writing—it's the ultimate security precaution."

This former official, who learned of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities well before they were publicly reported, suggested that Mr. Colby might have limited his report of the break-in activities to the Senators only to those operations undertaken by C.I.A. men themselves—and not provided an accounting of break-ins authorized by "contract" employees.

Another possibility, the former official said, was that Mr. Colby might have deliberately ignored those break-ins and wiretaps aimed at potential Soviet and other foreign espionage agents, in the belief that such domestic activities against foreign nationals were not illegal.

Another former high-level official recalled that the agen-

cy's penchant for not putting things in writing "was always a sore point."

'Constant Battles'

"There were constant battles between the guys in the field [overseas] and the guys in headquarters about writing reports and keeping such things as petty cash files," he added. "The guys in the field would always win out because it was considered better to get the job done than to keep good records of it."

A former official who served with Mr. Angleton in the counterintelligence division acknowledged that few operational reports had been made in writing.

Noting that Mr. Angleton had served for 27 years in the C.I.A., the former counterintelligence official added, "When you see [C.I.A.] directors come and go, you can understand how someone can begin to wonder whether there's politics at the top."

Another former C.I.A. official, who was involved with high-level operations under Mr. Helms for many years, confirmed that Mr. Angleton "seemed to have no confidence in the C.I.A. directors because they were political appointees."

"In my time," the former official added, "I don't think I ever saw one written communication from Angleton, which is pretty unusual since the agency was very coordinated" in its paper flow at the top.

Mr. Angleton, reached at his home in suburban Washington, refused to comment. A source close to him, however, took exception to the suggestion that Mr. Helms and other high C.I.A. officials had not known what was going on inside the Counterintelligence Division.

"Of course, there were oral discussions," this source said, "but they were discussions on how papers would be prepared. There is nothing that I know of that was handled only verb-

Reports

ally." He added that those former C.I.A. officials who were saying otherwise "probably had no need to know." Much of the information available to the Counterintelligence Division was considered to be most sensitive, he said, and made available to only a few high-level officers.

But the former C.I.A. undercover operative in New York who initially told of his experience in a published interview Dec. 29, recalled that little specific information about his activities had been put into writing.

"Would you?" he asked.

None of the few papers and reports he did see while working in the New York branch of the C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division had C.I.A. markings on them, he said.

'I Can Understand'

"I can understand why not now," the former undercover agent said.

The only written reports that were filed, he said, dealt with important intelligence information that was to be relayed to higher headquarters. "You had to put it in writing to make sure that it didn't get exaggerated going up the line," he said.

Mr. Colby and Mr. Helms began what could be an extended series of Congressional appearances this week with joint testimony before the intelligence subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services committees.

They have also appeared before the commission set up by President Ford to investigate allegations against the C.I.A. The commission's chairman is Vice President Rockefeller.

On Monday the two men scheduled to testify before the House Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
22 JAN 1975

Preposterous Proposal

PUBLICITY-HUNGRY Democrats in the U. S. Senate, anxious to press the political advantage resulting from the downfall of former President Richard M. Nixon, have just voted to create a new sensation machine, whose potentialities strike us as appalling.

By a vote of 45 to 7, the Senate Democratic Caucus on Monday called for the creation of a bipartisan select committee — like the one that probed the Watergate scandals — to investigate all foreign and domestic operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I., and other such hush-hush government agencies.

The dangers inherent in this bid for the news spotlight are as gravely serious as they are unnecessary. It is perfectly proper for Congress to know what is going on. But Congress, which controls the pursestrings of all our intelligence-gathering bodies, already has all the

machinery it needs for any responsible, in-depth investigation it may deem desirable.

To create another big Watergate-type committee; complete with the circus atmosphere and grandstanding of televised public hearings and all the inevitable leaks of confidential material involved, would be the biggest gift we could possibly give the Kremlin.

If our lawmakers want the Russian Communists to know for sure just what our operatives have been doing around the world to thwart them — this is the way to do it — and simultaneously to jeopardize the very lives of dedicated men and women performing perilous work in many areas.

The suggested special committee is a preposterous proposal, and one which would do irreparable harm if adopted. Surely second thoughts and sober judgment will result in its defeat when it comes before the full Senate, possibly later this week.

It must — for the safety of our nation.

LONDON TIMES
13 January 1975

The CIA

Were all the dirty tricks really necessary?

The Central Intelligence Agency was established under the National Security Act of 1947, but the old hands at headquarters in Langley, Virginia, agree that it was created by Allen Dulles who was director for many years and left his inimitable stamp upon it. If this is the case, the CIA should be a benign organization.

Allen Dulles, with his pipe and tweeds, looked like a schoolhousemaster, an American Mr. Chips. He had the big mouth and strong teeth of his brother, John Foster, and wore the same wire-frame spectacles, but his face was open and his eyes could twinkle.

He was a great party-goer. At strange relaxation, perhaps for the director of the world's second largest intelligence agency (the KGB is bigger by far), but he had a ready excuse.

When operating in Switzerland during the First World War he was invited to a party to meet a foreign radical who was passing through. He was much more earnest then, and refused. Much later he learnt that the man was Lenin, who was about to be smuggled back into Russia by the Germans.

One wonders what would have happened if America's future spymaster had met Lenin. Would he have tried to use him, or had the train wrecked? Could he have changed the course of history? I asked him once, but he would not be drawn. Perhaps the missed opportunity still rankled.

I used to call on him in his pleasantly rundown house in Georgetown. We would sit in the enclosed porch and drink whisky out of mansize glasses until his housekeeper—I think she was Scottish—came in to remind him of some appointment. We would discuss the affairs of the day or the craft of intelligence in very general terms. He afterwards wrote a book about it for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

He always assumed that I knew what the agency was all about and that its intentions were good. I suppose it was my Englishness. In spite of Wild Bill Donovan, who started the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the agency, the vast majority of the top people at the CIA are Anglophiles. British intelligence helped them to get going in the early days after the Second World War, and the painful memories of Philby and Burgess and Maclean have not diminished their close relationship.

For instance, I can remember calling on a former chief of British Intelligence, long since retired. It was just like the movies. His office was in a lovely Queen Anne house, and I was led upstairs by a footman in a short white coat. The

chief stood by a roaring fire, immaculately dressed and sipping a sherry. As we shook hands, he asked: "How is Dick?" Dick was Helms, the then director of the CIA. They were very close friends.

All this cosy upper-middle-class camaraderie ought to be reassuring. Dulles, Helms, Bissell and Angleton are typical of the Ivy League types most Americans are prepared to trust if not like. The men in the field can also be impressive. The station chief in Bonn for many years was a former musicologist, who still wrote seriously about music in his spare time.

His wife was a harpsichordist, and their huge living room looked like the musical instrument department of a museum. He was one of the best-informed men on West Germany. One had the impression that the White House could not go far wrong if presidential judgments were based on his information.


The game some of the agency men have been required to play can be nasty. For all Allen Dulles's avuncular kindness, somewhere in the back of his mind must have been filed memories of dirty tricks played all over the world, from Berlin to Indonesia, from Laos to Cuba.

Were they really necessary? The game, as Dulles saw it, was to defend the United States, confound if not defeat communism and, above all, avoid situations which could lead to nuclear war. The intentions were honourable enough, but recent events suggest that these honourable men have overstepped the line, at home as well as abroad.

The fear of creating a new kind of Gestapo persuaded Congressmen to write into the National Security Act that the agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions" within the United States. Yet the agency was involved in Watergate, if only peripherally, and it has since been alleged that it kept 10,000 Americans under surveillance.

No wonder President Ford has set up the Rockefeller Commission to inquire into CIA activities. The journalist who wrote the surveillance story was Seymour Hersh who broke the My Lai story and uncovered many of the Watergate scandals. He is probably the best investigative reporter in the United States. More revelations will no doubt be published, but before the poor Americans are driven to complete distraction it is as well to recall what the CIA is all about.

It was established when Truman, the first of the super-power Presidents, put Washington on a Cold War footing. The reorganization of the bureaucracy included the establishment



of the National Security Council: the integration of the armed services, first within the National Military Establishment and then under the Defence Department; and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

According to the United States Government organization manual, the CIA was created, "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, the agency, under the direction of the National Security Council:

- 1) "Advises the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as related to national security.
2. "Makes recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the national security.
3. "Co-relates and evaluates intelligence relating to the national security, and provides for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the governments using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities.
4. "Performs, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
5. "Performs such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

American officials are a good deal more opaque than the British variety, and the discretion thought to be necessary in describing the functions of an intelligence agency has hardly added clarity. Nevertheless, it is clear that the CIA is solely responsible to the National Security Council.

The functions of the NSC, again quoting the Government Organization manual, is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The council is composed of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defence. The council is located within the executive office of the President.

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"Activities—The council considers policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government concerned with the national security and makes recommendations to the President."

The need for good intelligence, especially for a President with the power of nuclear life and death, is obvious. A decision can be no better than the information upon which it is based. From the early beginnings of the Chinese empire all governments have recognized the need. Only the United States was the odd man out.

Apart from the limited tactical information of military and naval intelligence, sections (G-2), it did not have an intelligence agency before the CIA was created. As Henry Stimson, the then Secretary of State, primly said in 1939, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail". A charming remark, but the United States can hardly be blamed for joining the ranks of less artless nations such as Britain and the Soviet Union.

Today, of the CIA's four directorates the largest is the Directorate of Operations, known inside the agency as the Clandestine Services and outside as the Department of Dirty Tricks. This directorate is responsible for all covert operations such as espionage, counter-espionage, and paramilitary operations.

These included the so-called destabilization programme in Chile. It is also said to have been responsible for the surveillance of 10,000 American citizens. The authority for these activities is provided by paragraph 5 above.

The Directorate of Intelligence assesses all information received from open and covert sources and prepares the final intelligence reports. It monitors radio and television and analyses satellite and spy plane photographs. Its interests range from military research to political parties, from terrorist groups to national economies and crop prospects.

The Directorate of Management and Services provides support for covert operations, including apparently the false moustache and other goggle-making props to the Watergate "plumbers". The Directorate of Science and Technology, which works closely with the Pentagon, runs the spy satellites and spy planes such as the old U-

and SR-71.

The CIA employs about 16,500 people. Its annual budget is said to be \$750m, but this is little more than a tithe spent every year by the United States Intelligence Community. This includes the National Security Agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the FBI and other agencies. Altogether 153,250 men and women are employed, and the combined annual budget is more than \$6,000m.

The director of the CIA, Mr William Colby, is also the Director of Central Intelligence and as such is overlord of the entire intelligence community. It is a multinational conglomerate, and his authority is questioned by some who should know, but there is no question as to whom Mr Colby is responsible.

The United States Government Organization manual clearly establishes that it is the National Security Council, which means the President. Vast organizations tend to take on a life of their own, but the President approves and occasionally initiates all major operations.

The CIA is an instrument of the President, a component of his executive office. He is ultimately responsible. If the agency did investigate 10,000 Americans, in contravention of the National Security Act, then former President Nixon was responsible.

Such actions are approved, or rejected, by a control group which is part of the National Security Council apparatus. It has had a variety of labels, the last heard of being the 40 Committee. Henry Kissinger, in his capacity as the President's special assistant for national security affairs, is the chairman. The other members are the Under-Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A very senior British diplomat told me that he was convinced that Helms was incapable of breaking the law. He was too honest a man. He also suggested that a judgment should not be made which ignored the conditions and atmosphere of the time. Nixon believed that Vietnam was a patriotic war, and that those who opposed it were traitors to their country.

It is a fact that the army's counter-intelligence corps first investigated the anti-war protestors, largely because it had the manpower, until its activities were revealed in the press. The late J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, then somewhat surprisingly refused to become involved and the job was given to the White House "plumbers" and apparently to the CIA.

Whether or not the agency only obeyed presidential orders, the Rockefeller Commission is long overdue. Its first task should be to inquire into the nature of the President's authority because it has already been established that the agency's charter is not only the National Security Act with its congressional amendments. It has been considerably broadened by secret National Security Intelligence Directives, including apparently authority to operate within the United States.

Then there is the scope of the agency. Spy satellites have made much of the old cloak and dagger operations unnecessary. This is acknowledged within the CIA, but the top men cannot apparently overcome the nostalgia for their own romantic pasts.

Another question is whether the CIA should be responsible for both the collection of intelligence and dirty tricks such as undermining foreign governments and running private wars. I can remember Richard Bissell, jr, who was Director of Clandestine Services until the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, arguing that the two functions could not be separated. He said that Britain tried it during the war with disastrous results.

One question the commission is unlikely to ask is why should the CIA, or any other agency, be empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The usual short answer is that other countries also interfere, that is why the surveillance of American citizens was ordered, but there is more to it than that.

It is a matter of national attitude as well as policy. Given that the United States is the hope of the world, which most Americans believe, it is seen to be necessary to so order the world that the land of the free and the home of the brave continues to flourish.

This is what motivates those decent chaps with their pipes and tweeds at the CIA. British readers should not bridle. The CIA men really believe that the torch was passed from us to them, as in a way it was.

Even decent chaps can make mistakes. The best intentions can be dangerous, but there is this to be said about the United States. Unlike this country, Americans try to hold everybody accountable, even their spies.

Louis Heren

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HUMAN EVENTS

18 JAN 1975

Did CIA Files Come From Justice?

The New York Times' Seymour Hersh has asserted that the Central Intelligence Agency had compiled "illegal domestic files on nearly 10,000 American citizens," a charge that has helped set off both presidential and congressional probes of the super-secret spy group. But reports out of Washington last week indicated that the CIA files may not have been gathered in an illegal fashion after all.

Both Jerris Leonard, a former assistant attorney general for civil rights in the Nixon Administration, and James Devine, who headed the once-secret Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit (IDIU) at the Justice Department, made a decision in 1970 to turn over to the CIA the names of some 9,000 or 10,000 Americans suspected of being trained in foreign countries in how to provoke riots and promote guerrilla warfare.

Leonard said the Justice Department furnished the names of those with allegiances to militant groups to the CIA for surveillance during their trips abroad, but he added, "If the CIA was doing something on the domestic side, it was not getting to us." The agency is barred by law from internal security functions, but its surveillance activities abroad are unrestricted.

When HUMAN EVENTS contacted Devine, who is now with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, he said the names had come from the FBI and were people suspected of violating federal anti-riot statutes and destroying government property.

"A lot of these people," said Devine, "were traveling overseas, and they were meeting with groups that were inimicable to the United States, and the FBI could not make the coverage overseas."

Devine said the department had names that belonged to "militant groups, really, because we were interested at that time in about anybody that was getting sabotage or guerrilla training overseas," and these groups were quite open about stating their intentions of travelling abroad.

So, said Devine, both he, who had come to work for the government during the Truman Administration, and Leonard, considered a moderate Republican, asked the CIA to keep tabs on militants going to Algeria, North Korea and "any of those places." Devine said the idea had not come from Atty. Gen. John Mitchell.

Though Hersh now claims that the names he's talking about are totally different from those Devine has described, others are skeptical and think the "illegal" files Hersh has mentioned are quite possibly the legal files furnished the CIA by the Justice Department.

• Columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten reported last week that the Central Intelligence Agency did indeed maintain files on American citizens—Black Panthers, for instance, "who had received guerrilla training in Libya and demolition instruction in North Korea." The two journalists added that the CIA files "show no evidence of widespread domestic surveillance" as charged by the New York Times' Seymour Hersh.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 January 1975

THE CIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

'Spook Alley' Causes Gaps in Fairfax

By Allan Frank
Star-News Staff Writer

Everyone — well, almost everyone — is worrying about the Central Intelligence Agency's impact on the day-to-day life of average Americans.

Are they tapping my phone? Are they trailing me around the supermarket? Are they following my car? Are they being ridiculous?

Well. There is one place in the United States where CIA operations have an easily discernible effect on otherwise average Americans, and that's in posh, lovely, high-rent Langley area of Fairfax County, the homes of U.S. senators, real-estate men, professional football coaches, retired admirals and other wealthy members of society.

SINCE 1961, when the spooks moved from their headquarters at 23rd Street and Constitution Avenue in the District to a then-rural enclave between Dolley Madison Boulevard and the George Washington Parkway, the CIA's impact on then-unsuspecting Fairfax County has been pronounced, although low-profile.

It's not just the traffic jams that develop at the second and third stoplights up Dolley Madison from Chain Bridge. Or the deliberately anonymous cars that turn off the parkway, where the only road sign used to say "BPR" (until someone blew the CIA's cover). "BPR" is for Bureau of Public Roads, a federal agency adjoining the CIA.

There's the Chinese restaurant in Tysons Corner, where suburban families go to dine on egg roll and egg foo yung. There's the fashionable boutique where suburban housewives go to exercise their credit cards. The shop is owned by the wife of a CIA employee.

And there are the people you meet, from the magazine food critic to the man next door (who always seems to have strange days off).

AT "SPOOK ALLEY" itself — as the 213-acre tract in Langley is known to the irreverent — the air of mystery is almost suffocating. The CIA won't even disclose how much the complex cost. Was it \$46 million or \$56 million? Are there 10,000 or 12,500 employees?

CIA officials refuse to discuss such matters, and inquisitive reporters are left to their own devices. (Fairfax County offi-

cials will disclose the daily sewage flow, from which edifying statistic a certain population figure can be deduced. But who can say for sure whether the spooks are instructed to flush twice, to confuse enemy agents who might be privy to county sewage flow records?)

Try school enrollment: There are 1,750 children attending Fairfax County schools who admit to CIA parentage. If spooks have the normal number of children (1.75 per family), that would mean only a thousand CIA families in the county, which is obviously absurd. But how many parents will confess to CIA employment on the standard forms sent home with the youngsters at the beginning of each school year?

COUNTY OFFICIALS, without detailing the basis for their estimates, figure that the presence of the spy agency contributes about \$250 million a year to the county's economy.

Whether this includes the recent upsurge of supposedly international-cuisine eateries in McLean and its fashionable environs is not clear. It could just as easily be traced to the non-spook, upper-middle-class residents of the area.

But the Imperial Garden restaurant in Tysons Corner is known as a CIA hangout. It was started six years ago by a group of CIA employees and their friends, and perhaps 3 out of every 10 customers are reliably believed to be employees of "the company."

As the restaurant manager noted, however, "How the hell can you be sure who's in the agency and who isn't?"

One telltale sign is the rave review displayed by the restaurant, a reprint of the critique written by Washingtonian Magazine's food sampler, Charles Turgeon. He works for the CIA.

AT FAIRFAX Hospital the nurses have learned to tell CIA people checking in for an operation. They're the ones with a security agent or two hovering around to make sure the patient doesn't start babbling under anesthesia.

For those CIA employees under "deep cover," of

course, the agency supplies medical and psychological care at the Langley headquarters, or from one of the local doctors who has been cleared for security.

As for social life in the area, the agency's arrival 14 years ago wrought a subtle change.

"Before, at a party, you'd meet so-and-so, introduce yourself and say, 'Where do you work?'" recalled a 20-year resident of the community. "After the CIA came, it just wasn't polite to ask where they worked. There were so many CIA types around, it became very gauche to ask."

FOR THEIR part, CIA employees are presumably obedient to the advice of the agency's first boss, Allen Dulles: "Often the most trivial events are unimaginably important."

If this makes for a certain amount of inexplicable conversation gaps at McLean cocktail parties, it also is arguable that it adds a certain breathless mystery to partygoers who might — without the CIA's presence — be dismissed as merely dull.

Like other people, CIA employees have to eat, and if they don't like the fare at the employee cafeteria or up in the top-floor executive dining hall (described by a onetime regular as a "men's club . . . good steaks, chops and seafood") they tend to fan out to restaurants in nearby McLean, Tysons Corner or Georgetown, slightly farther away.

FOR TOURISTS in search of a cheap (or not so cheap) thrill, lunch at the Pikestaff, Caesar's Forum or the McLean Restaurant & Delicatessen will provide elbow-rubbing proximity to any number of CIA employees — or at least other tourists who look like CIA employees.

At the Pizza Supreme on Chain Bridge Road there are murals depicting Mad Magazine spies in trenchcoats and other CIA allusions. In the old days, when the agency didn't permit even its "overt" employees to acknowledge where they worked, many of the take-out orders for pizza were for "Mr. Brown," picked up by a series of customers who drove up in black cars.

A standing joke of the time was that the best way to gain entrance to the tightly guarded Langley headquarters was to arrive bearing a pizza.

The Fairfax police have what one officer describes as a "very cooperative" arrangement with the CIA. When a CIA employee is arrested, the police don't publicize it and always report the incident to CIA security.

When a man attempted to break into the CIA to escape from pursuing Russians, county police quietly hauled the man off. "We leave the press releases up to the CIA," a ranking policeman said. The county also provides extra protection of "safe" houses where foreign defectors are kept, and for at least several years county police also received training from special CIA schools.

AT THE AGENCY, employees can be swept up by clubs of every description: wine tasting, tennis, boating, photography. There's a ticket agency and a credit union, an alcoholic rehabilitation farm in New England and, for people who have troubles with tragedy, an officer who will help you arrange funerals for relatives. There are occasional complaints about the gym, which consists of small exercise rooms in one of the basements.

Barred by their chosen employment from most normal relationships with the community they live in, CIA people tend quite naturally to stick together.

"There is a tendency to socialize with people from the agency because if you make a slip of the tongue, you don't have to worry about it," says a former agent who specialized in "confirmation," the lifting of documents from foreign embassies. "You don't have to be so guarded in your conversations."

"What bothers me about a lot of what you read," says a former CIA covert operator who claims he dropped out because he couldn't tolerate the bureaucracy, "is that you get the impression that it (CIA) has a very conservative, suspicious atmosphere. There are probably more

international liberals at the agency per square foot than in any other section of the government.

LIBERAL or not, the CIA, through its extensive security force monitors the lives of its employees, who for safety and comfort tend to band together, occasionally living on streets where every family on the block works for "The Agency."

"The two biggest problems a CIA man has are his wife and his children," says the wife of a high-ranking CIA counterintelligence officer. "The husband and wife cannot talk over his business, the way, say, a lawyer and his wife can."

"The children have a very odd relationship with their father. That's a big problem. It's a peculiar life."

"You've got to practically raise the children yourself," one wife observed. "You just can't explain to them what daddy is doing. They're kept in ignorance and they're terribly inquisitive."

"The children get some wild ideas. They think it's all sort of Mata Hari stuff," she says. "It's really a very boring business. It's surprising what a humdrum monotonous life this can be for a woman of average income growing up with her family in the suburbs."

MRS. C.—not her real initial—describes her friends, largely agency wives, as "not particularly glamorous, not rich, not Ph.D.s. They generally are rather plain, strong women, mighty strong women who do their damndest enter-

taining. They generally speak another language and they stay friends. They go about their duties, have their little teas . . . and do damn well at it too. They are not boring."

The security aspect of CIA, while in some cases not much different from restrictions borne by employees of other agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission or the Defense Intelligence Agency, can be pervasive.

One former secretary at CIA claims that one of her co-workers who married a foreigner lost her job after the bridegroom failed to pass a security test. The newly married secretary was "relocated" in a Tysons Corner industrial research firm that does much contract work for CIA.

Other young secretaries, often recruited from small-town high schools, are instructed to live in "approved" apartment houses or in a special hotel where almost all the guests work for the agency.

Victor Marchetti, co-author of "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," a book the agency tried to stop before its publication after he resigned from CIA, says during his years there he even filed his tax return as a U.S. Army employee.

"It can be an almost womb-totomb existence," he said. Some guys meet their wives at the agency. The best man and the maid-of-honor are from the agency. All the guests at the wedding are from the agency."

NEW YORK TIMES
20 January 1975

Rockefeller Panel and Its C.I.A. Mission

By CLIFTON DANIEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19—What is the Rockefeller commission supposed to find out about the Central Intelligence Agency, and what is it not supposed to find out?

According to its charter from the White House, the commission must confine its investigation to "C.I.A. pacification program. activities within the United States." Judging by its membership, the commission would not be disposed in any case to pry into other activities, especially the C.I.A.'s clandestine operations abroad.

In the past, those operations have included overthrowing—or helping to overthrow—governments in Guatemala and Iran, organizing an invasion of Cuba, and subsidizing newspapers, magazines, political parties, trade unions and other organizations in various countries.

The agency has even been suspected of assassinations. Last night NBC television showed a 1973 fiction movie, "Scorpio," in which six murders are committed by C.I.A. agents or hired gunmen.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 17, 1970, William E. Colby, now the Director of Central Intelligence, rejected a suggestion that operation Phoenix in South Vietnam was a "program for the assassination of political leaders." The suggestion came

from the committee chairman, then Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas.

At the time, Mr. Colby was directing Operation Phoenix, a joint American-South Vietnamese effort to identify, find and dispose of the leadership of the Vietcong rebellion.

As early as 1968, when Operation Phoenix began, the United States mission in Saigon routinely reported that killings were involved in the Phoenix pacification program.

In 1973, a House subcommittee report estimated that 20,000 Vietcong suspects had been killed, some of them mistakenly because of faulty intelligence.

The report was prepared by the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, and was publicized by United Press International. The report said that its charges "should be either substantiated or repudiated after an impartial and thorough investigation."

No such investigation was made, however, and none is contemplated in the mandate of the commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

The commission was created Jan. 4 to investigate allegations reported in The New York Times that the C.I.A., in violation of law, had spied on the anti-war movement and other dissidents inside the United States during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations.

President Ford's order establishing the Rockefeller commission said that the C.I.A. "fills intelligence functions vital

to the security of our nation, and many of its activities must necessarily be carried out in secrecy."

At a news conference last Sept. 16, soon after he became President, Mr. Ford sought to justify such activities. "Communist nations," he said, "spend vastly much more money than we do for the same kind of purposes."

The Rockefeller commission was manifestly not established to inquire into those affairs. It was created, as the President's order said, only "to insure scrupulous compliance" with the statutory limitations placed on the C.I.A.'s activities inside the United States.

Those limitations do not allow the agency any police subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.

Aside from the President's admonition, the commission's members do not look like mavericks, muckrakers or crusaders against the agency.

Three of the eight—Vice President Rockefeller, former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, retired—have had past associations with the agency. There are no proclaimed C.I.A. critics among the eight.

Respect for Authority

All but two of the commission members, Edgar F. Shannon Jr., former president of the University of Virginia, and Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization, have been public officials. They can be presumed to have respect for established authority, national security and secrecy in military and intelligence matters. They were plainly picked for discretion and reliability, as well as experience.

Therefore, critics of the C.I.A.

presumably will have to rely on Congress for any broader inquiry. One of the main questions of the critics is whether it is necessary or proper for a democracy to engage at all in clandestine operations against foreign countries, their governments and their citizens.

There seems to be no general demand, incidentally, for the agency to abandon its primary function—collecting intelligence.

How far the Rockefeller commission will go in investigating even the domestic activities of the agency has been questioned. When Mr. Colby, the C.I.A. director, appeared last Monday before a Senate appropriations subcommittee, he simply responded in his opening statement to the allegations publicized by The New York Times.

It can be reliably stated, however, that the Rockefeller commission is authorized to investigate any and all evidence of domestic spying by the C.I.A.

The Executive order establishing the commission did not say whether its findings would be published, but it seems to be taken for granted that some public accounting will be made.

The commission was instructed to find out, whether the C.I.A. was complying with the legal restrictions on its domestic operations, determine whether the safeguards against violations were adequate, and to make recommendations to the President and Director of Central Intelligence.

In essence, the commission was told to find out whether the C.I.A. was using secret police methods against American citizens in their own country. It was definitely not given a mandate to expose C.I.A. operations against foreigners.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
11 January 1975

James Angleton, the man at the centre of the new CIA row, was described as the agency's only authentic genius. Raymond Palmer reports.

WHEN James R. Schlesinger, a tweedy, pipe-smoking economist took over as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in February 1973, Richard Helms, the retiring director, introduced to him a very thin, gaunt, six-footer with very dark skin. "This," said Helms proudly, "is the CIA's only authentic genius."

Schlesinger noted the man's name, James Angleton, and later added it to the list of 600 CIA employees he ordered fired from the agency. Angleton, an intellectual loner with a natural aptitude for Machiavellian intrigue, was too old a hand to be caught out so easily.

He simply went down to the personnel section and ordered them to change his "funny name" (his agency pseudonym) and went into hiding while carrying on his job as head of the CIA's counter-intelligence staff. He finally came out of hiding when Schlesinger was succeeded by William Colby, former head of the CIA's Far East Division, five months later.

With that incident still fresh in mind, it is not difficult to find old CIA hands prepared to offer a shade of odds that James Angleton is still not through with the spy game, in spite of his resignation as the man at the centre of the current controversy over allegations of the agency's involvement in domestic espionage in the United States.

James Angleton, 57, is one of America's top professional espionage experts, a brilliant innovator, and one of the most powerful members of the CIA's inner cabal. A glutton for work, he enjoyed the "game" of espionage for its own sake, for he is independently wealthy.

Basically, his job as chief of counter-intelligence staff, consisted of trying to penetrate opposition intelligence services while simultaneously trying to prevent penetration of the CIA by the opposition. This is the stuff of which spy novels are made, with spies and counterspies, double and triple agents, entrapments, deceptions and decoys, phony defectors and all the other pieces used in this real-life chess game.

The son of an American father and a Cuban mother, James Angleton grew up in Italy, where his late father had the dealership for National Cash Registers and was president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Rome. During World War II, his father became a lieutenant colonel in the clandestine Office of Strategic Services (OSS) because of his Italian background.

After graduation from Yale and two years at Harvard Law School, James Angleton followed his father into OSS and served with X-2, the counter-espionage section, where among other things he acted as liaison officer with Section V of Britain's MI6. In the immediate postwar period he was responsible for mobilising remaining Italian intelligence assets and setting up the basis of the postwar Italian secret service.

After his father's death, he sold his father's NCR dealership in Italy for one million dollars and invested the money shrewdly on Wall Street, thus founding his own personal fortune.

Transferred to CIA when it was founded in 1947, he was responsible over the years for introducing into the agency many espionage and intelligence innovations. One of his major contributions was the organisation of the CIA system of cooperation with friendly intelligence agencies throughout the world and, more covertly, cooperation with agencies belonging to some governments which were ostensibly anti-American.

As the driving force of CIA's Office of Special Operations (the intelligence gathering arm), he was one of the CIA's liaison officers with Harold (Kim) Philby when he was sent to Washington in 1949 as the representative of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). In his book, *My Silent War*, Philby recalled: "We formed the habit of lunching once a week at Harvey's where he demonstrated regularly that overwork was not his only vice. He was one of the thinnest men I have ever met, and one of the biggest eaters."

Angleton, in fact, is so thin and gaunt that one colleague described him as "A man who looks as though he is running out of ectoplasm." His passions, apart from his work and eating—are poetry reading and fishing. It was this latter pastime, at which he excelled, which resulted in his being nicknamed The Kingfish—also a reflection of his high position in the agency's hierarchy.

It is under this cognomen that James Angleton appears in a new book, *The Real Spy World*, by former CIA officer and adviser Miles Copeland, which is to be published soon by Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Copeland recalls that The Kingfish was the first CIA officer to be assigned the job of dealing with lunatic espionage requests from Government departments, including the State Department, the Pentagon, and even the White House.

Angleton got the assignment partly because of a wartime reputation for dealing with drunks and partly because of an oft-repeated story about how he successfully dealt with a mad woman who came to General Eisenhower's Grosvenor Square headquarters complaining she was being tortured by the Gestapo via shortwave radio.

Angleton treated the assignment seriously, but invariably used overt rather than covert means to complete it. He obtained his "intelligence" from such sources as Encyclopaedia Britannica and the New York Times, but dressed it up with cryptonyms, code names, agents, and all the other trappings so that it appeared to have come from a difficult espionage operation.

From something of a joke, The Kingfish's "lunatic projects" unit grew into one of the most important developmental sections of CIA. The unit didn't fabricate information—only the means by which it was supposed to have been acquired. The information was, in fact, more detailed and accurate than that then being pro-

duced by spies, who were almost invariably unreliable in the immediate postwar years.

Before long, the unit had become so adroit at developing what it called "alternative sources," which didn't rely on espionage, that it no longer had to deceive its customers about the sources of its intelligence. The Kingfish showed that masses of apparently harmless personal chit-chat in non-secret trade journals and newspapers, when analysed by computer, reveal patterns of personal assignments and movements which the Russians may be trying to keep secret.

As a result, the study of such overt sources, including directories, official memoranda and the like, is today one of the CIA's most productive means of acquiring secret information.

The Kingfish also quickly recognised the value of good relations with reputable journalists. He organised the systematic filing by embassies of the by-products obtained from journalists with whom they were in contact, making available to the CIA masses of information from the world's most skilled observers.

He also deserves much of the credit for having brought the agency's art of "creative intelligence" or "cratology" to its present high degree of effectiveness. This is the art of studying an object (or sometimes a photograph of an object) and reaching conclusions about its origin, the origin of the raw materials used, how it was manufactured and even the technical capabilities such manufacture represented.

Angleton was also concerned in the development of "gaming theory" as applied to intelligence work, Copeland reports. This included the element of Method acting, where players are provided with extremely sophisticated character studies of the world leader they play, enabling them to "game out" that leader's probable reactions to national and international situations.

If James Angleton's "reluctant" resignation to save his superiors further embarrassment does go through, then his genius will not be completely lost to the CIA. No doubt he, like others before him, will be rehired at his previous salary for a two or three-year stint to write his memoirs for the CIA's historical staff.

This was a project initiated by Director Richard Helms in 1967 in which former senior officers are encouraged to record their experiences and thoughts for an encyclopaedic history of the CIA which will never be completed nor published.

WASHINGTON STAR NEWS
21 JAN 1975

CIA Bid Charged

A Canadian moviemaker says that while he was in Las Vegas last year to do a movie about aircraft tycoon Howard Hughes, two Central Intelligence Agency men asked him to keep tabs on a former Hughes aide living in Canada, particularly on that person's dealings with a Richard Nixon brother, the Hughes Tool Co. and columnist Jack

Anderson.

The filmmaker, Bruce McInnes of British Columbia, said the two CIA men asked him to spy on the Hughes aide, John Meier, last August. The Nixon brother mentioned, he said, was F. Donald Nixon.

McInnes leveled his charges in an affidavit filed in Las Vegas by Meier as part of his battle to overturn income tax charges. Meier wants the government to disclose if it had him under surveillance.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
05 January 1975

The CIA: Its Roots Run Deep at Home

BY THOMAS B. ROSS

WASHINGTON—The disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency spied on thousands of private American citizens during the Nixon Administration is just one—though the most startling—of a long series of indications that the CIA has been operating illegally inside the United States.

In fact, it has been a matter of public record for more than a year that former CIA director Richard M. Helms formally condoned such

lous ... old and worried about his legend."

Hoover ultimately prevailed, or at least Nixon said he did, and the plan was not put into effect, or at least Nixon said it wasn't. There is little doubt, however, that the President got his private political police force in another form, the White House plumbers who—with equipment supplied by the CIA—broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and some of whom—CIA alumni included—took part in the "surreptitious entry" at the Watergate.

It was a strange fulfillment of the worst premonitions of those congressmen who, at the moment of the CIA's birth in 1947, expressed fear that a "Gestapo" was being set loose in our free land.

In proposing the creation of the CIA, the Truman Administration took great pains to emphasize that the agency was to limit itself to overseas operations.

It is clear from committee hearings and floor debate that most congressmen thought the National Security Act, as amended, would limit the CIA to intelligence work and, then, only outside the United States. There was nothing to the contrary in the express language of the act.

However, the act did include a vague provision authorizing the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Even though the fifth paragraph refers specifically to "intelligence" and not to clandestine activity, it was seized upon as a loophole under which the CIA's role was secretly broadened beyond the evident intent of Congress to include covert operations at home and abroad.

Richard M. Bissell Jr., former deputy director of the CIA for plans (now the Directorate of Operations, the so-called "dirty tricks" department), observed in a talk in 1968 that the National Security Act was "necessarily vague."

"CIA's full 'charter' has been frequently revised," he said, "but it has been, and must remain, secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the agency's authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a 'secret charter' remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution."

He was alluding to several classified NSC directives authorizing CIA activity within the United States under certain conditions. For example, NSCID 7 (National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7) empowered the agency to question persons

within the United States, provided it first checked with the FBI (a proviso that is reportedly often honored in the breach).

It enabled the CIA to brief and debrief scholars, students, businessmen, and tourists traveling to and from Communist countries. It allowed the CIA to sign contracts with universities and colleges to tap their fund of foreign expertise. And it established the rationale for the CIA's domestic fronts, foundations and regional offices.

Another directive, NSCID 6, empowered the National Security Agency to bug foreign embassies and citizens. The Huston plan for domestic intelligence amended the directive "to permit NSA to program for coverage of U.S. citizens using international facilities"—overseas phones or cables. The obvious purpose was to provide operative intelligence for the FBI and the CIA.

In short, the ambiguous "other functions and duties" clause of the National Security Act has been pushed to the limit at home as well as abroad. Even the express prohibition against "police, subpoena, law-enforcement, or internal security functions" appears to have been breached.

Two years ago, the New York Times and the Chicago Sun-Times disclosed that the CIA had secretly provided training to New York and Chicago policemen.

It had been evident since the 1960s that the CIA was deeply involved in the academic community. In 1966, it was disclosed that Michigan State University had provided academic cover for the CIA police operation in South Vietnam. The arrangement was not unique.

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The CIA had worked out secret ties with individuals and institutes at dozens of colleges, universities, and research centers. The prototype for this kind of relationship was the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The center was founded in 1951 with CIA money, and the following year Max F. Millikan, assistant director of the CIA, became its head. From the start, another key figure at the center was former OSS man Walt Whitman Rostow, an economics professor who became President Johnson's personal adviser on national security and foreign affairs, as well as his principal link with the intelligence community.

In a practice that subsequently became standard procedure at MIT and elsewhere, Rostow and his colleagues produced a CIA-financed book, "The Dynamics of Soviet Society," in 1953. It was published in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the other "sanitized" for public consumption.

The April 1966 issue of Foreign Affairs, the scholarly quarterly, contained an article entitled "The Faceless Viet Cong." It was a defense of the government's position that the

Charges that the Central Intelligence Agency has been involved in widespread, illicit activities within the United States—in apparent violation of its charter—have spurred calls for a thorough inquiry into the agency's purposes and performance. In this article, Thomas B. Ross, Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Sun-Times, puts the CIA's role into perspective, from its founding in 1947 through Watergate. Ross is the coauthor (with David Wise) of "The Invisible Government," published in 1964, which was the first survey of secret CIA operations in this country.

spying when it was proposed by ex-White House aide Tom Charles Huston on behalf of former President Richard M. Nixon.

In documents uncovered during the Watergate investigation, Huston proposed a broad domestic intelligence plan, including the practice of breaking and entering—"surreptitious entry," as it was politely described.

The Interagency Intelligence Subcommittee, on which Helms sat as the CIA representative, advised Nixon: "Use of this technique is clearly illegal: It amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion."

In other words, Helms must have been aware that the plan involved a double illegality—the simple violation of the constitutional rights of a citizen to his privacy, and the intrusion of the CIA into domestic operations. And so Huston confided in a memo: "I went into this exercise fearful that CIA would refuse to cooperate. In fact, Dick Helms was most cooperative and helpful and the only stumbling block was Mr. Hoover."

Huston complained that the fabled FBI director was "bullheaded ... gratuitous ... inconsistent, and frivo-

guerrilla movement in South Vietnam was controlled by the Communist Party of North Vietnam. It was written by George Carver Jr., who was identified only as a "student of political theory and Asian affairs, with degrees from Yale and Oxford; former officer in the U.S. AID Mission in Saigon; author of 'Aesthetics and the Problems of Meaning.'" In fact, Carver was an employee of the CIA. His contribution to Foreign Affairs represented only one of the hundreds of articles and books which the CIA had got into print at home and abroad without identification of their source.

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In addition to its penetration of the book business, the CIA also gained a foothold in journalism. In November, 1973, the Washington Star disclosed that more than 35 journalists working abroad—full-time reporters, free-lance journalists and correspondents for trade publications—were on the agency's payroll. Soon afterward, CIA spokesmen said director William F. Colby had ordered the practice stopped, at least for full-time reporters for general news publications.

The CIA also manipulated students and scholars in a similar manner, as had become abundantly clear in 1967 with disclosure of the agency's longstanding links with the National Student Assn., the nation's largest student group with chapters on 300 campuses.

The NSA disclosures led to a rash of revelations about the CIA's involvement with virtually every important segment of American life—business, labor, government, the churches, the universities, the news media, charitable organizations, book publishers, lawyers, teachers, artists, women's organizations and cultural groups.

In response to the furor over the revelations, the President ordered an investigation by a three-man group, headed by undersecretary of state Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and including Helms and John W. Gardner, secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and later head of Common Cause.

But the CIA was already well enough entrenched in other domestic areas. In fact, the agency's home-front activity had become so extensive by 1964 that a special section, the Domestic Operations Division, had been secretly created to handle it.

The Domestic Operations Division (DOD) was headquartered one block from the White House in a private office building at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue. The division occupied the entire fifth floor under an elaborate, tongue-twisting cover designation: "U.S. Army Element, Joint Planning Activity, Joint Operations Group (SD 7753)."

The very title of the division flouted the intent of Congress, which had been assured when it established the CIA—and over and over again since—that the agency would not and does not engage in domestic operations.

Far from severing its connections with the business establishment after the foundation disclosures and the Katzenbach report, there are strong indications that the CIA deepened and broadened its relationship.

During his 1968 talk, Bissell emphasized the necessity of a greater use of major international companies as a cover for CIA operations overseas.

Early in 1974, a high-ranking CIA official told a small group of reporters that more than 200 U.S. intelligence agents were stationed abroad, posing as businessmen. Since the CIA was engaged at the time in a campaign to persuade the public that it was cutting back on its clandestine operations, the figure undoubtedly was conservative.

In any event, it was clear that the CIA was deeply involved with American business. As with its ties to labor, the universities, emigre and student organizations, publishing and the press, the involvement had an inevitable domestic effect. By subsidizing the various groups—even, for foreign purposes—and by promoting the "capitalist" interests of major international corporations—as old CIA hand Miles Copeland perceived it—the CIA was obviously developing a large lobby of support at home.

Those who benefit from a relationship with the CIA might be disposed to go along or look the other way when the agency oversteps the legal bounds in the United States. When the CIA subscribed to the illegal Huston plan for domestic intelligence, it is reasonable to assume that large and influential forces in the private sector were prepared to cooperate.

The Watergate scandal exposed how willing the CIA was to be used—at least at the outset—and how close the White House came to turning the CIA and the FBI into a political police force.

—When Huston solicited support for Nixon's illegal domestic intelligence plan, Helms readily subscribed to it.

—When the White House demanded a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg, a private American citizen, the CIA produced it.

—When John Ehrlichman sought technical assistance for E. Howard Hunt and the plumbers, Gen. Robert E. Cushman, the deputy director and now Marine Corps Commandant, immediately complied. Later, when the Watergate prosecution requested a statement from Cushman, Colby told him to clear it with Ehrlichman, and Cushman complied with Ehrlichman's demand that his name be dropped from the formal affidavit.

—When H.R. Haldeman, on Nixon's instructions, ordered Cushman's successor, Gen. Vernon D. Walters, to divert the FBI investigation of Watergate, Walters promptly did so. And Helms, who attended the meeting, with full knowledge that the CIA would not be compromised by an investigation, offered no opposition.

The Watergate inquiry was thus put off the track for a critical two

weeks in its crucial opening stage. And only when acting FBI Director Patrick Gray demanded that Walters put it all in writing did the CIA at last formally withdraw its original request for a diversion of the investigation and admit that it was completely uninvolved.

As the transcript of the pertinent conversation between Nixon and Haldeman shows, the President decided to bring the CIA into the coverup with the full expectation that it would go along.

Nixon indicated that in his previous experience as Vice President and in the 1960 campaign, the CIA had displayed a willingness to cooperate in a political coverup at presidential direction. Nixon alluded to his book, "Six Crises," and how that "S.O.B." and (expletive deleted) Allen Dulles had reacted to it.

In the book, Nixon alleged that during the 1960 campaign John F. Kennedy had exploited information provided him by the CIA for political advantage. During the final days of the campaign, Kennedy called for a strong U.S. support of the Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow Castro. Nixon contended that Kennedy had been told in the traditional briefing of candidates by high ranking CIA officials that planning was far advanced for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Nixon said he was compelled to oppose Kennedy's position on Cuba—even though he had vigorously supported the invasion within the National Security Council—in order to protect the operation, and as a result, may have lost the election.

When "Six Crises" appeared, Dulles sided with President Kennedy and endorsed a White House statement that Kennedy had been provided with only general details of the CIA's link with the Cubans and denying that he had been briefed on the Bay of Pigs.

But Nixon insisted, in his taped conversation with Haldeman, that Dulles "knew" that Kennedy had been fully informed, but lied to protect the President.

"Now what the hell" Nixon explained. "Who told him to do it? The President."

Dulles and the CIA covered up for Kennedy. Nixon suggested, now the CIA would cover up for him.

"You call them (the CIA)," Nixon directed. "Play it tough. That's the way they (the Democrats) play it, and that's the way we are going to play it."

It came as a shock to many in Congress and the general public that a political leader of Nixon's broad inside experience should have expected the CIA to take part in illegal political activity. It came as no less a shock that the CIA satisfied Nixon's expectations at least in part.

But during the long struggle to unravel the Watergate scandal, Congress was wary of focusing on the CIA for fear of being diverted from its main purpose. Now that the truth of Watergate has been exposed, the climate is ripe—for the first time since the CIA was created in 1947—for vigorous congressional inquiry into the agency's involvement in this and other domestic activities.

LONDON TIMES

11 January 1975.

The CIA debate: What are 10,000 names to an organization that 'spies' on millions?

No one in the American Central Intelligence Agency can be genuinely surprised that one of its employees has leaked information on the so-called "domestic spying activity". There is no Official Secrets Act in the United States.

The official who tells his government's secrets directly to a foreign intelligence organization can be prosecuted under the Espionage Act. But that same employee might leak those same secrets to a newspaper which is read by all the intelligence services in the world, and not even lose his job. Like Daniel Ellsberg and Victor Marchetti, he might even become one of the nation's mini-heroes. To a disgruntled employee, the temptation to spill confidences to a sympathetic and skilful reporter like the *New York Times* Seymour ("Cy") Hersh, can be very strong.

If there is surprise at all, it is over the figure 10,000. ("CIA spied on 10,000 Americans", ran Cy Hersh's headline.) Why this particular figure? In early 1971, the FBI was exposed for having amassed 100,000 or so files on persons who "pose a threat to the nation's stability and security". It was later revealed that the United States Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps had files on "thousands of subversive persons" and that they were only part of a gigantic Defense Department system which had computerized files on 25,000,000 Americans.

The Treasury Department's Secret Service, answering an accusation that it had files containing "the names and aliases of 5,000 black people", replied that yes, it did indeed have such files, but the inference that it was racially biased was unfair because it also had files on 150,000 white people.

When the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights questioned a Pentagon spokesman on why its files contained information on Governor Wallace and Presidential candidate George McGovern, he raised a laugh by answering: "Why not? It's better to have such information than not to have it." The fuss, such as it was, died down in a week or two.

Now there is a fuss about a mere 10,000 names. The CIA's "octopus" has access not only to all the information just mentioned, but to files of the Internal Revenue Service (78,000,000 names), the Veterans Administration (15,000,000), the FBI's fingerprint records (160,000,000) and some five or six other government departments totalling 30,000,000.

Thanks to the Library of Congress's system of indexing, it can also reach any telephone or trade directory, any *Who's*

Who, or any book on current affairs which lists in its index the names of persons it mentions. A print-out of information resulting from a White House enquiry might contain information from as many as 50 different sources, American and foreign. Allowing for duplications and overlaps, and given the looseness with which labels are being applied to various CIA activities these days, it might fairly be said that the CIA "investigates" or "spies on 100,000,000 Americans".

In questioning an agency spokesman about recent allegations, a Washington reporter said he was not asking about information the Agency can assemble from its tie-ins with computers of organizations which are authorized to operate in the United States, but "your own stuff". The spokesman replied that there is no such thing. The Agency gets all its information on personalities, mainly foreign but also domestic, from other organizations: partly by "penetrations" in the case of unfriendly countries, and by above-board requests and sometimes computer tie-ins in the case of countries with whose security services the CIA has liaison arrangements.

The emphasis is shifting towards the latter. Or was. The trend may reverse itself now that former CIA employees are being applauded for having asserted as fact that Willi Brandt, Jomo Kenyatta, President Luis Alvarez of Mexico, and others who have been friendly to the United States were no more than "CIA agents", and are being applauded for the revelations. Meanwhile, the liaison continues, for one reason: the increasing internationalization of terrorism.

Terrorist groups are not only forging effective international ties, they are beginning to get financial aid and "administrative support" from international criminal organizations, particularly those trafficking in narcotics, to add to what they were already getting from certain radical governments. There have recently been indications that they will shortly be able to manufacture nerve gas and comparatively simple nuclear explosives—"powerful enough", says atomic scientist Dr Edwin Teller, "to blow up several city blocks of Manhattan and small enough to hide in a broom closet". Any imaginative television addict will see the possibilities.

Purely defensive measures will not deter "the new terrorism", as security experts are beginning to call the wave they

foresee for 1975. An attempt to defend every target the terrorists might conceivably strike would require armies of guards which could be supported only by police states of the sort the CIA's critics profess to fear.

A sound offensive, a campaign to spot the terrorists before they act, also requires measures which smack of the police state, but less so than a defensive system which brings into existence armies of guards.

Or so it is argued by the CIA. Even the Libyans, still the most active of the governmental supporters of Arab extremists, seem to have been persuaded—at least to the extent of spreading the word to their protégés that when it comes to seeking asylum after hijacking aircraft they are on their own.

Arab countries which are equally anti-American have been persuaded to make their card files available to visiting CIA representatives bearing microfilm cameras, or to officials of friendly Arab or European services who, they realize, will pass on their film to the CIA.

The "take" already runs to something over 1,000,000 names of suspect terrorists and their supporters, complete with descriptions, identity card details, and sometimes photographs—a number almost double the total number of terrorists in the world who are capable, by knowledge of language, experience in international travel, and other qualifications, to operate in the new dimensions.

By the end of 1976 if not before, my own "well-informed official sources" tell me it will be possible for 999 international airline travellers out of every 1,000 to avoid entirely all those annoying airport searches, simply by getting a "no adverse information" clearance from a computer which contains entries for all persons in the western world and parts of Africa and Asia who own passports, and which can retrieve the clearance information in less than seven seconds.

The searches can be concentrated on the one tenth of one

per cent whose names are for one reason or another not entered in the computer, or whose names do not match their passport numbers and the identifying details, or who are definitely carded as suspect.

But what about Cy Hersh's 10,000 Americans? As an old friend of mine who is one of the original "octopi" says: "We can programme our computers to arrange their information into almost any kind of category, but we can't get them to enter into a bureaucratic battle over which agency is responsible for what."

The battle between the CIA and the FBI started long ago, back in the days of the atomic spies, when J. Edgar Hoover wanted to arrest individual spies, find them guilty in highly publicized court trials, and collect more notches for his six shooter, while the CIA, seeing its job as one of combating enemy espionage services in their entirety, wanted to "turn" the agents quietly and keep them active as channels for deception.

The battle has abated since the death of Mr Hoover, but it is easy to understand how the CIA is not likely to be conscientious about turning over to the FBI its files which contain information on Americans generated by its operations against foreign groups.

How many of these files are there? To find out exactly what list of files Mr Hersh's "well-informed official sources" had in mind we will have to await findings of the Blue Ribbon committee. Meanwhile, my well-informed official sources assure me that when Mr Colby tries to come up with a list of approximately that number he will have several possibilities to choose from. In any case, he will be able to argue that they are as little likely to be the start of police staying where they are as they would be if transferred elsewhere.

Miles Copeland

The author was a founder-member of the CIA. His *The Real Spy World* will be published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson in February.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
05 January 1975

Spying: Threat Or Safeguard?

BY D.J.R. BRUCKNER

CHICAGO—We used to joke about the Central Intelligence Agency being everywhere—in protest groups, antiwar rallies; radical student and racial groups; and lurking about Watergate.

We used to smile at the assertions of radicals in other countries that the CIA was behind al-

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most any unusual occurrence, but the revelations of its operations in Chile put flesh on the ghost that was spooking those radicals.

Congressional investigations, or punishing officials of the agency, or even devising new ways of legislative oversight will not solve the problems presented by the necessity of gathering information secretly and keeping it secret.

The current arguments suggest that political leaders in this country are primarily concerned about government spying on citizens of this country, but not on those of other countries. Such a problem could be solved elegantly by intelligence exchange agreements between nations: Your spies will watch my people and mine will watch yours, and we will tell one another.

Governments do not write treaties about such arrangements but, at many times and concerning particular problems, such exchanges have actually been made; it would be surprising if they were not made now, in some places.

For organizations or for people who exercise great power, some secret gathering and analysis of information is absolutely necessary.

But the intelligence operations of governments are political functions and they must be justified in a political context. The remark of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, when people challenged him about Chile, that "a government has to have some covert operations" is inadequate and a bit infuriating. It might have been tolerable in a past age when most people were more aware of threats from other nations, and when they had more reason to be confident about the conduct of their own government.

For more than 35 years we

have been taught to admire good agents in good causes. Some early films of Alfred Hitchcock were powerful justifications for good spying. The enormous literature of World War II taught the same lesson, and the cold war and the prototype of the "third man" reinforced it.

For years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation cooperated in creating popular broadcast series to strengthen the same indoctrination. Even a decade ago, a tremendous audience could be gathered for a series like "The Man From U.N.C.L.E." in which the loyalties of the agents were not necessarily national, but all was good.

But the politicians ought to pay more attention to entertainment: The great popularity of a character like James Bond, to whom the question of the cause's goodness is irrelevant so long as he likes it, should have alerted them.

War itself changed people's attitudes. Vietnam was justified by the government to the American people as an outgrowth and extension of intelligence operations, and the misuse of intelligence estimates and statistics in that conflict could be seen by anyone. The war we came to fear was our own against others, and there was a greater desire to be free from war than to be secure from fear.

Even in civil life, audiences that once desired stories and films about struggles and subversion in business are now fearful at revelations of the extension of secrecy and subversion in a world of worldwide business.

More recently, military surveillance of political leaders and military spying on the National Security Council, innumerable leaks of secretly gathered information for political purposes, the use of some federal agents as provocateurs or of grand juries as fish nets, and the enormous secret conspiracy called Watergate have made a population that was weary of "agency" suspicious now of power itself.

The Ford Administration should not be nonchalant about this dangerous problem. Despite the disillusion, most people do understand the need for international intelligence operations in a world that is not motivated by goodwill.

But here we see the secret operators divided in their own loyalties, as irregular in purpose

NEW YORK TIMES
22 January 1975

Intelligence in Review

The Senate Democratic majority has taken an important initiative in proposing machinery for an independent and sweeping evaluation of the nation's intelligence systems, the first such assessment since 1947. The task demands political sensitivity and discretion; it holds a great potential for long-lasting impact both on national security and on civil liberties.

By the remarkably lopsided vote of 45 to 7, the Democratic Caucus rejected the viewpoint of Senator Stennis that the Central Intelligence Agency would be destroyed were it subjected to thorough and unbiased scrutiny. His proposal that only Senators already charged with C.I.A. oversight responsibilities could be trusted to carry on the evaluation was rebuffed, and rightly so.

Adequacy of oversight and accountability is one of the central questions before the inquiry, and it would make little sense to assign investigators from the ranks of those to be investigated. The Rockefeller Commission has already been criticized for lack of detachment; it would only compound the damage if the parallel Senate inquiry fell into the same trap.

For the sake of public credibility, on which the success of the whole enterprise ultimately depends, Majority and Minority Leaders Mansfield and Scott should capitalize on their broad license in choosing members for the new select committee, stressing intellectual honesty and diversity of approach above prior experience or exposure in the intelligence field. We only regret that the committee is not to be a joint creation of Senate and House.

Though much of the committee's analytical work will have to be done in closed sessions, insulated from the heat of immediate controversies, there is also a public education function.

The testimony of Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee last week was a good example of how the public interest in disclosure can be served without violating the intelligence community's legitimate responsibilities for secrecy. Mr. Colby described many normally secret C.I.A. activities in the United States, relating to recruiting, security and logistical support. These seemed largely innocuous, and may help many on the outside to understand how an intelligence system works.

Enmeshed with these disclosures, however, was Mr. Colby's acknowledgment that the C.I.A. had indeed infiltrated agents into American dissident movements starting in the '60s. There were instances of physical surveillance of Americans, wiretaps and so-called "sur-reptitious entries" into citizens' homes. Mr. Colby and his predecessor, Richard Helms, are certainly entitled to argue that the agency's activities were not illegal, though theirs is hardly the last word. The judicial branch of government will have to determine whether the law has been broken.

The broader responsibility—and opportunity—of the Congress now is to assess whether the nation's intelligence community is set up to do the job properly required of it. This is an ambitious task, and may result in proposals for a restructuring of old established institutions. If the allotted nine months is too short a time to do the job responsibly, the committee should not be hurried into a half-baked conclusion.

as in method, using secret skills against agencies and officials in their own government.

The citizen might be left to choose between internal and external threat; and the situation in which that choice becomes either necessary or accepted is one in which the executive authority of the nation is bound to call for

JAPAN TIMES
4 January 1975

Mexico's Echeverria CIA Collaborator: Ex-Agent's Book

By DONALD ARMOUR

LONDON (Kyodo-Reuter) — President Luis Echeverria of Mexico is named as a collaborator of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in a book published here Thursday by a disgruntled ex-CIA officer.

The book, "Inside the Company, CIA Diary," was published in London by Penguin Books because the author, Philip Agee, says he was put under pressure from his former employers not to publish it and has avoided his home country while writing it.

The author ignored a U.S. ruling whereby ex-CIA men must submit manuscripts about the organization to their former employers for approval.

The 600-page book is very free in the naming of names. A list at the back purports to expose personalities and organizations as agents, collaborators and creations of the CIA. The entry on President Echeverria reads: "Mexican Minister of Government (internal security) and later President. Close liaison collaborator of the Mexico City (CIA) station. Cryptonym: Litempo-14."

The book concentrates chiefly on the enormous web of CIA activities in Latin America, because this was the author's field of activity. He worked in CIA stations in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico City between 1960 and 1968. Now an avowed anticapitalist, he calls for socialist revolution, without saying that he is a Communist.

Predecessors Also Named

The author says President Echeverria's predecessors, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and Adolfo Lopez Mateos, were also close collaborators of the CIA's Mexico City base, its biggest in the Western Hemisphere. Diaz Ordaz was, so the author says, at the pinnacle of an organization called "Litempo", a CIA operation which consisted of a series of operational support programs to the Mexican security forces for the purpose of obtaining intelligence exchange with the Mexicans.

The author describes how there were ill feelings when U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman arrived and discovered that Diaz Ordaz was more interested in maintaining links with the local CIA station chief than with him, on CIA involvement.

In the suppression of stu-

dent demonstrations in Mexico City during the summer of 1968, when hundreds were slain or disappeared, the book says the Mexico City CIA station obtained information by its agents on planning by a strike committee and on positions taken by Communists and far-left groups. "Highlights of this intelligence are being passed to Diaz Ordaz and Echeverria for use by the security forces," a diary entry reads.

The book is in fact a cryptodiary. Although in diary form, it was written only recently, each "entry" being a later reconstruction of the events of the time, and of the author's feelings then.

During Agee's tour of service in Mexico, the CIA provided advice and equipment for a new secret communications network between President Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the country, the diary tells us "other joint operations with the Mexican security services include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action," it says.

Labor Implicated

Other alleged collaborators of the CIA named by Agee include George Meany, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). He calls him a principal CIA agent/collaborator in the U.S. trade union movement for the purpose of CIA international labor operations. A chief instrument of this, set up by the CIA, the author says, is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) based in Brussels. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), ostensibly concerned with adult education and social projects, is a CIA-controlled operation for organization anti-Communist trade unions overseas, he also says.

On the CIA's involvement in overthrowing the late President Salvador Allende of Chile, Agee says the agency was involved as far back as 1964 in trying to smash the Marxist politician's political hopes. Before the Chilean presidential election that year, he says, the Montevideo base where Agee was stationed was involved in raising Chilean escudos to be sent to the CIA station in Santiago to mount a "really big operation" to keep Allende from being elected.

The author does not specify what was involved in this op-

eration. But elsewhere he does detail from his own experience what kind of methods the CIA used, in Latin American countries.

Psychological Warfare

These included psychological warfare such as the placing of anti-Communist propaganda in the news media, frame-ups of party officials, publishing of false propaganda attributed to revolutionary groups in such a way that it would be both difficult to deny and damaging to the group. It included sabotage, economic warfare, support for small armies, youth and student organizations, personal harassment such as putting invisible itching powder on car steering wheels, introducing substances into food which make the body go a bright, unnatural hue, and "goon-squads to beat up and intimidate party officials, using stink bombs and other harassment devices to break up meetings. . . ."

Describing feelings among the CIA after the 1964 elections, Agee reconstructs the mood of the day in a diary "entry": "... returns from the elections in Chile today show Eduardo Frei an easy winner over Allende. Chalk up another victory for election operations. Allende won't be a threat again for another six years."

The author also speculates that the 1973 truck drivers' strike in Chile, the economically crippling, long drawn-out event which encouraged the right-wing military junta to seize power from Allende, might have been financed by the CIA.

One key passage in the book, covering the November 1963 period in Ecuador, indicates CIA interest in truck drivers and transport unions. "On 31 October the national drivers' federation was required by the Government to undergo 'fiscal analysis,' which means they're going to bring under control the one organization that can stop the country completely . . . in fact it's not really a union because many of its members are owners of taxis, trucks and buses and even gasoline stations. Its orientation then is middle class, rather than working class but for our long-range planning it's the most important of the organized trade groups to be

brought under greater influence and control."

The author also recalls that Uruguyan collaborators of the CIA asked the agency "to write the scenario for proof of Soviet intervention with trade unions in 1965 and 1966" he suggests that the CIA might have done the same in Chile.

Describing a frame-up operation in Ecuador, the author says a Quito airport official in the CIA's payroll "found" a toothpaste tube on an Ecuadorian revolutionary returning from Cuba. The tube contained rolled up into a ball inflammatory plans for revolution written by the CIA and planted on the Communist.

The document was intended to appear as the Ecuadorian Communists' report to the Cubans on the status of their organization and on plans for armed action. "We are describing what we know of the organization, filling in with imagination where necessary . . ." the diary recalls.

Soon after, the diary says, a local CIA chief "told Varea (then Ecuadorian vice president and according to the author a salaried CIA agent) to get going on speeches related to all the recent cases involving Communist plans for action. . . ."

In 1963, according to the book U.S. Agency for International Development, (AID) provided Ecuador with more than a million dollars worth of weapons and police equipment, including 2,000 rifles, with a million pounds of ammunition, 6,000 tear gas grenades and almost 2,000 gas masks.

The CIA's priorities in Ecuador Agee says, were penetration of Communist organizations, and the Cuban mission, maintaining agents, at the highest level of government, in the security services and in the opposition parties. It included propaganda to counteract anti-U.S. or pro-Communist propaganda and neutralize Communist influence in mass organizations.

Agee claims that the outstanding liberal journalist of the country Gustavo Saigado was working as a CIA agent, writing columns in the daily newspaper El Comercio, or rather doing final drafts on articles prepared in the CIA station for El Comercio.

From his own experience, the author describes the chief

NEWSWEEK

27 JAN 1975

THE SPOOKS WHO

intention of CIA operations in Ecuador and Uruguay as destroying the left, forcing the governments of these countries to break off relations with Cuba, and disrupting the activities of Soviet bloc countries. Targets included local politicians who, it was hoped, would become dependent on the local CIA station for money. The station in Quito, financed an anti-Communist Christian front which exploded a bomb at a church, the intention being to whip up feeling against revolutionaries, the book says.

Ordered to get a hold over local politicians, the young CIA officer is advised: "The way to do it . . . is to provide money for high Government official's mistress keeping, rent, food, clothing, entertainment."

The author also provides a run-down of local CIA agents in Montevideo in the early 1960s. Under codenames like Avidity-16, Avcave-1, and Avbuzz-1, they included a post office clerk who intercepted the international mail, a Communist Party penetrator who "bugged" the electric sockets with listening devices and "Aybaron", a hilarious Cuban Embassy chauffeur, who "in spite of an accident the first day he was out with the embassy car," steadily gained Cuban confidence.

He describes CIA efforts to find out where Soviet and other Communist embassies are to be placed in Latin America, efforts to buy adjacent property, install listening "bugs" and set up observation posts including some manned by experts who could lip-read in Russian.

Agee describes his initial feeling as a young CIA officer as "being on the threshold of an exclusive club with a very select membership." A passage which rings somewhat like Russian novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn's description of the mentality of Soviet MGB secret police in his book "The First Circle."

Agee describes himself as ending up disillusioned and embittered at what he considers CIA efforts to prop up rotten and corrupt governments. The methods which led to the Watergate scandal were institutionalized at the Virginia CIA training school, he says.

The loftiest aim of the CIA, he was told is to root out communism. But the list of accessories used for this task reads more like the props of a traveling circus than the instruments of such a serious endeavor. Equipment sent down to the Montevideo sta-

CIA director William Colby isn't the only one telling agency secrets these days. Indeed, part of Colby's presentation to Congress last week was a plea for stronger laws to stop the spurt of tell-all books and articles by former CIA agents. Last year the agency was only partially successful in censoring a book entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," co-authored by ex-agent Victor Marchetti. Now the CIA faces an even more difficult battle with a onetime spook who has gone outside the country to publish his exposé.

The book is called "Inside the Company: CIA Diary," and ex-agent Philip Agee avoided all attempts at prior censorship by having it published first in Great Britain.* Now an American edition is planned by Straight Arrow Press, a publishing house connected with Rolling Stone magazine, and the CIA brass is more than a little concerned. "Nobody could doubt Agee's authenticity," said one former CIA operative, and the book's accuracy apparently extends right down to the ferocious wood ticks that infest "Isolation," the secret CIA training base at Camp Peary, Va. More important, the book names dozens of undercover agents and collaborators whom Agee encountered during eight years in Latin America—including three Presidents of Mexico and a leader of the Communist Party in Ecuador. "I think it's terrible, frankly," Colby told Newsweek in an interview two weeks ago, "because this puts people's reputations

WASHINGTON POST

19 JAN 1975

By JOYCE ILLIG

Cloak and Arrow

A CONTROVERSIAL new book just published in England, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, by Philip Agee, will be published here in May by Straight Arrow Books, the San Francisco publishing house that is a division of Rolling Stone.

The manuscript was offered to many large publishing houses before Straight Arrow became involved but, according to Straight Arrow's managing editor, Diane Cleaver, there was some hesitation because of all the trouble Knopf had over Victor Marchetti's book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. After a prolonged court battle, Knopf was ordered to delete some sections of Marchetti's book.

Straight Arrow feels safe in going ahead with publication, Cleaver said, because the British publisher and prime contractor, Penguin, will have 10,000 copies in Canada in February. "If the book's available in Canada, it's rather silly to think that it

tion, for example, included "wigs, hair coloring, special shoes and clothing, special glasses, moustaches, warts, moles."

RUSH INTO PRINT

in bad shape, it puts people in physical danger."

Agee sees it differently, of course. A 1956 graduate of Notre Dame, he began his twelve-year CIA career as a conservative Roman Catholic, but eventually came to view himself as a revolutionary socialist whose mission was to warn the world about CIA machinations abroad. "Reforms of the FBI and the CIA, even removal of the President from office, cannot remove the problem," he writes. "American capitalism, based as it is on exploitation of the poor, with its fundamental motivation in personal greed, simply cannot survive without force—without a secret police force." And to buttress that shrill argument, Agee lists a variety of U.S. organizations—from the AFL-CIO to New York's First National City Bank to the International Police Academy in Washington, D.C.—that he claims are financed, controlled or influenced by the CIA.

Disclosures such as Agee's, Colby told Congress last week, are not subject to criminal penalties under existing law unless "made to a foreigner or . . . with an intent to injure the United States . . . The irony," Colby added, "is that effective criminal penalties do exist for unauthorized disclosure of an income-tax return, patent information or crop statistics—but not for the darkest secrets of the nation's most secret service."

*640 pages. Penguin Books, London.

wouldn't be available here," she said. The 480-page American edition will be priced at \$10.

Agee joined the CIA in the late 1950s after being recruited at the University of Notre Dame, where he went to college. He was an agent in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico before resigning in the late '60s and is now living in England.

"The book is really quite amazing," according to Cleaver, "because it does give the day-by-day operations of the CIA in a way that hasn't been done before. Agee names a lot of names, and in that sense it's a very sensational book. Many of the names aren't familiar to us but it mentions some American corporations and individuals who are involved with the CIA. There are appendices in the book which list everyone involved and it's quite extensive."

Straight Arrow arranged for the American rights after Jann Wenner, owner of the Rolling Stone Corporation, mentioned the book to Alan Rinzler, then the president of Straight Arrow and now a consulting editor. At the end of last summer, Rinzler was in London and made an agreement with Penguin. "It wasn't brought to us," said Cleaver. "We went after it."

JOYCE ILLIG writes regularly on the publishing scene for Book World.

PEOPLE

3 FEB 1975

IN HIS OWN

WORDS

PHILIP AGEE: A SPY WHO QUIT UNMASKS THE CIA HE SERVED

Jesuit-trained and a Notre Dame graduate, Philip Agee seemed an ideal recruit for the CIA—or "the Company," as insiders call it—when he first "came aboard." And a zealous CIA post-officer he proved for 12 years, most of them spent on station in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico City. But shortly after Agee "went ashore" (resigned) in 1969, the CIA began receiving disturbing reports. Apparently Agee had gone to Castro's Cuba to research a book. Next he holed up in Paris, then resurfaced in London. Often broke, he was kept going, ironically, at times by handouts from agents trying to gain access to his manuscript. Agee's book, just published in Great Britain and titled *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, is all that the agency feared: a detailed spook-and-tell account of CIA operations in Latin America, laced with Agee's tortured account of his failing marriage and his secret conversion to radical socialism that led to his CIA exposé. Former CIA men do not question "its deadly accuracy," as one described the book, although they put down Agee as "not a very high-level staff officer." Others are furious at his identifying nearly 250 CIA staffers, agents and collaborators, noting coldly, "This is sometimes perceived as penetration by a hostile agent." "Victor Marchetti, author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (PEOPLE, Sept. 9), calls Agee's book "authentic" but adds that letters to him from Agee are "a little like hearing from someone who's just got religion." In the cold, as far as legal action is concerned, is the CIA itself. Director William Colby points out that the oath of secrecy required of CIA men is little more than a gentlemen's agreement: the agency cannot prosecute an ex-CIA officer who blabs. Recently Philip Agee talked in England with Jerene Jones of PEOPLE about his CIA experiences, gradual radicalization and ordeal while writing his book.

Did you agree with CIA policies while you were carrying out its orders?

I agreed with what the CIA wanted me to do when I first started. I was in favor of their policies, because I thought we were buying time for the liberal reformers in Latin America in the 1950s and '60s—people like Betancourt in Venezuela, Haya de la Torre in Peru, Kubitschek in Brazil.

What changed your mind?

I see now that it was a way to ra-

tionalize U.S. intervention. Little by little, I came to believe that it was not reforms that were most important, but freedom for big U.S. corporations to operate in those countries. The more successful we were as the CIA, the further away from liberal reforms we got. The CIA is a political police attempting to hold back history. A socialist revolution is the only means to effect reform in most developing countries. Cuba, which I visited in February 1974, is the only Latin American country to fulfill the social goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Apart from gathering information, did you personally commit any political crimes in Latin America?

Yes, many times. Constantly, in fact.

What kind of crimes?

Things like wiretapping, planting false documents, suborning politicians and framing people to get them arrested and put in jail.

In your book, you list nearly 250 persons you identify as CIA officers, local agents, informers and collaborators. Are these agents still active?

I would assume so. In October, I made a list available to the press of 37 CIA people in Mexico City, and the two top agents were withdrawn.

Were any on your list of 250 your friends?

No comment. I don't consider them friends anymore.

What do you think will become of them?

I hope they won't be able to serve anymore. I hope I have disrupted their effectiveness, curtailed their activities.

By identifying CIA agents, have you possibly imperiled their lives?

That is beside the point. These are grown men I am writing about. They can take care of themselves. I just want to neutralize them, not have them killed.

Do you feel any moral conflict?

I feel badly about it. It is a conflict, no doubt. But staying quiet is worse than writing about it. The real people who are being sacrificed are those struggling against injustice.

Among the CIA "collaborators," you list a president and two former presidents of Mexico. Do you stand by this?

For future editions I would say that the current president of Mexico, Luis Echeverría Álvarez, was a reluctant collaborator, but not an agent. He was simply following the lead of Díaz Ordaz, who preceded him. Echeverría broke with the CIA.

In what ways did the CIA prop up regimes in Latin America?

By the establishment of Public Safety Programs in AID (Agency for International Development). We trained and infiltrated the local police posing as AID technicians. In Montevideo, for instance, we expanded and promoted the police capability for repression.

Do you know of instances where the CIA went beyond "smearing" critics and actually disposed of them?

The CIA arranged the assassination of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and tried to do the same to Castro.

What is a day like in the life of a spy?

A grind. You start in the morning by reading all the local newspapers. Then you read all the Telex messages and cables and correspondence in the station, and prepare for agent meetings. You get the money ready—if you need it. Afterwards you write reports—contact reports—on agent meetings. In the evening, you go to embassy cocktail parties, dinner parties and receptions. The more people you know in the local community, the more possible spy contacts you have.

How did you get your instructions, and did you ever disobey?

We got our instructions by coded cable, by couriers and in diplomatic pouches. I never disobeyed. The things I didn't like, I just dragged my feet on.

Did the CIA know you were writing your book? Did they know its contents?

I assume they did. I have no evidence, but they could have broken into the publishing house or into my house. The KGB (Soviet Intelligence) would have known what was going on.

Do you feel that you were "smeared" by the CIA after you left the agency?

Yes. The CIA circulated the report that I was a drunk and despondent agent in Mexico City, spilling my story to a journalist. I was not drunk or despondent.

What makes you think you were shadowed and "bugged" while you were

writing your book?

I just saw it. In London there were seven people tailing me on the tube and around my apartment. They were always the same people—probably British. And the telephone engineer told me there were funny things on my line at the telephone exchange.

Do you feel you are in danger now?

No, not especially. The CIA can't do anything to me here that isn't approved by the British. One wonders, of course, but you can't worry all the time.

Were you aware of the CIA's domestic spying activities that have recently come to light?

I spent some time back in the States in 1966-67. By that time a new division—the Domestic Operations Division—had set up offices in various U.S. cities. The alleged purpose was to discover foreign influence in the protest organizations, like the anti-Vietnam war group.

Do you think there was foreign control?

No matter how tenuous, most of these cases had some foreign connection. All foreign operations have domestic connections.

Should the CIA continue?

I think the CIA should not exist. It is an instrument of repression.

Then how would you change the CIA?

There will have to be a socialist reorganization in the U.S. When people think of socialism they often think of the KGB, but the style of the Soviet secret police is not in the American tradition. We have different ideas and traditions. There would have to be citizen control, with regular reviews of policy.

Were you surprised at Watergate?

Watergate is chapter and verse out of the CIA manual. If these acts are criminal when committed by officials in the U.S., what are they when inflicted on foreign peoples? Are they not crimes abroad as well, or does morality change when you cross the border?

What are your future plans?

I want to go back to the U.S. as soon as possible. But the American Civil Liberties Union has told me not to return until after my book is published in the States. The CIA could enjoin me not to publish, as they tried with Victor Marchetti when he wrote *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*.

How would you compare your book to Marchetti's?

He was writing from the headquarters vantage point, whereas my book is a window on the CIA in the field. Between the two, you'll get a pretty good idea of what the CIA is all about.

ROLLING STONE

30 JAN 1975

EX-CIA AGENT TELLS MORE

Rather than waiting until publication of my book (*Inside the CIA: A Company Diary*) I send comments now. While the principal argument is not with the CIA as your interviewer correctly wrote (RS 174), it should be emphasized that the real argument is with capitalism, an economic system founded on personal greed. While liberal arguments may have entered our conversation, given the questions asked, my view is that a socialist revolution, not liberal reform, is the correct road out of the capitalist world's current crisis. As for hope, I'm not only hopeful but I'm also confident that the CIA and their forces of repression can and will be defeated as part of the weakening and eventual defeat of the ruling minority of the U.S.

Thus Ralph Gleason's moving columns (RS 172, 173) on "what to do about it" are disturbing. Vacillation between grooving on the music and despair is just what the Rockefellers and their servants want the disaffected to do. But the changes so many want can only be obtained through strength and unity in a political party or politically oriented organization, through study and sacrifice and through risk taking. No overnight miracles but a long, hard struggle with successive small political actions accumulating.

PHILIP AGEE

Cornwall, England

LONDON TIMES

6 January 1975

CIA UNDER SCRUTINY

President Ford is undoubtedly right to appoint a commission to investigate allegations that the CIA has been conducting illegal intelligence operations within the United States. The allegations are serious enough to cause concern, and the public mood in the United States is now much less tolerant of the notion that the law can be bent when someone in a position of power believes it to be in the national interest. Vietnam and Watergate have undermined confidence in the Executive, and recent revelations about the activities of the CIA have persuaded many people that the American system of checks and balances has not been effective in this area.

Nevertheless, the problem is not just a simple matter of bringing the CIA to heel. In the first place it is hard to envisage the commission digging very deep in three months, which is the time allotted to it. Then the distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence work is not as simple as it looks on paper. For instance, links between

domestic protest groups and foreign governments may need to be investigated. How far these really did exist in the case of the Vietnam demonstrations may be questionable but the need to find out is not. As for Watergate, the CIA was dragged in because the FBI refused to do the dirty work. Obviously the CIA was wrong to allow itself to be used in this way but it comes under the direct authority of the White House and therefore needs an unaccustomed level of determination and integrity to resist a request from that quarter.

This suggests that the basic problem lies only partly in the CIA itself. It is not quite such an unaccountable private army as is sometimes depicted. It comes under the National Security Council and is supposed to be overseen by committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Its brief is very wide.

Obviously it has on occasion developed a momentum of its own that has stretched the formal constraints on its activities. It has also been adept at persuading

both the Executive and the Legislature to approve, or turn a blind eye to, some very dubious activities. But the ultimate responsibility for what it has done must rest at least as much with those who were supposed to oversee it as with the agency itself.

There is, of course, an obvious problem in controlling clandestine activities in an open democracy, and there are strong temptations in an imperfect world to adhere too enthusiastically to the maxim that nice guys finish last. When the United States was sure of its mission in the world there was too little concern about the means used to pursue it, and when the inner security of the state seemed threatened similar attitudes prevailed. If Mr Rockefeller's commission can help to restore a decent respect for legality and a proper sense of the relationship between means and ends in a democracy it will have done valuable service. But it ought to look at the whole context in which the CIA operates.

HARPER'S WEEKLY
24 JAN 1975

Tracking the CIA

Acting on INPOLSE, Your Intrepid Reporters Stalk the CIA and Hit Paydirt

The stately, four-story Washington town house bore absolutely no external markings to identify it as the home of International Police Services, Inc., a company that we had been investigating on a tip that it was a CIA proprietary—or secretly owned front company. Large shutters blocked the view through the windows. There was no mailbox. The building looked like a funeral home in hiding, mum and withdrawn.

There was a surprising bustle of activity outside the back entrance, however, as workers of all kinds—plumbers, carpenters, electricians, painters—ambled in and out of the building. Movers had emptied the place the day before, they said, taking truckloads of equipment to an unknown destination, and the repairmen were now cleaning up for the next occupants. The telephone had been disconnected, with no forwarding number. International Police Services (INPOLSE) had vanished at the moment we had found it.

Inside the vacant building, there were remnants of what looked to have been a specialized school. Three of the rooms were stripped laboratories, with formica tabletops around the perimeter and sinks with arching faucets. One lab had a formica display table in the middle, and another was built around a long, shallow basin of stainless steel, which we guessed had been used for developing film.

In addition to the labs, there were several offices and about half a dozen large classrooms, complete with blackboards, world maps, and wall signs preaching school discipline: CLEAN BLACKBOARD AND CHALK TRAY AFTER CLASS. One classroom was lined with wall sockets, wiring along the floor, and other evidence that it had once been an audio room with earphones at each desk. Someone had left magazines on a table—copies of *Police Chief*, *The Shooting Industry*, *American Firearms Industry*, and the *International Police Academy Review*. A Code of Professional Conduct, written in French, was

posted in one hall. It was a kind of pledge of allegiance for police officers. Other signs were in Spanish.

The secret schoolhouse was bare except for file folders strewn about on the first floor. The folders had been emptied, but they were still labelled and the labels proved to be the only clues. Ten folders were marked "SURVEILLANCE—INTERVIEWS". About 50 others carried the names of companies around the country, presumably firms with which INPOLSE did business. Finally, six folders were marked with the names of individuals, who turned out to have been instructors at the school.

The corporations and the instructors, plus independent sources, provided us with hard evidence that International Police Services, Inc., operated for nearly 23 years as an arm of the CIA, under cover as a private firm. Part of its business was to export police wares to foreign police forces—guns, ammunition, nightsticks, handcuffs, holsters, uniforms, radios, and relatively unsophisticated kinds of bugging and surveillance equipment. But, according to INPOLSE officials, this export work was only a sideline to the larger task of education. Over the years, INPOLSE provided specialized training in police techniques to thousands of foreign policemen from 87 countries around the world.

Philip Agee, a renegade ex-CIA operative nine years' experience in Latin America, described how, in 1965, he sent one of the Agency's Uruguayan agents, Alejandro Otero, to INPOLSE for training. Otero was then chief of intelligence for the Montevideo, Uruguay, police department. In an interview in London, Agee said that the special courses in Washington were designed "to jack up" Otero and "get him going against the Tumpamaros," the strongest group of Uruguayan revolutionaries at one time.

Agee's story begs comparison to the explosive film, "State of Siege," in which the Tumpamaros kill an American official of the AID Public Safety program, in the belief that the

program is merely a front for CIA interference in Uruguay. The State Department, reacting to publicity around the film, has vehemently and consistently denied that the Public Safety programs have been used or controlled by the CIA.

Agee's real-life CIA experience indicates otherwise. He told us that AID's own International Police Academy, a school very similar to INPOLSE that is run out of an old trolley barn in Georgetown, was originally established by the CIA. He went on to say that CIA operatives regularly used the AID Public Safety programs for cover in Uruguay and elsewhere, and that the Agency took advantage of AID's contact with foreign police forces to recruit its agents from among the local cops. Agee recounted how his request to have Otero trained was forwarded to James Angleton's counterintelligence staff at CIA headquarters, and how Otero was assigned to 12 weeks at the International Police Academy followed by four weeks at the CIA's "private" school, INPOLSE.

Angleton is the same senior CIA official who resigned last month in the wake of disclosures that his office had been involved in large-scale domestic operations—seemingly in violation of the CIA's charter. Agee stated—and three other CIA sources confirmed—that Angleton's counterintelligence office also controlled the CIA's worldwide police liaison, infiltration, and training programs. We have learned that the actual CIA operation that funneled people like Otero into training assignments was known by the acronym DTBAIL, and that a former Angleton staffer named Byron Engle moved from the CIA in 1962 to head the entire Office of Public Safety in AID.

"State of Siege," was banned from Washington's Kennedy Center two years ago because of its political overtones. The movie also provoked a heated debate in Congress over AID's police training programs. Most of the inquiry focused on AID's International Police Academy, which has now been legislated almost

out of existence.

But none of the Congressional hearings or probes disclosed the operations of INPOLSE, even though it was older and at least as large as the Police Academy. Commercial cover worked so well for INPOLSE that it conducted classes, undetected, for 14 years at the old brownstone in the heart of Washington—10 blocks north of the White House, six blocks east of Embassy Row on Massachusetts Avenue, only a couple of blocks from the homes of all three *Harper's Weekly* Washington editors. (In 1960, INPOLSE, or the CIA, paid more than \$100,000 in cash for the building.)

The school served as a parallel institution for the Police Academy, and several instructors referred to it as a kind of "graduate school" for IPA.

Philip Agee said INPOLSE was used to conceal CIA training experts whom "you didn't want kicking around the Police Academy." One high CIA official, who retired two years ago from Agency headquarters here, observed that INPOLSE "performed services that IPA was not capable of performing."

We took the names of the corporations from the discarded file folders and showed them to people knowledgeable in the traffic of firearms and bugging devices in Washington's underworld. These people recognized some of the firms, many of them run out of post office boxes in obscure cities, as dealers in police hardware and low-quality surveillance equipment. After examining our list, the State Department's Office of Munitions Control acknowledged that INPOLSE is registered as an exporter of munitions and other material requiring special government approval.

The State Department pondered our request for information about specific licenses—showing how much the company had exported, and to whom—for more than a month, without conclusion. We then filed an official request under the Freedom of Information Act, which by law requires a response within 10 days. The State Department has now been studying the matter for six weeks.

So we have not been able to determine the nature and volume of INPOLSE's arms exporting business. Several former IN-

POLSE officials said that the flow of exports was heavy during the 50s and early 60s but tapered off rapidly thereafter when large firearms firms moved into the police export business, attracted by all the government money being thrown around. In recent years, sources said, INPOLSE did almost no export work and restricted itself to its function as a Smith & Wesson dealer, selling police revolvers to the students.

Since much of the school's training business was presumably financed through contracts with the AID Office of Public Safety, we went through AID records to find out how many foreign policemen had been sent there. We located contracts worth \$320,889.13, covering about a thousand students. But INPOLSE officials themselves said this represented only a small fraction of the company's work with AID over the years.

After further toil in the bureaucracy, we found an AID clerk who said that many INPOLSE records were "missing" from the files. For example, all the financial records of a major, worldwide contract during the Vietnam era were not there. The contract covered the years 1963-70. Obviously, the AID records are hopelessly incomplete, and another Freedom of Information request for the remaining contracts has been pending since early December.

Even if the AID contracts turn up, they will not tell the full story of INPOLSE's activities. According to a former officer of the company, AID was often bypassed altogether in contracts directly between INPOLSE and foreign governments and police departments. These relationships have proved impossible to enumerate thus far, as have the relationships between INPOLSE and American agents receiving special training. All former INPOLSE officers have vigorously denied that the company ever trained Americans, but one ex-CIA operative said that he himself took a counter-insurgency course there in the late 60s before going to Vietnam for operations that included working closely with the Vietnamese police in the Phoenix program.

A former instructor at INPOLSE confirmed the fact that Americans had been trained there, recalling "at least one" group of agents under the tutelage

of a guerilla expert from the Philippines, Napoleon Valeriano. We have established that INPOLSE used the services of Valeriano, who distinguished himself in CIA agent Edward Lansdale's campaign against the Huk rebellion in the Philippines during the fifties. Lansdale became legendary as "The Ugly American," and Valeriano later seemed to turn up wherever there were concentrations of jungle, insurgents, and CIA agents. He helped train the CIA's Cubans for the Bay of Pigs expedition, and subsequently helped train counterinsurgents for Vietnam.

The former officers of INPOLSE denied that the firm had connections with the CIA at all. Frank Holmes, its first president, refused even to discuss the matter unless we would tell him which of his former employees had given us our leads. He and the other officers painted the police training experience as a relic from an old era, bygone and uninteresting.

To some extent they are right. INPOLSE is recently dead, and the International Police Academy is scheduled to close in February—in accordance with an amendment proposed by Senator James Abourezk (D-S.D.) and adopted by Congress. A just-retired high-ranking CIA official, with direct knowledge of police training matters, said that IPA had been "turned over to AID... that is, really turned over" by the Agency in the last couple of years, anyway.

The era of large, Washington-based, CIA-sponsored training schools for foreign policemen is ending after a run of many years. But this does not mean that the Agency is now without methods to penetrate and train the police and security establishments of foreign countries, or without the means to recruit foreign officials for use in American intelligence programs and covert operations.

The new law contains two loopholes large enough to fly a U-2 through. One, for which CIA Director Colby personally lobbied, allows the CIA itself to continue training foreign police. (Colby assured the Congressmen that it would not be done too much.) The other loophole exempts programs for training foreign officials in narcotics con-

trol. Already the word is out in Washington that significant numbers of CIA operatives are moving over to the Drug Enforcement Administration, following the bureaucratic winds. And no one knows when we will find out which of the CIA's other proprietaries—there are hundreds in this country—is carrying on the INPOLSE tradition.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 11 January 1975 JOHN TORODE

WHEN THE CIA was set up, it was given carte blanche by the US Government to operate abroad as it saw fit (subject, of course, to civilian control) except in four countries. They were Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There, it was formally agreed with the host governments that the agency would act only with their prior knowledge and approval.

Some of the most recent CIA defectors claim that that agreement has been secretly buried by the Americans who now feel free to get up to any sort of secret dirty trick over here just as they do in France, Chile, and other unstable and backward parts of the world. Senator Schweiker's latest revelations give credence to this view.

Except that I am assured by the Brits that relations are as good as ever and the Schweiker letter just doesn't ring true. That in turn raises another possibility. Just suppose the Schweiker letter was a forgery. Who would benefit? None other than the CIA — by discrediting the many other, more sensational and substantial allegations about the agency now doing the Washington rounds.

But, if that is too convoluted for your taste, let us return to the supposed breakdown of the special relationship. My ex-CIA source puts it like this: Cord Meyer, the (well known) CIA boss in London, has spent all his life on the covert (dirty tricks) side of the CIA.

He is a "swashbuckler and a special ops man." Not the sort of character you'd send to London to swap cosy gossip with the Brits. More the man to head a befed up super secret team in a country on the verge of instability.

As my man puts it: Britain is in economic chaos with "Labour extremists" in both the union and government, part of the country in a state of armed revolt, and Rightist paramilitary groups are limbering up. Just the sort of unstable situation in which both full scale espionage and good ole dirty tricks come into their own.

The Sparring Blow by Blow

This is a portion of our conversation with Dennis Flemming, the last president of International Police Services.

Q. This American from the CIA that we talked to said he came over to your place before he went to Vietnam and took a course in police methods. In the late sixties. He said he was with some other fellows from the CIA.

A. I don't know. He may have that a little screwed up. Did he say us, or did he say International Police Academy.

Q. No. He said International Police Services, on R St.

A. Well, that was our address . . .

Q. That's what got us interested . . .

A. But I don't recall anything like that. We've had people coming in and checking in to see what the hell we do and that sort of thing, but I don't recall any training per se.

Q. Well, in fact we were able to confirm that with one of your instructors.

A. Uh, what instructor?

Q. Well, I wouldn't give your name to somebody else, either. But it was someone who had a long relationship with your company.

A. Well, as I say, we've had people from all kinds of government agencies come over to see what we're doing, but it doesn't ring a bell that we had a group of people from that outfit.

Q. Did you have any connection with the CIA in the business?

A. Not except as a friendly bystander.

Q. I see. Cause, I guess, we have several sources who have said that you were what is known as a CIA proprietary. In other words, that the CIA helped to set you up and was running you during the course of your business.

A. Well, here's the thing. People can say a whole lot of things. And I don't know what their purpose might be in saying them. But I'm talking to a guy I don't know from a bale of hay over the phone. . . .

Q. You don't really want to talk about it then?

A. Look. My position is that I'm just the last boss of a losing cause. We lost some money in that company. It was a bad deal, and I don't feel like talking to anyone about it. You know. I'm a retired cop, and I'm a very private guy.

Q. Where were you a cop? That must have been a long time ago.

A. That's not really important.

Q. I know, but . . .

A. This thing's all history now. I'm unhappy that something I was involved in didn't turn out, but I'm not thinking about it now. I don't even talk about it to my brother. . . .

Not all the former instructors of INPOLSE talked freely with us. This is one example.

Q. I understand that you at one time had a connection with International Police Services, Inc. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do, teach courses for them?

A. Yes.

Q. I see. When were you there?

A. Uh. What's this for?

Q. It's for *Harper's Weekly*. We're looking into police training and the export of police equipment.

A. And what's your name again?

Q. Taylor Branch.

Q. And you're with *Harpers*?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't mind my asking a few questions, do you?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Can I ask you why?

A. Well, I just don't like to . . . If you'll write me a letter and put it in writing, I'll, maybe I'll answer it.

Q. Could I come to see you?

A. No, no, it's not necessary. Have you contacted anyone else?

A. Yes, we've been talking with some of the officers.

Q. And who are they?

A. Oh, Mr. McKinney and Duane and several of the others. Uh, you worked for them after you retired from the FBI?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of course were you teaching?

A. Uh, what's your number, and maybe I'll call you back.

Q. Uh. (gives numbers)

A. All right. I might give you a call. (hangs up.)

A portion of a conversation with an ex-instructor from INPOLSE.

Q. Were you training Americans over there, too?

A. No. All foreigners, Latin America, Africa, Asia, Southeast Asia, just about everywhere.

Q. I see. But that's how we got interested in the story in the first place. We talked to an American who had been with the CIA, who said that he had

been trained at International Police before he went to Vietnam. Would you know anything about that?

A. Let's see. Oh, yeah. You're right. But I wasn't engaged in it, myself. That's right. We had a fellow from the Philippines who taught them counterinsurgency and that sort of thing. You're right. They had a group over there from CIA.

Q. I see. Just that one fellow from the Philippines.

A. That's right. Who are you, again?

Q. Was there just that one course for the fellows from the Agency?

A. I can't recall. I know there was at least that one group. There might have been two or more, but I really don't know.

Q. Did the Americans mix with the foreigners, or did they keep them separate?

A. No, as I recall, we had the Americans in between the foreign classes.

A. I see. So they didn't overlap.

A. No, that's right.

Q. Did the Americans have some of the same instructors?

A. Yes. They did have some of the same.

Q. I see. What kind of counter-insurgency were they teaching?

A. Oh, I don't know that. That wasn't my cup of tea, so I never got into that.

Q. What did you teach?

A. I gave a course on surveillance, informants, that sort of thing. Regular police work.

LONDON OBSERVER

19 Jan. 1975

Portrait of CIA as an old fool

from JOHN GRAHAM

WASHINGTON, 11 January

NOT a week passes in Washington these days without some disparaging revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency, but this week's discovery is surely one of the oddest.

Senator Richard Schweiker, of Pennsylvania, yesterday made public a document in which the CIA asks various American companies to bid for a contract to supply it with information on transportation technology and developments in Britain, Germany, Canada, France, Japan and the Soviet Union.

Although the document is unclassified, the CIA has instructed the companies to limit all knowledge of the exercise to the spymaster's traditional 'need-to-know' criterion.

The CIA also wants full details of any company employees who may work on the projects, and specifically orders that no non-Americans be involved.

There is both more to this than meets the eye, and less. Senator Schweiker has swiftly denounced the agency for doing what should properly be done by the Department of Commerce or Transportation. He has found in the exercise another proof that the CIA has set up 'an invisible government of its own.'

But all agree that foreign transportation systems and technological developments are of legitimate interest to the United States Government and the CIA; any self-respecting espionage organisation would at least arm itself against subversion with a copy of Bradshaw's railways time-tables.

Why the mystery?

There is little dispute that other countries have surpassed the US in mass transport technology. This particular search for knowledge by the CIA may therefore be neither illegal nor especially threatening to individual or national liberties.

It may also be a sensible method, since a company specialist in transportation sciences is likely to know far more than a CIA man, to be better placed to acquire knowledge and evaluate it. Using private citizens has the additional advantage that the resident CIA agent is not forced to expose himself.

All of which appears so harmless as to dispel mystery, but it is precisely this that is so mysterious. Why is the agency going to such trouble when most of the information it could receive is publicly available anyway?

Technical papers in all the countries named provide masses of up-to-date data on new technology. Close co-operation already exists between the US and most of the named countries on these matters.

The suspicion grows that the project has not a sinister, but a Parkinsonian, explanation, that of an institution grown so big that it puts its fingers into any pie, however unnecessary or idiotic the insertion. This suspicion is to a degree confirmed by the

NEW YORK TIMES

24 January 1975

An F.B.I. Inquiry, Too

Predictably, the admission by former high officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that, during J. Edgar Hoover's tenure, the bureau kept records on personal indiscretions of some members of Congress has turned the Capitol purple with the cries of outraged solons.

Somehow, Congressional cries of injury could be taken more seriously if Congress had been less timorous and considerably more responsible over the years. The notion—not to say the firmly held belief—that Mr. Hoover had a treasure trove of scandal about high governmental personalities was a live aspect of Washington life for decades, as was the knowledge that neither Attorneys General nor Presidents had the courage to rein in Mr. Hoover or to call him to account. In those circumstances, Congress did not choose to serve as residuary protector of individual freedoms.

The timing of the newest allegations about the F.B.I. was fortuitous, coming as it did when Congress was moving to investigate charges of domestic spying by the C.I.A. The Senate Democratic Caucus has taken a sensible step in putting the C.I.A. and F.B.I. inquiries together. A thorough review of the C.I.A.'s activities in this field is meaningless without an over-all look at the issue of domestic security, including the F.B.I.'s responsibilities and the consequences of Mr. Hoover's hostility toward the intelligence agency.

Several members of Congress were quick to note the possibilities of political blackmail implicit in the practice of keeping files on legislators, and Senator Jackson of Washington went so far as to charge that it "goes to the heart of the separation of powers." While he is undoubtedly right, it was the Congressional forfeiture of responsibility to the Executive that made the practice possible in the first place. To redress that balance, Congress needs to go beyond the allegations of domestic spying by the C.I.A. and information-gathering about legislators to grapple with the basic problems of a domestic security program—including clear definition of its limits as well as provision for oversight and control. These are problems that the Congress has grossly neglected in the past.

bureaucratic language of the document: 'Ground transportation may be pushed in the direction of smaller, quieter, more efficient and less-polluting personal transportation systems.'

But it may come as a greater surprise to learn that for the CIA, foreign 'ground' transportation systems include those which operate over water.

There seems to be only two points of anxiety in this latest agency romp, both of them minor.

Why does the CIA wish the companies to identify in their reports not only the foreign firms and institutions engaged in the relevant work, but also the personnel?

And if the work were to take place in, say, Derby, might it not infringe the gentlemen's agreement under which the US and Britain do not spy on each other in each other's country, but only in third countries?

These are, as said, minor points. For once the CIA plays the fool, not the knave.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
19 JAN 1975

Agency's company store

By Tad Szulc

The author is a veteran Washington reporter, author, and free-lance writer.

ONE OF the CIA's most sensitive secrets is the network of CIA-owned companies created in 1950, at the height of the Cold War, to provide fireproof covers for overseas operations.

In the 1960s, it was used to disguise the financing of such enterprises as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26s in the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of other covert activities.

THE HOLDING company or the CIA's corporate empire is the Pacific Corporation located in Washington, Pacific, whose subsidiaries are said to employ some 20,000 people worldwide, was incorporated in Dover, Del., on July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall Corporation [no kin to the publishing firm of that name], an incorporating agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy Delaware's tax advantages.

A CIA official familiar with the Pacific Corporation explained that in this and every other case where a CIA company is incorporated in a

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
16 JAN 1975

state capital, the local secretary of state is informed of the true nature of the enterprise to avoid tax or any other inquiries. Thus Delaware's secretary of state refuses to disclose the names of Pacific's directors at the time of the incorporation.

The Pacific Corporation owns such operational CIA companies as Air America, Inc., whose planes supported all the agency operations in Indochina; C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based airline often used by the CIA; Air Asia Co., Ltd., specializing in aircraft maintenance; the Pacific Engineering Company; and the Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd.

The Pacific Corporation and these five other companies have headquarters in a third-floor suite at 1725 K Street, N.W. in Washington. Oddly, all six are listed in the building directory and in the Washington telephone book. But to a casual visitor to the K Street building lobby, all these names are wholly meaningless, as are those of nine officials listed under Suite 309.

CIA INSIDERS say that the Pacific Corporation may own dozens of other companies elsewhere in the United States and abroad.

It is known that the Pacific Corporation had about \$200 million in "sales" in 1972. This fact emerged

when the Price Commission, engaged in classifying companies by their size for reporting purposes, came upon the Pacific Corporation's tax returns.

Tax returns? Of course. Because the corporation serves as a CIA cover, it has to behave like all other companies. Thus it pays taxes. The CIA realized, however, that the Pacific Corporation's cover was in jeopardy if the Price Commission applied to it the rule that all companies with sales in excess of \$50 million annually must report their activities. Accordingly, the Pacific Corporation sent a letter to the Price Commission advising it that its domestic sales were below \$50 million—that the balance was in foreign operations.

The final irony is that the Pacific Corporation actually makes a profit on its different operations; the problem is how to feed it back, discreetly, to the U.S. Treasury. The empire also finances secret overseas operations.

To disguise the movement of a large volume of dollars—as was the case in Viet Nam and in the preparations for the overthrow of the Chilean regime in 1973—friendly American banks and currency houses discreetly handle this flow of funds.

A jaded view of the CIA spying

By CLARK DeLEON
Inquirer Staff Writer

I am beginning to think there is something the matter with me. Have I outgrown outrage? I think not. At least I hope not, but I cannot disregard these symptoms of encroaching jadedness.

I can't pinpoint when it began, but I know I recognized it for what it was during the Battle of Watergate and Nixon's March to San Clemente. With each day, each revelation, each lie, I grew not more indignant, but more — and oh, how I hate to admit it — bored.

So now we come to the CIA, and again ho-hum fills my soul rather than molar-gnashing righteousness. That's why I'm worried.

I mean, I recognize this business of domestic spying for all its constitutional ramifications, Big Brother and all that. And I feel a sense of duty to my chosen craft to cast a steaming finger toward the government and shout "Villain!"

But am I outraged? No. And how can I not be outraged when people who make their living being cynics seem to

be genuinely angered by this latest revelation of governmental intrusion?

Maybe it's because I always figured the CIA was involved in such nastiness. After all, what are secret police for?

When I was in college during those molten years of student activism and paranoia in the late sixties and early seventies, CIA or FBI surveillance was given to any right thinking, left-leaning collegian. It was almost a matter of honor. Just what kind of revolutionary could you claim to be if you didn't believe that there was a secret dossier on you being compiled by some covert government agency?

Even at the moderate student newspaper office where I worked it was generally accepted that our phones were being bugged, if not by the CIA, at least by the university administration, which in those days amounted to the same thing in our eyes.

So that's why I'm having difficulty with the public reaction (if indeed it is public) over the whole thing.

I can't subscribe to the end-of-democracy-as-we-know-it line of breast beating going on among some (bite my tongue) weeping liberals. Nor can I buy the line articulated by some recent letters to the editor which state, "If these people have nothing to hide, they have nothing to fear from CIA spying." This is like saying that you shouldn't object to being mugged as long as you don't have any money on you.

Anyway, I felt a little better about my own lack of gut churning over this issue when I read a story in the Sunday New York Times headlined "U. S. Furor Over CIA Is a Puzzle to Europe." The people in Bonn, Paris, Rome and London don't understand why we're so upset over something they tolerate as politically expedient, or at any rate, politics. "You don't have a country over there," one diplomat was quoted, "you have a huge church."

Perhaps that is the trouble. I'm agnostic.

GENERALMonday, Jan. 27, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST
R 2

U.S. Exports of Rice Seen as Policy Tool

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

Observers of American agriculture sometimes call rice the "diplomatic crop," since about 60 per cent of U.S. rice is exported, and about half of that is shipped under the Food for Peace program to promote foreign policy as well as alleviate hunger.

In Asia, this rice aid is critical to the economies of several of the United States' main military allies.

At home, a number of corporations have a large stake in the continuation of these federally subsidized shipments. A powerful congressional lobby also supports them.

Since 1969, for instance, the Connell Rice and Sugar Co. of Westfield, N.J., has sold more than half of all the rice tonnage shipped overseas (mainly to Asia) under Food for Peace contracts.

A congressional friend of company president Grover Connell is described by industry and government officials as one of the most influential legislators in getting rice allocated in the food aid program.

The member of Congress is Rep. Otto E. Passman (D-La.). Louisiana is one of five states in which rice farming is concentrated.

Few government officials were willing to talk on the record about Passman's extensive role.

One of the few who was—Irwin R. Hedges, coordinator of the program from 1969 to 1973—said that Passman was feared in the bureaucracy.

"He would call up threatening that we were intimidating private enterprise types by not going along with their prices," Hedges said. He added that a colleague in the Food for Peace program came to his office "trembling" after a

call from Passman.

According to a number of diplomats, Passman has, in effect, instigated requests for food aid rice from foreign governments.

He has been known to summon diplomats to his office, discuss their countries' food deficit problems and extol the virtues of American rice. "The message is clear," said one diplomat.

Indonesian authorities said that subsequent to the signing of a contract for the commercial purchase of 110,000 tons of rice from the Connell Co. in 1973, Passman indicated that he would attempt to arrange food aid rice shipments as well.

By his own account, Passman also has helped sell U.S. rice for cash while visiting foreign countries at taxpayers' expense. Passman, who is chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that handles foreign aid, has done this in talks with leaders of countries that receive large amounts of American economic and military assistance, such as South Korea.

Although foreign officials conceded that Passman can smooth the way for rice shipments on extremely attractive Food for Peace credit terms, this can cause some difficulties.

One is that a ton of rice is more than twice as costly as a ton of wheat. Therefore, countries seeking to avert starvation tend to prefer to import wheat, since their dollar credits can buy twice as much food.

For his part, Passman said that his interests are broader than just supporting the American rice industry. "I support all American agriculture," he said.

Passman's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee has no direct jurisdiction over the budget for the Food for Peace program. That is handled in the annual agricultural appropriations. However, government officials said that Passman has indirect influence, because his subcommittee

handles the budget for the U.S. Agency for International Development, which in turn is in charge of food aid programs.

In fiscal year 1972, rice exports under Food for Peace accounted for 1.08 million tons of the 2 million tons exported. In fiscal year 1973, they made up 994,000 tons of the 1.6 million-ton total, and in 1974 rice accounted for 592,000 tons of the 1.8 million-ton total.

Close to a third of the Food for Peace budget went for rice in fiscal 1974, which ended last June 30. This was because U.S. rice prices were up sharply; the United States had massive commitments to send food to Indochina, and there was less wheat or feed grain available than in previous years.

Since the mid-1960s, hundreds of thousands of tons of rice have been shipped to Indochina. The sales were financed by dollar credits provided by the United States under Food for Peace.

Proceeds from the local sale of the U.S. rice by the governments receiving it have also gone to help support the military budgets of Cambodia and South Vietnam. That practice was stopped by Congress as of June 30, 1974.

In South Korea, proceeds of the sale of the rice aid helped defray the Seoul government's expenses of sending combat troops to South Vietnam.

Since 1969, the Connell Co. has won the largest share of the Food for Peace contracts awarded by the buying agents of foreign governments with dollar credits available for food purchases here.

Connell, founded in 1912, is one of the country's largest rice traders. It buys rice from farm cooperatives, millers and farmers in all the rice-producing states and exports it to about 100 countries.

Rice industry sources say Connell's size, ample storage facilities and aggressiveness give it advantages over smaller rice mills and pro-

ducers' associations.

According to unofficial records supplied by the Agriculture Department, Connell's share of the tonnage shipped under Food for Peace contracts in fiscal years 1969 through 1974 was 40 per cent, 75 per cent, 62 per cent, 63 per cent, 72 per cent and 54 per cent, in chronological order.

In fiscal 1974, with rice prices at record levels, Connell sold rice into the program with a total value of \$172 million, well ahead of such competitors as the Continental Grain, Cargill, and smaller milling firms.

Grover Connell, the company's president, says that the firm's share of the market is in line with its overall share of the commercial export trade.

Contract awards under the Food for Peace credit program are made on public tender, with competitive bidding and open disclosure.

"We're successful in Public Law 480 because we're the low bidder," he said. "We have the largest amount of business because we sell cheaply—because our profit margins are smaller."

On Jan. 7, however, Connell won a contract to supply South Korea 60,000 tons of rice on a bid that was \$6 a ton higher than the offer of a competitor, Riceland Foods, of Stuttgart, Ark.

The Seoul government's buying agent in New York City—the Office of Supply of the Republic of Korea (OSROK)—claimed the Connell rice would be cheaper because of calculations on ocean freight rates. Connell's rice was to be delivered from the San Francisco Bay area, Riceland Foods' from Gulf ports. However, the Department of Agriculture, which reviews all Food for Peace awards, disagreed, and the department rejected the OSROK award. Subsequently, a compromise was worked out in which Connell provided 46,000 tons and Riceland Foods 10,000 tons.

Connell last week described OSROK as an "extremely tough buyer," which is effective in securing commodities at the lowest possible price in this country.

J. H. Park, of the OSROK organization in New York City, said last week that he knew Passman "very well . . . Mr. Passman is known in our country as pro-Ko-

reah."

However, he said that he never discusses individual Food for Peace contracts with the Louisiana congressman.

Meanwhile, there are indications that the rice trade under the Food for Peace

program has now run up against political problems in Congress.

Officials of the U.S. rice industry concede that they have benefited greatly from the Food for Peace program. They are working hard in Washington to overcome a

limitation enacted by Congress in December that could force the administration to divert food aid to needy countries that may not be military allies of the United States.

Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) last week strongly con-

demned administration efforts to earmark \$107 million in food aid credits, mostly for rice buying, to South Vietnam in this fiscal year. He said the country harvested a 7 million-ton rice crop in 1974—300,000 tons larger than in 1973.

WASHINGTON POST
30 January 1975

Long-Term Impact of Arms Sales to Persian Gulf Questioned

By Michael Gettler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Booming U.S. arms sales to the Persian Gulf—a \$4 billion-a-year business presided over discreetly by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger—are a key part of a strategy aimed at winning influence now with the oil barons of the region.

What has been sacrificed by this quest for quick influence, however, is top-level White House attention to the longer-term impact of shipping so many weapons into one of the world's most volatile areas.

"The whole thing could simply explode on us," says Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia.

"We already have a couple of wars going on there, and there is a long history of hostilities and instabilities—tribal, ethnic and religious—in that part of the world," he said in an interview last week.

Saudi Arabia, he warns, is becoming suspicious and nervous over the vast U.S. military sales to neighboring Iran, though both countries are supposed to be "our friends." Small Iranian forces and arms are being used in fighting a rebellion in Oman and U.S. artillery sold to Iran is being used in Iraq where the Kurds' war against Baghdad continues.

The influx of U.S. arms to Iran is widely perceived as providing a convenient excuse for the Russians to

has been ordered. "He probably prefers the flexibility that comes with these tactical decisions," explains one aide, "rather than heeling to a hard policy that could come out of a study."

The Pentagon has substantial say in who gets what weapons. But it is Kissinger who is the central figure in approving all important sales.

Kissinger's pivotal role was attested to by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger in a Sept. 25 press conference. "I should make meticulously clear that the Department of Defense does not have its own policies with regard to the sale of arms," he said. In general, he explained, military assistance "rests under the purview of the Secretary of State. We are the administrators of such programs."

Kissinger is not the instigator of specific arms deals. But in the wake of the global oil-economic crisis that has focused sharp attention on the oil wealth and military weakness of the Persian Gulf, a convenient merger of arms, oil and related interests has taken place.

Gulf nations have shown big appetites for the most modern weapons available. Price is not an object. The United States has often shown a willingness to respond. This in turn signals U.S. military advisers or corporate salesmen overseas that they may whet Gulf appetites even more. When the proposals reach Washington, Kissinger is the key decision maker.

Economically, it is argued that the sales help the U.S. balance of payments and recoup some of the dollars spent on higher oil prices. It keeps more people working in defense plants here and to some extent lowers the Pentagon's cost on some weapons by increasing production.

It is meant to strengthen the Shah of Iran, in particular, as the strongest and most stable pro-Western power in the region.

It is also meant to strengthen Saudi Arabia's King Faisal as the other major pro-Western leader and perhaps provide the United States with some influence in getting these two oil giants to help solve the Arab-Israeli dispute short of war.

Perhaps, White House aides argue, U.S. arms aid will soften Faisal's call for the Israelis to give up Jerusalem, for example.

Influence through arms may also assure, some say, that oil is not cutoff again or at least that prices won't rise again, though Kissinger suffered a jolt

when the shah—a big U.S. arms buyer since 1972—led the charge to raise prices last year.

Even those, like Hamilton, who have serious doubts about the long-range wisdom of U.S. policy are not certain that the current approach is all wrong or that there is any better alternative at the moment than selling the oil exporters all the weapons they want.

But until the "urgent need to re-think our arms policy in that region" is begun, Hamilton suggests, there can be no certain answers to the question of whether there is a better approach.

Last month, Rep. Clarence D. Long (D-Md.), a House Appropriations Committee member, wrote to President Ford complaining that the crucial decision in mid-1972 by former President Nixon to expand arms sales to Iran greatly had been made "without national security studies of the possible consequences."

Long also complained that he twice in 1974 attempted to get details from Kissinger on "our policy commitments to Iran" and got "evasive and incomplete answers."

Even some State Department officials, who support Kissinger's approach, concede that it is hard to be sure—without a detailed study—that a vastly different approach wouldn't work.

If the United States withheld its arms and technology from Iran and Saudi Arabia, could it cause them to lower oil prices and ease the global economic crunch?

The conventional answer is that the other oil exporters in the cartel wouldn't allow it and all would rush into the eager arms of French, British and even Soviet weapons salesmen.

Yet, Iran and Saudi Arabia wield vast power within the oil cartel. American weapons and the support that goes with them are generally viewed here as superior to other nations. While Faisal bankrolls the Egyptians to new French arms, he buys U.S. planes and ships for himself.

More importantly, the United States is vital to these nations when it comes to balancing the Soviet presence in their region.

"The question has come up," said one State Department official, "as to why the U.S. should submit to near blackmail on oil costs. I can't give you an official answer because the question hasn't been systematically addressed. Personally, I don't believe we could force a price drop, but I'm not sure I could prove it."

News Analysis

greatly expand their arms and influence in Iraq, a situation that former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has also questioned.

U.S. government officials acknowledge that neither the Nixon nor Ford administration has carried out a major, National Security Council study of where the Persian Gulf arms race might lead 10 years from now, as is usually done with crucial issues.

Instead, the decisions to sell arms to the oil giants of Iran and Saudi Arabia—and more recently to the tiny but wealthy and strategically located states of Kuwait and Oman—are viewed by aides around Kissinger as basically tactical, immediate foreign policy tools used by the secretary to bolster the U.S. hand.

Kissinger himself may well be the reason that no major study by the National Security Council staff he heads

In the meantime, the impact of the arms sales grows in this country and in the Gulf, and there is an uneasiness among some members of Congress and some senior planners in and out of government that the entire oil situation is uncharted and potentially very dangerous.

In this country, dozens of American firms are now producing military hardware for the Gulf, raising questions about whether, in a recession, the White House would cut back the arms flow even if it felt it should.

In fiscal 1974, the United States sold a record \$8.3 billion worth of arms overseas, more than double the previous year. More than half—some \$4.3 billion worth—went to the Persian Gulf: \$3.7 billion to Iran, almost \$800 million to the Saudis and \$81 million to Kuwait.

Purchases by Iran will probably level off this year, though at a multi-billion-dollar annual level. But Saudi sales will jump, possibly to \$2 billion, according to rough estimates which include money to pay for 94 American military advisers to train the Saudi National Guard.

Sales to Kuwait will escalate to about \$500 million, and small, initial sales to Oman—including new TOW anti-tank missiles—will be made.

Almost weekly, there are new links in the U.S. chain to the Persian Gulf.

At Bethpage, N.Y., some 2,000 workers from the Grumman Corp.—manufacturers of the U.S. Navy's new F-14 fighter—are preparing to leave for Iran to help the Iranians learn to use the 80 F-14s they have ordered. They will join more than 15,000 Americans already in Iran, more than 800 of whom are military personnel or civilians associated with arms.

Somewhere in the United States, a Navy patrol plane detachment will

probably soon get orders allowing them to land for refueling on the tiny island of Masirah, off the coast of Oman. There, they will keep track of Soviet warships that might move toward the narrow openings to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.

Kissinger is known to want U.S. reconnaissance "eyes" over these entryways to the world's oil taps, and that is behind the recent request to the British for landing rights on the island.

"My chief criticism," said Hamilton about all this, "is that our policy is focused disproportionately on the military aspects of our relations, which are important but which shouldn't be all-encompassing. I don't argue that we should cut them off completely... but we've taken the path of least resistance, contributing in a major way to an Iranian military build-up and making them dominant in the region."

"I'm not sure that's in our national interest," he said "or in the interests of regional cooperation."

In return for those arms, however, Iran has acted as a protector in the region, and as a surrogate for U.S. interests to an extent greater than is generally realized, according to experienced State Department officials.

Aside from the battles in Oman and Iraq, Iran is functioning as sort of a U. S. weapons warehouse. The Iranians shipped dozens of American-built F-5 fighters to Saigon in 1972 to help the United States beat the Vietnam cease-fire re-supply deadline. More recently they shipped other F-5s to Jordan, and some officials expect eventually they may be refurbishing tanks for the Pakistanis.

It is now evident, specialists say, that the shah not only wants weapons but also the technology and production line skills that could build up his in-

dustry and make him independent of the United States perhaps a decade from now.

Negotiations to allow co-production of military equipment in Iran—perhaps starting with helicopters—are already under way. The United States hopes to go slowly, but the shah, with his oil and price leverage, may force a faster pace.

What happens years from now if the United States is not independent of Persian Gulf oil needs and the shah is independent of the United States is an unanswered question.


Meanwhile, hundreds of arms salesmen from America, France, Britain and Russia continue to line up outside every defense ministry in the Persian Gulf.

It doesn't take much to persuade the shah of Iran to buy new equipment. The shah reads the U.S. trade magazine Aviation Week as carefully as he reads oil production reports and is well-informed on defense issues.

But the sheer number of U.S. military advisers and industry salesmen now in the area does worry Hamilton and others, mostly because the occasional military attaché who is eager to impress the local U.S. embassy or perhaps to line up a retirement job in an aircraft company may further stimulate the easily whetted appetite for weapons among the sheiks.

The actual overseas sales proceed in many ways. For the most part, foreign countries prefer to buy from the U.S. government, to keep the United States in the act as a middleman and perhaps get better prices because the government can buy in quantity with other orders.

Orders from the Persian Gulf, in particular, are about 90 per cent government-to-government sales, with the



remainder direct contracts with American companies.

But no matter how the sale is proposed, if it involves arms or weapons technology by a company, the U.S. government gets a look at the deal and must give its approval.

Finally, among those concerned over the arms sales question, there is the sense of unreality.

Large amounts of weapons are being sold to countries that have sharply raised oil prices, in part to acquire those arms. They are the same coun-

tries that are generally identified, whether correctly or not, as the cause of the world's economic upheaval. And they have even been mildly threatened that U.S. force will be used against them if they go too far.

WASHINGTON POST
23 January 1975

Victor Zorza

Searching for the Real Dr. Kissinger

In recent days we have been given two totally dissimilar accounts of Dr. Kissinger's view of what is going on in the Kremlin.

One account, in the New York Times, is generally consistent with Kissinger's concern, expressed privately at various times to senators and others, that the Kremlin in-fighting between the good guys and the bad guys may lead to the victory of the hawks and the defeat of detente.

The other account, in a column appearing in The Washington Post, says that Kissinger does not believe there is an all-out leadership struggle between good and bad guys going on in the Kremlin. This is indeed the view now being expressed by Kissinger, who adds that Brezhnev himself took a hard line in ousting Nikita Khrushchev, and then reverted to detente. He also recalls that Khrushchev too at first took a hard line to oust Georgi Malenkov, and then came out for peaceful coexistence. He is not, therefore, unduly concerned about the effect on detente of the present Kremlin "jostling" among those who aspire to succeed Brezhnev.

Will the real Dr. Kissinger ever step forward? He is unlikely to do so, because what he says for publication about goings on in the Kremlin is calculated for political effect, not for public enlightenment, and therefore depends on the circumstances of the moment.

When he was trying to mobilize congressional support for detente, and for the concessions which he wanted to make to the Soviet Union on trade and other matters, he was willing to scare his listeners with talk of hawks in the Kremlin. Now that hawks have prevailed on some issues—such as the repudiation of the trade bill and emigration arrangements—he has to argue that detente is not threatened, because his first concern now is to prevent a chain reaction.

Dr. Kissinger can hardly be held to blame for behaving as a politician—this, after all, is what he is. But for real enlightenment one must go to one of the top U.S. academic experts on foreign affairs, who notes in his book that each period of detente in the past was "ended abruptly (by the Kremlin) with a new period of intransigence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hardliners."

The Harvard professor who wrote this in 1968 was also called Henry Kissinger. All the three Kissingers were right, each in his own way, but the professor is more right than the others, because his analysis can be supported by factual evidence. What happened in the last two power fights in the Kremlin, first when Khrushchev took over from Malenkov, and then when Brezhnev took over from Khrushchev, was that Moscow's foreign policy became immobilized for a time.



This is what could also happen as a result of the struggle for the succession to Brezhnev. The damage to detente, even if temporary, could be serious—and there are some signs already that the "bad guys" in Moscow are straining at the leash.

The latest evidence comes from Moscow broadcasts hinting at domestic opposition to the Vladivostok agreement, which in some ways mirrors the opposition to it in the United States. The agreement became possible only because Brezhnev made what Kissinger has described as "very major concessions"—and because President Ford made equally major concessions which Kissinger does not, of course, admit.

In both countries the concessions made by their leaders have been criticized, in Washington openly by such people as Senator Jackson, and in Moscow secretly by the military hardliners and their political associates. The Moscow criticism could be gleaned only between the lines, and because these signs are usually difficult to read, few Western experts were willing to attach much importance to it.

But Kissinger himself has provided the key to the Kremlin code. He disclosed that the Soviet Union had at first insisted on having as many nuclear weapons as the United States, Britain and France combined, and that it abandoned this demand in Vladivostok. The new agreement provides for equality in numbers as between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet military have been concerned lest such equality between the superpowers might make it difficult for them to match, in a crisis, the combined nuclear forces of the United States and the others, as well as China.

The Moscow broadcasts now say, in reply to "fears" supposedly expressed in letters sent in by "listeners," that further U.S.-Soviet negotiations will take

account of the fact that "several other countries" also possess nuclear weapons. Does this mean that Moscow wants to renegotiate the Vladivostok agreement? The "listeners" are assured that Soviet security interests will not be neglected. The Kremlin, Moscow Radio insists, is not going in for "some sort of unilateral disarmament by our country, as some listeners fear."

The broadcasts—both on radio and on television—use almost exactly the same wording, and are obviously a coordinated propaganda operation. The Kremlin does not usually conduct its struggles on Moscow television, but there have been several occasions in the past when an analysis of the Soviet propaganda output provided clues to the issues in dispute in the Politburo.

The Moscow broadcasts now provide a warning that new difficulties may arise in translating the Vladivostok agreement into treaty form in time for Brezhnev's spring visit to Washington—if indeed he is in a position to make the trip. There are problems on the U.S. side, too, on how to make sure that the Russians are indeed observing the agreement.

On both sides these problems now loom larger because of uncertainty about Brezhnev's future—just as last year the uncertainty about President Nixon's future prevented any real progress on SALT during the Moscow summit. Dr. Kissinger goes on making brave noises now, as he did then, but SALT is in danger, at least in the short term, and so is the whole structure of foreign policy which relied so much on the linkage between SALT, trade, emigration, and the like.

For the long term the prospect is indeed good, as this column has argued in the past—but in the long term we are all dead.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 January 1975

Scientist Says U.S. Fails to Spur Technical Exchange With Soviet

By WALTER SULLIVAN

Technological exchanges with the Soviet Union, a key element in American foreign policy, are being hampered because the Federal Government is "poorly organized" to promote them, according to the chief scientist of the International Business Machines Corporation.

Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb, who previously headed the National Bureau of Standards, said yesterday that joint research projects, scientific and technical cooperation and other mutual efforts helped to cultivate an atmosphere of détente and interdependence, reducing the danger of war.

But, he said, there is no technically qualified authority in Washington capable of inducing the Federal departments and agencies to bring a high level of technical expertise to bear on the problem.

Problems on Soviet Side

Impediments to full development of Soviet-American exchanges are not limited to the American side, Dr. Branscomb said. He listed a wide range of difficulties in dealing with the Soviet Union.

He also noted that most arrangements so far had been with institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Soviet industrial laboratories, also believed to be doing important work, have remained "hidden from view," he said.

Dr. Branscomb gave the Phil

Beta Kappa lecture to the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at the Americana Hotel, 53d Street and Seventh Avenue.

He said that "in a few short years," there had been a basic change in American scientific and technical exchanges with the Soviet Union. Whereas formerly they dealt almost entirely with basic and academic science, they have now become dominated by projects of industrial, social or economic importance.

This shift has introduced complex problems requiring sophisticated decision-making by the Government. For example, under the Trade Reform Act of 1974 and other export regulations a variety of controls have been imposed to prevent exports that would damage national security.

Cool to Technology Export

The Defense Department, which can recommend rejection of an export license, is cool to the export of production technologies and this coolness is shared by many industrial concerns. Their preference is for the export of goods, rather than of production capabilities, some of which are competitive.

Nevertheless, because technology transfer can be an important component of United States trade relations with the Soviet Union and other nations, Dr. Branscomb said, the Gov-

ernment must be capable of identifying license applications in this area that are suitable for approval.

"The balancing of economic, political and military considerations, all of which are major determinants of national security," Dr. Branscomb said, "calls for a more consistent and technically sophisticated view of the management of the science and technology aspect of commercial relations in East-West trade."

Also required, he added is "a more realistic view of U.S.S.R. motives and expectations in our bilateral relations," as well as "a major overhaul" of Government capacities to deal with the problem.

Dr. Branscomb cited the growing effect of the 1972 Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology. This has led to 32 protocols for cooperation and 11 agreements on cooperative research between government agencies on both sides.

These, in turn, have resulted in two or three hundred projects. While it may be too early to assess the productivity of these projects some, such as the joint effort on magnetohydrodynamics, are "very active," he said.

One problem that should be weighed, in terms of its ethical and political considerations, Dr. Branscomb added, is giving the Soviet Union preferential access to American technology

"when the developing nations are clamoring for that preference on the basis of need rather than strategic power."

The recent agreement with Saudi Arabia on technology transfer was cited as another example of the new demands being made on American policy makers.

Dr. Branscomb expressed hope that the appointment of Dr. Dixy Lee Ray to head of the new Bureau of Oceans, Fisheries and Scientific Affairs in the State Department "will expand the traditionally limited scientific and technical input to foreign policy."

LONDON OBSERVER
19 Jan. 1975

Saturn sneaks back

from our own
Correspondent

Bonn, 11 January

PROFESSOR Heinz Caminci, head of the West German Space Observatory at Bochum, said today he estimated that the wreckage of the Saturn rocket that took Skylab into space in 1973 had plunged into the Straits of Mozambique between Madagascar and Mozambique—a 1,000-mile track of Indian Ocean, 300 miles wide at its narrowest point.

He said it was possible that a 34-ton section of rocket had split into chunks of debris weighing up to two tons before impact, which he timed at about 6.45 GMT today.

"NSA officials must have had sweat on their brows during this past night," he said. "Saturn passed over Los Angeles, Chicago and Quebec, travelling at 270 metres a second. It's easy to imagine the terrible catastrophe it could have caused."

Considering the vast store of technical know-how at the fingertips of NASA, it is unbelievable that the Americans took such a terrifying risk. It would have been simple to fit Saturn with a self-destructing mechanism. The events of this past night have been a technological anachronism.

Professor Caminci said he had set up a "telephone university" during the night—a European network of private space trackers who kept a vigil on Saturn.

"We have had more than 2,000 telephone calls during the night, most of them from people who were just scared and could not sleep."

US space officials said they believed re-entry took place somewhere over an area stretching from the Azores in the Atlantic across the whole of Africa to the Indian Ocean, but they are unable to pinpoint the spot.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1975

Commemorating the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

Apropos of the recent scrutiny of the C.I.A. and of the eagerness of the Soviet press to exploit the issue by suggesting that it be brought up at the Geneva talks, I enclose a stamp which was issued in 1967 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Secret Service CHEKA 1917-K.G.B. 1967.

The Russians must be very proud of their Secret Service to have publicized so widely its golden anniversary. I wonder what the reaction of this country and the world would be if in 1977 the U.S. Post Office issues a stamp portraying Henry Kissinger to commemorate thirty years of C.I.A. Would some of our letters mailed abroad be returned for "Postage Non Grata"?

C. A. LASCARIS

Virginia Beach, Va., Jan. 13, 1975

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 1975

Threat of Force Serves as U.S. Weapon

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19—Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger have attracted considerable attention in recent weeks by their refusal to rule out the possibility that under certain direct circumstances the Ford Administration might use military force in the Middle East or Vietnam.

Of the two officials, Mr. Kissinger, with his comment to a Business Week interviewer about the hypothetical use of force in case the Western world was undergoing "actual strangulation," touched off the larger controversy.

In the Arab world, in particular, the radical press distorted Mr. Kissinger's remarks to make it appear as if United States Marines were about to land. And French television added to some European jumpiness by filming a marine landing exercise on Sardinia and suggesting that it was connected with Mr. Kissinger's statement.

In the Business Week interview, the questioner asked:

"One of the things we also hear from businessmen is that in the long run the only answer to the oil cartel is some sort of military action. Have you considered military action on oil?"

'A Very Dangerous Course'

Mr. Kissinger asked: "Military action on oil prices?"

"Yes," was the answer. Then followed Mr. Kissinger's controversial response:

"A very dangerous course. We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstances where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price, it's another where there is some actual strangulation of the industrialized world."

Mr. Kissinger said later, "I was astonished when this was seized upon."

"No nation can announce that it will let itself be strangled without reacting," he said on public television, "and I find it very difficult to see what it is that people are objecting to."

"We are saying the United States will not permit itself or its allies to be strangled," he said. "Somebody else would have to make the first move to attempt the strangulation. It isn't being attempted now."

Further Qualification

He said, in what he plainly hoped would be his last word on the subject:

"There would have to be an

overt move of an extremely drastic, dramatic and aggressive nature before this contingency could ever be considered."

In the weeks since the Business Week interview, despite the controversy, neither Mr. Kissinger nor any of his top aides have expressed regret about the "strangulation" remark. They have been irritated by some of the published commentaries, but Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues seem to believe that despite the outcry, the remarks may in the long run benefit the United States.

In their view, the moderate forces in the Middle East will be able to utilize the interview to caution the more radical forces to act with restraint in oil matters or run the risk of possible American intervention.

This interpretation is disputable. The radicals could point to Mr. Kissinger's remark and argue that it made no sense to show goodwill to the United States since Washington would be motivated by its own "imperialist" interests in the long run.

Mr. Kissinger believes that in the Middle East a major struggle has been going on between the moderates and the radicals and that the more weak and servile the western world appears to be to the oil producers, the more likely the radicals will prevail in driving up prices and demands.

'Signal' Evidently Not Intended

The "strangulation" remark apparently flowed from Mr. Kissinger's own philosophy and not from any high-level decision to send a "signal" to the Middle East.

Mr. Kissinger and his aides have expressed amusement at

speculation that Washington is looking for some opportune moment to drop a verbal bomb on the oil producers. They stressed that Mr. Kissinger's remarks were an "honest answer" to a question that suggested that the Administration was too soft toward the producers.

But once having left open the military option, the Administration did decide at the highest level not to close it.

President Ford endorsed Mr. Kissinger's "hypothetical" remarks in a subsequent Time magazine interview, and Mr. Schlesinger said at a new conference that Mr. Kissinger "has indicated very clearly that in the gravest emergency the United States would be prepared to have recourse to force, or would consider recourse to force under those circumstances."

Mr. Schlesinger also refused to rule out American use of force in Vietnam, even though by law the United States is barred from reintroducing military combat forces in Indochina.

Intentions Kept Unclear

Just as Mr. Kissinger believed it would damage American interests to rule out all military options in the Middle East, Mr. Schlesinger clearly viewed it important to keep Hanoi worried about a reintroduction of American force.

He said, in answer to a question about North Vietnamese motivations, that he did not believe Hanoi planned an all-out offensive in South Vietnam comparable to the countryside attacks of 1968 and 1972. One of the reasons he gave was his belief that North Vietnam was concerned about possible American re-entry into the conflict if an offensive occurred.

"I think that the North Viet-

namese continue to have an abiding respect for American power, that they do not discount American power, and that they are reluctant to take those steps that they fear might conceivably lead to a reintroduction of American power," he said.

U. S. Opinion Called 'Volatile'

When a newsman asked whether he really believed Hanoi was still concerned about American intervention, given the Congressional ban on American combat forces in Indochina, the Defense Secretary replied:

"American opinion, indeed, is volatile. American opinion, historically, has reacted in anger to outright aggression, unprovoked massive attacks. Hanoi still recognizes that were a massive invasion of the type of 1972 to occur, that the President has the power to approach the Congress and the Congress under those circumstances might well authorize the use of American force."

At the moment, Congressional opinion seems sharply opposed to any introduction of American forces in the area and most observers believe the Administration will have great difficulty even in obtaining the additional funds it wants for South Vietnam and Cambodia.

American officials acknowledge that both hypothetical situations—the use of force in oil production areas and the use of American combat forces in Indochina—are hardly likely to come about. But by dangling the possibility before the radical oil producers and Hanoi's leaders, the Administration hopes to achieve its objectives short of actual use of force.

WASHINGTON POST
20 January 1975

Carl F. Salans

The Trade Tie-Up

The fate of the Soviet-American trade agreement of 1972 is a useful reminder in this post-Watergate era of the sound principle that the President and not the Congress must conduct the foreign policy of the United States. It is also an illustration of the failure of the Congress itself to recognize that it possesses broad constitutional powers through the wise exercise of which it can play its legitimate foreign policy role without unnecessarily tying the President's hands.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement was not a treaty submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Nevertheless, as a matter of constitutional

law, the President required congressional authorization in order to carry out one of the essential provisions of the agreement, namely, to grant most-favored-nation status — or equal tariff treatment — to the Soviet Union.

In granting the President this authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment to the U.S.S.R., the Congress attached conditions, despite the fact that the agreement itself quite explicitly called for the unconditional extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment by each party to the other. In so doing, the Congress provided the Soviets with an unchallengeable legal excuse for withholding their approval

of the agreement.

The conditions which the Congress attached had a perfectly laudable, humanitarian objective: to liberalize Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. But this objective could have been achieved without writing into the trade legislation conditions which violated the terms of the trade agreement.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had apparently worked out a formula with the Russians last October whereby they gave assurances that Soviet emigration policy would be liberalized once the trade agreement became effective. From the Soviet standpoint, these unilateral assurances did not amount to an agreement. For the Soviets could not admit that Jewish emigration, which they considered to be a purely internal affair, could properly be a subject of international agreement any more than the U.S. has been willing to admit that domestic treatment of minority groups in the United States is a proper subject of international treaty. Yet, on the basis of these unilateral "assurances" given

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1975

Merchants of Death

Millions of words have been written in the past three decades about the dangers of nuclear war and rightly so. But the arms that have killed more than ten million human beings since World War II have all been conventional weapons. Most of them have been obtained through an international arms trade that makes Basil Zaharoff and the other "merchants of death" of an earlier era look like peanut vendors.

The United States unfortunately leads the world in arms sales, which the oil billions of the Arab states and the oil-payments deficits of the arms-producing industrial nations are turning into perhaps the world's fastest growing commerce.

The recent contract for \$750 million with Saudi Arabia for sixty American F-5 jet fighters and the training of pilots is unique, however. It carries the United States a long way toward becoming a large-scale supplier of both sides in both of the Mideast's main arms races, that between Arabs and Israelis and that between Iran and the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.

In the year ended last June, American arms sales abroad more than doubled to \$8.5 billion. Almost \$7-billion of that was for the volatile Middle East, with Iran alone getting \$4 billion on top of \$2 billion the year before. Apart from \$1.5 billion of arms grants to Israel during and after the October 1973 war, gift arms in recent years have been reduced sharply by Congressional opposition to the arms trade. But cash sales now have soared far above the levels of arms aid the Congress found objectionable.

The irony is that arms gifts were under the control of Congress. Cash arms sales are not as yet. Arms gifts went primarily to allies and were designed to advance foreign policy interests or the security of the United States. The current level of arms sales appears to be unrelated to any coherent policy at all, despite what President Ford said at his press conference. Decisions appear to be made on an ad hoc basis without overall plan or high-level policy review.

The predominant factor in the booming business seems to be a directive by President Nixon on Dec. 20, 1973, creating an interdepartmental committee to spur exports, including arms sales, for balance-of-payments reasons. The rationale evidently was that if the United

Mr. Salans, an international attorney in Paris, is a former deputy counsel to the State Department.

by the Russians, the United States had an "understanding" of what the Soviets would do on the emigration question, and this understanding was conveyed in writing by Kissinger to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) last October. It is usually part of such understandings that they should not be made public, and that if they are, their existence will be denied. This common diplomatic technique can often prove more effective and reliable than signed commitments.

If the matter had been left at that point, the Congress could have passed the trade legislation without attaching conditions and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement would have entered into force. The agreement had a duration of only three years. Had the Russians not lived up to their assurances or the understanding during this period, Congress would have had it in its power to enact legislation withdrawing the Pres-

ident's authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union as it had done in 1951. The President would then have been required to terminate it, and the trade agreement simply would not have been renewed. Moreover, the Soviet Union would have a vested interest after three years of most-favored-nation status to retain its tariff benefits by continuing a liberalized emigration policy. Thus Congress' attachment of conditions was a futile and unnecessary act, since the Congress always has the constitutional power to withdraw the tariff treatment from the Soviets if it is not satisfied with Soviet emigration policy.

The trade agreement is not necessarily dead. If the new Congress recognizes its inherent constitutional authority, it can withdraw its conditions without in any measure giving up these constitutional prerogatives.

In the meantime, one can only hope that neither detente nor Jewish emigration will suffer. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must now show sufficient restraint and wisdom to preserve a favorable climate for continued commercial relations and for corrective action by the new Congress to permit the entry into force of the trade agreement.

States did not sell arms, other nations would.

But there obviously are other factors. The armed services have always been interested in foreign purchases that, by increasing the production run, reduce the per-weapon cost for the Pentagon's budget. American arms companies, when unrestrained by Government policy, naturally will sell for profit to any buyer.

When prospective buyers have the kind of cash the oil-producing countries now possess, extraordinary results follow. Perhaps the most extraordinary is the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the sale to Iran of some of the nation's most advanced weapons—such as the Navy's new F-14 jet fighter—simultaneously with their introduction into the American armed forces.

The arms trade is no longer simply a hand-me-down business for getting rid of obsolete, second-hand weapons. The Soviet Union has supplied Syria with MIG-23 swing-wing interceptors before providing them to its Communist allies in Europe. France and Britain are seeking foreign orders not only to help oil payments, but to help their defense industries survive. France now exports more than half of its aerospace output.

After the 1967 war, the United States repeatedly sought Soviet agreement to limit arms sales to Israel and its Arab neighbors and Moscow always refused. In the Persian Gulf, it is the United States—through its enormous arms sales to Iran's Shah, who talks openly of reviving the glory of Persia's ancient empire—that has spurred a multinational arms race. Soviet arms sales to Iraq helped trigger the Shah's action. Now, even the tiniest of sheikdoms is acquiring jet fighters.

In theory, American influence for peace can be stronger with countries dependent on American—rather than Soviet—arms and a flow of American spare parts and ammunition. But Soviet arms transfers now appear to be running at half or less of the American level, with those of France and Britain still further behind.

Control and limitation of arms transfers to the developing countries—and especially to the tinderbox area of the Middle East—will not be easily achieved. But it will not be achieved at all if the United States abandons moral leadership by becoming the leader in arms sales. In view of the apparent indifference of the Ford Administration to this dirty business, Congressional action to revive an American policy of restraint and leadership by example is an urgent necessity.

WASHINGTON POST
19 January 1975

Jack Anderson

'Whatever the Shah Wants, the Shah Gets'

The Shah of Iran, driven by dreams of power, has been baiting the U.S. He led the charge for higher petroleum prices. He made public cracks against the U.S. Now he is upsetting the power balance in the Middle East, with a sudden tilt toward the Arabs.

This behavior should have caused a strain in Iranian-American relations. Yet strangely, the Shah's ties to Washington are as strong as ever.

Sources with access to the secret cable traffic tell us that the State Department has had advance notice of every move the Shah has made, including his clamor for oil price increases and his defection to the Arabs.

Yet not a cross word has appeared in the diplomatic exchanges between Washington and Teheran, not the slightest hint that the U.S. disapproves. Indeed, sometimes the language in U.S. cables is positively lyrical.

Some time ago, for example, the State Department notified the U.S. embassy that Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) would visit Teheran as part of a Middle East study. Back came this euphoric, classified cable: "Embassy is delighted Congressman Gilman is including Iran in forthcoming study mission and looks forward to welcoming him to this friendly and progressive country of considerable strategic importance to U.S."

We have been shown other embassy cables, which stress "how firm a friend Iran is to the U.S." and how lovable the Iranian leaders are, from the Shah on down. A close personal relationship has grown up, according to our sources, between the Shah and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They constantly send warm messages to one another, our sources say. Kissinger also gives the Shah thorough briefings on his most sensitive negotiations, including his dealings with Communist China. These briefings are far more detailed, we are told, than those accorded other world leaders.

The U.S. is also supplying the Shah with the military hardware to fortify his empire and dominate the Persian Gulf. This has enormous strategic significance, since most of the crude that flows out of the oil shiekhdoms must be shipped through the gulf.

In the past two years alone, some \$6 billion worth of military equipment has been sold to the Shah. The sheer volume, some Pentagon people have complained, threatens to deplete Amer-

ican resources.

Hundreds of U.S. specialists have also been dispatched to Teheran to advise the Iranians on military matters. In fact, the General Accounting Office has been moved to warn that the "extensive sale of United States military skills (to Iran) could adversely affect the readiness/status of U.S. forces." The "technical skills sold to Iran," declared the GAO, are in "critically short supply in the United States military units."

Yet the watchword in the Pentagon, say our sources, is that "whatever the Shah wants, the Shah gets."

Behind the curious American love affair with the Shah is the shadowy presence of the Central Intelligence Agency. The story goes back to the early 1950s when the dashing, young playboy emperor was ingloriously ousted by Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.

Our sources say the Shah had actually fled the country when the CIA intercepted him, brought him back and restored him to power. The CIA engineered the coup that overthrew the moody Mossadegh.

The Shah and the CIA have lived happily together ever after. He has permitted the CIA to set up its sophisticated, high-powered electronic equipment, including telemetry interceptors and long-range radar devices, in Iran—all the better to monitor the activities of Iran's great neighbor to the north, the Soviet Union.

The CIA is so close to the Shah, according to our sources, that he has actually funded CIA projects when its budget has run dry. Even the Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms, is a former CIA director. Probably no other ruler in the world would welcome a spy chief as the American ambassador.

The previous ambassador, Joseph Farland, was abruptly removed from Teheran, incidentally, to make way for Helms. Farland had scarcely settled in the embassy when he was ordered out. His departure was so "emotional," according to our sources, that he was moved to tears.

Yet it turned out he wasn't being sacked at all; in fact, the White House

tried to placate him by offering him his choice of four other ambassadorships. Quite obviously, Washington simply wanted the former CIA chief in Iran.

Why? Why does Washington back an emperor who openly thumbs his nose at the U.S.? Why didn't the U.S. try to stop the Shah's oil extortion? What games are Henry Kissinger and the Shah playing in the Middle East? Here are the best answers we could find:

- A Cabinet member, who asked not to be identified, said the U.S. does not condone the oil extortion and would like the Shah to reduce oil prices. But Kissinger, according to this Cabinet source, believes it is more important to have a powerful and trustworthy ally in the strategic Middle East.

- Another key official said Kissinger wants a Middle East ally, without the umbilical cord showing. Through an independent Shah, the official suggested, Kissinger can manipulate events behind the scenes. "It's a put-up job," said the source.

- It was at American request, according to CIA sources, that the Shah sent troops to help Oman battle leftist insurgents. If unfriendly forces should seize Oman, it could jeopardize free passage through the narrow Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The Shah is also helping the Kurds, with U.S. encouragement, in their struggle for independence from Iraq.

- Some sources, including one at the Cabinet level, suggested that the Shah's overtures to the Arabs may be part of an international squeeze play to persuade Israel to make the concessions Kissinger needs to secure a Middle East settlement. In the past, Iran has been a secret ally of Israel, supplying 40 per cent of Israel's oil. Their secret services, Israel's Shin Bet and Iran's SAVAK, have worked closely together. But not long ago, Iran's secret police chief spent a week in Cairo consulting with his Egyptian counterparts, and Iran suddenly has started taking the Arab side in the Middle East maneuvering. The real purpose, some sources suggest, may be to force a settlement out of Israel.

Meanwhile, one high official told us, with a sly smile: "It's true that the Shah is a tyrant, but he's *our* tyrant."

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Western Europe

TAGESANZEIGER 6 Nov 74 Bern

Werner Herzog

IS SPAIN THE CIA OPERATIONS CENTER FOR SOUTHERN EUROPE?

[Text] Madrid 5 November. It can be concluded from confidential information and investigations in Spain, Portugal and the United States that the American secret service wants to make Spain an intelligence center for the "endangered zone" of Southern Europe. More than 200 CIA agents are said to have arrived in the Iberian peninsula during the past few months. Americans believe that the security of Southern Europe and of the Mediterranean is at stake.

The Iberian and the American press have published in the past few days various details about the CIA presence in Spain and Portugal, and the Madrid newspaper "CAMBIO 16" now has taken up the subject in a more extensive inquiry. The results confirm the statements of other press organs. Although the CIA is denying any activity in the Iberian peninsula, it is estimated that more than 200 of its agents have arrived in Spain and Portugal this year. High military authorities in Lisbon reported a week ago that more than 100 CIA-men are in Lisbon at present. We learned from the embassy in Washington that visa applications by American government officials for staying permits in Spain have tripled since last May.

Turntable Madrid?

The first statements about CIA intentions were made by the American TV reporter Daniel Schorr. According to Schorr, who had received his information from Kissinger's assistant Eagleburger, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the oil-producing Arabian Mediterranean countries are at the top of the CIA's list of priorities. The probable center of the action is said to be in Spain. "CAMBIO 16" also reported about the visit of CIA deputy director Vernon Walters in Lisbon and of his two recent visits in Madrid. Walters is said to have traveled at Kissinger's order and to have collected information about the situation in Portugal and Spain, and especially about the activity of the communist parties in the two countries. According to various sources, Kissinger distrusted the reports of his ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon, who described the situation as "harmless."

The target of the CIA's "Iberian action" (the organization has 16,500 employees and an annual budget of 2.25 billion francs) seems to be exclusively concerned with the procurement and evaluation of intelligence. According to "CAMBIO 16," Latin-American journalists working in Spain are part of this information net.

The origin of the American concern are the activities and the success of Portugal's communist party. Kissinger and also the CIA are said to be convinced of the "danger of infection" to Spain by Portugal. The US is especially distrustful of the communist party secretary Cunhal and his appeasing and prudent tactics.

Cunhal promised the cooperation of his party in the economic reconstruction of Portugal and the consideration of the democratic rules of the game. At the CP Congress of 20 October, he eliminated the formulation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from the party program. Cunhal is acting in this manner within the strategy of the West European communist parties. The latter are trying to assume power with the aid of alliances (even with leftist Catholic circles) and via the road of the people's front. This policy of the "open hands" corresponds to the reasoning that a revolutionary "solution"

is no longer possible in the highly developed countries of Western Europe, and that power can be achieved only by democratic means.

The fact that Cunhal is part of the Portuguese government is complicating the role of the country in NATO. In the past, NATO gave secret nuclear information to all governments of the member countries. However, Washington now seems to have decided to exclude Portugal from this information. A session of the Atomic Committee in Brussels was postponed. The deputy of the Defense Ministry, Minister Vito Alves, will participate in the annual session of NATO in London. The results of this session are awaited with great interest.

One reason for the concentration of CIA action in Spain is said to be the possible support of the American military bases in the country. The treaties concerning these bases (the airfields of Torrejon near Madrid and Moron near Seville and the nuclear fleet base Rota near Cadiz) are expiring at the end of November 1975. On Monday, the "roving ambassador" McCloskey arrived in Madrid for discussions concerning the extension of these treaties. According to present information, it was reported that only military aspects are being discussed during the present negotiations at the Madrid Foreign Office. Spain and Portugal will try to make use of the concern of the United States about the future of its bases in the Iberian peninsula (the US air-base Lajes in the Azores) by making corresponding demands also in the economic and technical domain. Both governments have already promised their continued collaboration.

Ist Spanien CIA-Operationszentrum für Südeuropa?

Von unserem Mitarbeiter Werner Herzog

Madrid, 5. Nov. Aus vertraulichen Informationen und Untersuchungen in Spanien, Portugal und den Vereinigten Staaten ist zu schliessen, dass der amerikanische Geheimdienst Spanien zu einem Informationszentrum für die «gefährdete Zone» Südeuropa machen will. Ueber 200 CIA-Agenten sollen in den letzten Monaten in die Iberische Halbinsel eingeleitet sein. Auf dem Spiel steht nach amerikanischer Ansicht die Sicherheit Südeuropas und des Mittelmeers.

Nachdem in den letzten Tagen die iberische und die amerikanische Presse vereinzelte Details über die CIA-Präsenz in Spanien und Portugal veröffentlicht hatte, griff die Madrider Zeitschrift «Cambio 16» das Thema in einer grösseren Untersuchung auf. Die Ergebnisse bestätigten die Äusserungen anderer Presseorgane. Obwohl die CIA jegliche Aktivität auf der Iberischen Halbinsel bestreitet, wird geschätzt, dass über 200 ihrer Agenten dieses Jahr nach Spanien und Portugal eingereist sind. Vor einer Woche meldeten hohe Militärstellen in Lissabon, dass sich momentan über 100 CIA-Leute in Portugal befänden. Aus der spanischen Botschaft in Washington war zu erfahren, dass sich die Visaanträge für Spanienaufenthalte von amerikanischen Regierungsbeamten seit dem Monat Mai verdreifacht hätten.

Drehscheibe Madrid?

Die ersten Erklärungen über die CIA-Absichten hatte der amerikanische Fernsehreporter Daniel Schorr abgegeben. Portugal, Spanien, Italien, Griechenland und die ölfördernden arabischen Mittelmeerländer stehen nach Schorr, der seine Information von Kissingers Mitarbeiter Eagleburger erhalten hatte, zuoberst auf der Prioritätenliste der CIA. Das wahrscheinliche Zentrum der Aktionen sei Spanien. «Cambio 16» berichtete auch über den Besuch von CIA-Subdirektor Vernon Walters in Lissabon und seine zwei kürzlich erfolgten Visiten in Madrid. Walters soll im Auftrag Kissingers gereist sein und Informationen über die Lage in Portugal und Spanien und speziell

über die Tätigkeit der kommunistischen Parteien in den beiden Ländern gesammelt haben. Kissinger misstraute nach verschiedenen Quellen den «verharmlosenden» Berichten seiner Botschafter in Madrid und Lissabon.

Ziel der «iberischen Aktion» der CIA (die Organisation beschäftigt 16 500 Angestellte und verfügt über ein Jahresbudget von 2,25 Mrd. Fr.) scheint ausschliesslich die Nachrichtenbeschaffung und -auswertung zu sein. Zum Informationsnetz sollen laut «Cambio 16» in Spanien tätige lateinamerikanische Journalisten gehören.

Ursprung der amerikanischen Besorgnis sind die Tätigkeit und der Erfolg der Kommunistischen Partei Portugals. Kissinger und auch CIA-Leute sollen von der «Gefahr der Ansteckung» Spaniens durch Portugal überzeugt sein. Besonderes Misstrauen hegen die USA gegen KP-Sekretär Alvaro Cunhal und dessen beschwichtigende und vorsichtige Taktik.

Cunhal versprach die Mitarbeit seiner Partei am wirtschaftlichen Aufbau Portugals und die Beachtung der demokratischen Spielregeln. Am KP-Kongress vom 20. Oktober strich er die Formulierung der kommunistischen «Diktatur des Proletariats» aus dem Parteiprogramm. Cunhal handelt damit innerhalb der Strategie der westeuropäischen kommunistischen Parteien. Mit Allianzen (sogar mit Linkskatholiken) und über den Weg der Volksfront trachten diese an die Macht zu kommen. Diese Politik der «offenen Hand» entspricht der Einsicht, dass in den stark entwickelten Ländern Westeuropas eine revolutionäre «Lösung» nicht

mehr möglich ist und die Macht nur auf demokratische Weise erreicht werden kann.

Die Tatsache, dass Cunhal in der portugiesischen Regierung sitzt, kompliziert überdies die Rolle des Landes in der Nato. Bisher gab die Nato nukleare Geheiminformationen an alle Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten ab. Washington scheint nun aber entschlossen zu sein, Portugal von diesen Informationen auszuschliessen. Eine erste Sitzung der atomaren Kommission in Brüssel wurde verschoben. An der Jahressitzung der Nato in London wird der portugiesische Beauftragte des Verteidigungsministeriums, Minister Vitor Alves, teilnehmen. Die Resultate dieser Sitzung werden mit Spannung erwartet.

Ein Grund zur Konzentration der CIA-Aktionen in Spanien soll die mögliche Unterstützung durch die amerikanischen Militärbasen im Land sein. Die Verträge dieser Basen (Flugplätze Torrejon bei Madrid und Moron bei Sevilla und der nukleare Flottenstützpunkt Rota bei Cadiz) laufen Ende November 1975 ab. Am Montag ist der «fliegende Botschafter» McCloskey zu Diskussionen um die Verlängerung dieser Verträge in Madrid eingetroffen. Nach bisherigen Informationen verlautete, dass bei den jetzigen Verhandlungen im Madrider Aussenministerium rein militärische Aspekte im Vordergrund stehen. Die Besorgnis der Vereinigten Staaten über die Zukunft ihrer Stützpunkte auf der Iberischen Halbinsel werden Spanien und Portugal (US-Luftstützpunkt Laies auf den Azoren) mit entsprechenden Forderungen auch auf wirtschaftlichem und technischem Gebiet zu nutzen versuchen; beide Regierungen haben ihre weitere Kollaboration bereits zugesagt.

East Asia

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 January 1975

Vietnam: the end at hand?

By Allan E. Goodman

Salmon
I arrived in South Vietnam on the eve of the loss of Phuoc Long province to the human-wave assaults of the North Vietnamese Army. After two weeks of interviews here I have never been more depressed about the nation's future.

There is for the first time in government and political circles a realization that the boundary between a Communist and non-Communist Vietnam is shifting from the 17th parallel to the entire western border of South Vietnam and the strips of land from that border to the coast in the Quang Tin and Phuoc Long-Binh Tuy areas. As one Vietnamese friend put it during the course of two weeks of interviews here, "The end is at hand."

Accommodation — once thought by many, including this writer, as a way to shift the conflict from the military to the political arena and also opposed by many as a sellout when victory was around the corner — is now the single word most commonly used by religious and political leaders to describe what they regard as the only strategy left for dealing with the Communists. But, where it used to mean "live and let live" and referred to cease-fire arrangements made between local Army commanders and religious leaders with the Communists, it now means adaptation.

A Roman Catholic priest, for example, speaks of the need for the religion to prepare its followers for all possibilities. He points to the fact that some one million Catholics practice the religion in North Vietnam. He says it is an encouraging sign that "if the Communists take over and since we have no place else to go we can learn to live with the Communists."

Such comments are beginning to be voiced by groups and personalities long noted for their stern anticommunism. Behind this new perspective is the hope that the social and political complexity of the South will result in something less than a complete Communist takeover.

The loss of Phuoc Long province thus symbolized a turn for the worst and contrasts sharply with the impact of the loss of Quang Tri province some two and a half years ago. As one Vietnamese friend put it, "When Quang Tri fell, Thieu fired the generals responsible and the government made immediate plans to launch a counteroffensive. But when Phuoc

Long fell, no one was fired, no counteroffensive was started, and three days of mourning were ordered by the government. You mourn for something that is permanently lost."

At least after Quang Tri, the Vietnamese people had the option of seeking a cease-fire. But the past two years have proved that a cease-fire is a long way off and that the war will continue to be fought to achieve a stalemate, the only basis for any truly effective cease-fire. A wide circle of government officials expect, consequently, that more territory will be lost to the Communists and that the fighting will continue at the current level at least until the end of 1975.

Despite the ominous developments of the past few weeks, the United States commitment is being liquidated. One Defense Department economist estimated, for example, that even if Saigon received the amount of assistance programmed over the next two years when that figure is adjusted for inflation, the decline is startling.

All this lends new credibility to the scenario most critics of the war have long predicted: a gradual collapse of the government and the Army. Using military pressure to accelerate the process, however, the Communists still appear to be counting on the growing opposition to the government and the debilitating effect of corruption to deliver the final blow.

And so, more tragedy is still ahead for the Vietnamese. Having at last created an anti-Communist South Vietnam, the U.S. may now abandon those for whom the war was fought. When some months ago Henry Kissinger spoke of a moral commitment to Vietnam, he discovered that many Americans had instead a moral repugnance for what has happened here.

But that reaction will pale when most Americans realize that having failed to win the war for the Vietnamese in the '60s, Washington has failed in its efforts to assist this long-suffering people to find peace in the '70s. For the South Vietnamese still do not regard a Communist takeover as the peace they had hoped to achieve. But the South Vietnamese are quickly becoming a people without hope.

Mr. Goodman is with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1975

Vietnam, '63 and Now

By Mieczyslaw Maneli

The writer headed the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964. In 1968, the Government dismissed him as professor of law at Warsaw University. He is now professor of political science at Queens College of the City University of New York.

Two years have elapsed since the Vietnam agreement and protocols were signed and "peace" was announced.

More than ten years ago, I participated in various behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations. Now that emotions surrounding the conflict have flared up once more, it might be interesting to consider what the Western world could have achieved in Vietnam and compare that with the new reality following the war.

In the spring of 1963, I was secretly asked by President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, the secret-police Ngo Dinh Nhu, through Roger Lalouette, the French Ambassador to Saigon, to approach the Government in Hanoi in order to explore the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the struggle.

During the subsequent months, I had many wide-ranging discussions with the highest North Vietnamese officials, including President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong. The basic question was this: In case of American withdrawal, what kind of real guarantees could be given by them that a united Vietnam would not merely become one more partner in the Communist bloc?

To resolve this problem, the North Vietnamese leaders were slowly developing plans, which I discussed with a group of Western ambassadors.

Under the plans, North and South Vietnam could slowly develop postal, economic and cultural relations. Northern industrial goods would be paid for by the South with its rice.

Also, the North would not press for a speedy reunification, but instead a coalition government would be set up in the South. I asked if such a government could be headed by Mr. Diem. In the summer of 1963 the answer was finally yes.

Hanoi had always sought neutralization of the South. As for the North, both Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong were reluctant to accept the label "neutralization," but were eager to accept the idea. North Vietnam would not become an aggressive outpost against other countries, and neither Soviet nor Chinese troops would under any conditions be allowed on Vietnamese soil.

I pursued the matter further: What guarantees could be offered to the

West that Hanoi would keep its word? I stressed that the West would not be amused by a new game called "the international commission." The answer was that in case of a United States withdrawal the North would be prepared to give all kinds of substantial guarantees and American participation in the supervisory process was not excluded.

At the time, I knew about strained relations between Hanoi and both Moscow and Peking; further, Hanoi's leaders wanted to preserve and widen their small margin of independence from their powerful allies, whom they hated and feared.

They were willing to accept a negotiated agreement whose result would not have been worse for the West than the one in 1973; Vietnam would have been divided into two parts, with free commercial and cultural intercommunication between them.

This unstable situation would have

been guaranteed by rivalry between the Soviet Union and China, and North Vietnamese animosity toward those countries, and Cambodian neutrality, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk's strong anti-Communist tendencies.

Further guarantees would have been the development of Titoist trends in the Eastern bloc, intensified by a new Vietnamese "Titoism"; new political and economic cooperation with Western powers, and last, but by no means least, the American economic and political power that was undiminished by the war.

Today, following ten years of war and two years of "peace," we face problems that existed potentially, or actually, in 1963:

Vietnam is divided into three parts; Hanoi is isolated, being reluctantly supported by its overprotective allies; the Vietcong is attacking; the regime in Saigon is unpopular, attacked anew

by Buddhists, intellectuals and other non-Communist opponents. Saigon's generals fight their private enemies far more effectively than they do the Communists.

In Cambodia, the Government is weaker than it was in 1963; Prince Sihanouk, in exile in Peking, against his inclinations has been pushed further to the left. In Laos, the same tape is being replayed: new shaky coalitions and no hope for the future, while the people remain indifferent—so long as they are not robbed or bombed.

Hegel remarked that all important facts and personages in history occur twice; Marx added that the first occurrence was as tragedy, the second as farce; Sir Francis Bacon in such a situation could only have advised the hapless to pray.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

23 January 1975

South Viet air losses heavy, not replaced

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

The South Vietnamese Air Force has suffered heavy losses in the two years since the Vietnam peace agreement was signed, and the losses are not being replaced, according to Vietnamese military officers.

Because of American assistance, South Vietnam has one of the largest air forces in the world.

But the combat losses, the diversion of American aid funds to items considered more essential than airplanes, and other problems such as a lack of spare parts for many helicopters have reduced the Air Force's effectiveness.

Aircraft losses?

The Saigon government has not been announcing total losses of aircraft, apparently for fear of the effects it would have on armed forces morale. But well-informed military sources say that communist gunners have shot down nearly 300 aircraft of all kinds in the past two years.

The losses were markedly greater in 1974 than they were in 1973, apparently reflecting an increase in the fighting and in Saigon's bombing activities last year. The extension and improvement of the communists' anti-aircraft system in South Vietnam also have undoubtedly contributed to the higher losses.

President Ford has announced that he will ask the U.S. Congress soon for a supplemental \$300 million military aid appropriation for South Vietnam. But informed sources in Saigon say that even if all of the requested

amount is granted by Congress, it will go only into the purchase of "high priority" items such as ammunition and fuel. There will be nothing left, they say, for the replacement of aircraft.

Fighter planes cut

The United States had planned to provide South Vietnam with 128 of the F-5E fighter planes at a cost of about \$200 million. According to military sources, only about 25 of these have been turned over to the South Vietnamese. Plans to deliver more of the fighters have apparently been dropped.

The F-5E was the focus of considerable controversy in the first year after the Vietnam cease-fire was supposed to go into effect. The new plane was to be used to replace the F-5A, which the South Vietnamese had had for some time prior to the peace agreement. Critics pointed out that the supersonic F-5E was faster and better equipped than the F-5A, and argued that this was hardly the one-for-one replacement called for by the peace agreement.

U.S. officials argued that the two planes had the same "configuration" and were therefore interchangeable. Now it appears that the controversy will be laid to rest by budgetary limitations.

Vietnamese Air Force officers reported late last year that they had reduced their fighter-bomber missions by about one-third as a result of congressional cuts in American aid to South Vietnam. The Air Force also

permanently grounded about 70 of its A-1 Skyraider fighter-bombers. Helicopter missions were sharply reduced.

But the overall reductions in air activity have not prevented the Air Force from striking recently in areas which not too long ago seemed to be virtually off limits to air attacks. South Vietnamese pilots last week reported knocking out half of a North Vietnamese convoy of 150 trucks and armored vehicles in the central highlands on a supply route leading out of Laos. Three such raids took place in a single week.

The raids followed an upsurge of communist attacks and fall of the provincial capital of Phuoc Long to the communists early this month.

In Laos, the communist-led Pathet Lao have accused the South Vietnamese of carrying the recent bombing raids into Laotian territory. In South Vietnam, the communists have accused the United States of using its own reconnaissance planes to "guide" South Vietnamese aircraft during the fighting in and around the provincial capital of Phuoc Long.

Whatever the truth of the latter accusation, the South Vietnamese bombing over Phuoc Long did not appear to be very effective. Because of heavy North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire, the South Vietnamese planes were reported to have bombed at altitudes about 10,000 feet. One warplane accidentally dropped its bombs off target, killing more than 40 civilians and government soldiers, according to refugees who escaped from the fighting.

Latin America

Human Events, Washington
4 January 1975

Cuba's DGI: Surrogate for Russia's KGB

By COL. ROBERT D. HEINL JR.

One of the least known yet crucial obstacles to normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States is Fidel Castro's unabated support for violent subversive activities in this country and his all-out operations of Cuban intelligence as a surrogate for Russia's KGB.

Cuba's *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI) is the largest and most modern and certainly most aggressive--national intelligence organization in the Western Hemisphere save for our own CIA.

While the DGI's *modus operandi*, targets and makeup have hitherto been little known save in highly classified intelligence circles, it is now emerging as a main focus and instrument of subversion, terrorism and espionage directly aimed at the U.S. government and American society.

Cuban funds as well as training in advanced terrorist techniques have in recent years supported a range of groups including Weathermen, SDS, Black Panthers, Puerto Rican revolutionaries, American Indian subversive movements, crypto-guerrilla Chicanos and the violent "ELQ" anti-American Quebec separatists in Canada.

Operating through so-called "Venceremos Brigades" of volunteer U.S. cane-cutters traveling to Cuba, Castro controls an extensive network of recruiters for Cuban subversion and intelligence activities.

Among widespread sea-based subversive and intelligence operations Castro still conducts throughout the hemisphere, Cuba maintains a flotilla of fishing boats in the Florida Straits and the approaches to Puerto Rico, to act as staging-points for infiltration and exfiltration of agents via small craft to and from U.S. territory.

The hub of Castro's American operations is the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, located behind a brownstone front at 6 East 67th Street, New York City, a few steps off Third Avenue.

This office, besides nominal diplomatic functions, serves as headquarters for the DGI. Approximately half the Cuban "diplomats" in this mission, including its chief, Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon Quesada, are officials of the DGI and comprise its general staff for U.S. operations.

Since 1970, following victory in an internal power struggle lasting several

years, the DGI has come under Kremlin control. Its director, Russian puppet José Mendes Cominches, is today wholly supervised by Gen. Viktor Semenov, chief KGB officer in Cuba.

During the past four years under intensive Russian tutelage, the DGI, now nearly 3,000 strong, has, in the words of one U.S. specialist, "markedly professionalized and widely internationalized its operations."

The DGI has two main functions in the United States. The first is that of any foreign intelligence agency: diplomatic, military, economic and technical espionage and counterespionage. The second, and in many ways more aggressive and sinister, is to discover and exploit unrest, disloyalty and social weakness throughout this country and where feasible inflame these into subversion, terrorism and violence.

One of the DGI's first major exercises in subversion was support of U.S. black militant organizations. Beginning in 1967, Cuba planted two DGI officers specializing in black movements in the New York U.N. mission. These two arranged entrance to Cuba for American black revolutionaries, for their training in certain of the over 100 Cuban guerrilla-schools and camps, and funded and advised them on return to this country.

In April 1969, unmasked by the FBI, the counselor and first secretary of the Cuban Mission hastily decamped from New York and were declared *persona non grata* for these activities.

Another U.N. Cuban in New York, third secretary Lázaro Espinos Bonet, was also expelled in 1969 when he was discovered in an attempt to ferret out floor plans and security arrangements for President Nixon's Key Biscayne residence, as well as details of the President's Florida travel plans.

Close on the heels of their infiltration of the Black Panthers and other black groups, the Cubans established similar relationships with white terrorist-youth organizations, notably the SDS and Weathermen, representatives of whom have received training in Cuba.

Castro and his DGI enjoy the unique advantage—compared with the KGB—of romantic aura and allure for impressionable young people to whom Fidel and the late Che Guevara are still folk heroes. This is one of the DGI's strongest assets in manipulating youth-dominated radical and terrorist groups.

Castro's pulling power with youth is illustrated in Cuba's exploitation of the Venceremos (Spanish for "We Will Conquer") Brigades, seven of which have been recruited in this country by Cuban agents since November 1969 with aggregate membership of about 2,000. According to intelligence sources, plans are well advanced to recruit an eighth Venceremos group to go illegally, like its predecessors, to Cuba next March.

These brigades—actually more nearly company sized—are nominally supposed to assist Cuba in harvesting sugar cane but are in fact intensive schools of Communist propaganda. Each brigade has a 20-25 person hard-core propaganda and political cadre. Each unit puts in approximately 10 weeks under Castro's control.

Not just anybody can join the "VBs", as U.S. security specialists dub the brigades. Today, there are over a dozen regional Venceremos committees covering the United States. These regional cells screen each applicant, who is required to fill out an exhaustive personal history which then forms the basis for his Cuban and often his KGB dossier.

In addition, he is photographed. Then, if recommended for acceptance, the would-be VB is given a final going-over by the Venceremos National Committee in New York, all of whose members have been chosen and appointed by the DGI.

After acceptance, VB recruits go either to Canada or Mexico, whence, in violation of State Department regulations, they proceed as a contingent to Cuba.

Once arrived, while most cut cane and imbibe propaganda, a chosen handful from each brigade is sent to terrorist or even espionage schooling in remote camps, several of which are known to exist in Oriente Province.

Showing communism's typical concentration on juvenile brainwashing, young American radicals with small children are specially welcomed. These youngsters, usually aged 8-13, are called *Venceremitos* ("Little Conquerors") and are put through special anti-American schooling while their parents work with the brigade.

But the top-priority Cuban terrorist penetration now in progress is the DGI's all-out support for all main and numerous splinter underground Puerto Rican revolutionary groups.

The Puerto Rican separatist "PSP" movement is the main link with Cuba and has offices enjoying diplomatic status in Havana. The DGI has financed, equipped and planned PSP bombings both in San Juan and in New York City.

Because the PSP has cells in such American cities as New York, Chicago, New Haven and Bridgeport, it provides a useful auxiliary for the DGI in both intelligence and terrorist missions in this country as well as in Puerto Rico.

According to FBI sources, some 150 Puerto Rican revolutionary leaders are training in Cuba, while the DGI has spent thousands of dollars distributing sophisticated Cuban manuals on urban terrorism to PSP cells.

Evidence in the hands of security specialists indicates the PSP may well now be mounting a long-planned wave of violence and that the recent simultaneous bombing of five public structures in New York City represent a PSP operation with DGI coaching and direction.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

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U.S. gaffe in Latin America

Some agile hemispheric fence mending is in order in the wake of vehement Latin-American objections to the new U.S. Foreign Trade Act of 1974.

Despite State Department objections, Congress inserted provisions in the act barring oil-rich Venezuela and Ecuador from new trade preferences because of their membership in OPEC.

Twenty Latin-American and Caribbean nations have formally condemned the move as "discriminatory and coercive." Now Argentina has cancelled a special foreign ministers' meeting set for March in Buenos Aires.

This means that upcoming U.S.-Latin-America talks will take place within the framework of the Organization of American States (where the U.S. has less and less clout) rather than in special foreign ministers' meetings as envisioned for the "new dialogue" sought by Dr. Kissinger. This represents a clear setback for the U.S. in Latin America, which has worked hard to build special links to the larger nations in the region as well as offset past complaints of "big-stick diplomacy."

Consequently, Dr. Kissinger is wise in planning to go ahead with a trip into the region before April.

The economic restrictions of the trade act are really but part of a larger Latin-American concern. Although the U.S. has attempted to convince the Latin Americans that the act is to their advantage, the Latins view it as an insensitive political slap at their independence and a callous congressional "indifference" about hemispheric relations.

These Latin-American perceptions should be given serious

What the Cuban activities amount to is, in the words of one U.S. official, that, besides hemispheric misbehavior, "Fidel Castro is waging an undeclared war on the United States which shows no sign of letting up."

Despite widespread reports that Russia has been soft-peddling Castro in an attempt to facilitate U.S. recognition of Cuba, the intensification of DGI operations in and against this country has been largely financed and guided from the Kremlin by the KGB.

Even without Kremlin support, however, Castro has always kept the DGI on the prowl for ways to annoy, hurt and disorganize the United States.

NEW YORK TIMES

24 January 1975

20 Latin Countries Condemn U.S. Trade Act

By DABID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 —

Twenty Latin-American and Caribbean countries today voted condemnation of the new United States trade act as "discriminatory and coercive" in a resolution by the governing body of the Organization of American States.

The United States abstained after failing to persuade the permanent Council of the O.A.S. to remove what it described as unacceptable language.

Several Latin-American delegates said the trade-law issue was serious enough to warrant interrupting the "new hemisphere dialogue" inaugurated last year between Latin America and the United States by Secretary of State Kissinger.

The resolution expressed the organization's "deep concern over the deterioration of inter-American solidarity caused by provisions of the United States foreign trade act of 1974, which in the unanimous opinion of the representatives of the Latin-American countries distort the general system of preferences, establish discriminatory and coercive measure in detriment to the countries of Latin Ameri-

ca [and] run counter to the fundamental provisions of the charter of the O.A.S."

The principal element of controversy in the trade act is a clause barring Venezuela and Ecuador from new tariff preferences because they are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Earlier this month, Venezuela and Ecuador began allying support from other Latin-American governments to oppose the trade act.

Today José María Machín, the Venezuelan delegate to the O.A.S. Permanent Council told Latin-American newsmen that the "coercive" aspects of the law were of such magnitude that it would disturb the "atmosphere" of a scheduled meeting of hemisphere foreign ministers in Buenos Aires in March.

Argentine diplomats disclosed that their Foreign Ministry had begun asking other hemisphere governments whether they considered the March meeting "appropriate" in view of the "climate" created by the trade act.

The vote in the O.A.S. Permanent Council was a setback for the United States, whose representatives had spent the last eight days trying to convince

Latin Americans that the new trade law contained more benefits than restrictions.

The United States delegate, John W. Ford, had pointed out that over 90 per cent of Venezuela's and Ecuador's exports to the United States were already free of tariffs.

Mr. Ford said that the United States abstention today was necessary because the resolution "fails to present a balanced picture of the trade act in its full dimensions."

"Regretably the resolution focuses on certain rigidities without mention of the many positive elements," he said.

The resolution calls for debate on the trade law at the O.A.S. General Assembly here in April, following study by the hemisphere group's secretariat and the inter-American economic and Social Council.

Voting for the resolution were Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Delegates from Bolivia and Haiti were absent.

Were we to recognize Cuba, allow it to open an embassy in Washington and consulates throughout the country, and lift existing 28-mile travel restrictions the State Department imposes on the New York-based Cuban U.N. Mission, the country would be flooded with Cuban agents, both intelligence and subversive.

Since roughly 50 per cent of all Cuban diplomatic personnel abroad are DGI operatives, the bulk of these unwelcome newcomers would enjoy diplomatic immunity, another handicap for our own security and intelligence services and the reason that they, who know Fidel Castro best, look with such misgiving on the idea that Washington and Havana can just kiss and be friends again.

NANA, Detroit News

scrutiny in Washington. Will Venezuela, hitherto a stout friend of the U.S., more and more identify its interests with those of OPEC and the "third world"? Venezuela, it should be remembered, continued to supply U.S. oil needs during the 1973 embargo.

All parties to this dispute, including the U.S. Congress, need to cool tempers and do some rethinking. Fortunately, steps along that line are already evident. Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen has introduced legislation allowing OPEC nations

that did not participate in the oil embargo to be eligible for new tariff provisions.

Meantime, finance and economic ministers will meet in March at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which will be followed by a meeting of foreign ministers at the OAS General Assembly in April. These forums could provide useful occasions to ward off an unnecessary rift between longtime Western Hemisphere neighbors.